Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Jonathan Alford
Abraham Ascher
James Critchlow
Clara M. Lovett
Mary Ellen Fischer

NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1980

WORKERS AND PARTY IN POLAND

Jan B. de Weydenthal

Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan — Zalmay Khalilzad
Soviet Decision-Making and International Relations — Uri Ra'anan
Limits of the Permissible in China — June Teufel Dreyer

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Cover: Polish workers man the picket lines in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk on the night of August 18, 1980. Photo by Lehtikuva/Photoreporters.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Workers and Party in Poland
Jan B. de Weydenthal

The workers' strikes of July-August 1980 have brought substantial changes in Poland, including the emergence of a new party leadership. But the fundamental question remains: How can a lasting accommodation between society and the party, as well as the well-being of the country, be achieved? Efforts to overcome the mutual distrust are a central feature of the party's current efforts to reestablish its authority. Resolution of this question, amid the uncertainties posed by economic difficulties and the threat of Soviet intervention, is crucial to future developments in Poland.

Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan
Zalmay Khalilzad

A year after invading and seizing practical control of the government in Afghanistan, the USSR faces determined opposition from Islamic, tribal, and other partisans. Unable to rebuild a "loyal" Afghan military or to unite Afghans behind the regime of Babrak Karmal, Moscow maintains 85,000 troops in the country. Partisan disunity and Soviet threats to neighboring countries have so far prevented development of a coordinated and well-armed anti-Soviet insurgency.

Soviet Decision-Making and International Relations
Uri Ra'anan

Soviet policy evolves and operates within parameters that differ in essential aspects from the Western political framework. This factor is reflected both in the manner in which the leadership functions and in the criteria that may be applied when international issues are examined.

Limits of the Permissible in China
June Teufel Dreyer

Since 1978, the Chinese leadership has been involved in a major effort to revitalize the Chinese economy. To help stimulate greater productivity on the part of the population, it has drastically revised the standards of permissible behavior. This move has fundamentally altered the balance between toleration of dissent and maintenance of public order.

* * *

Essay-reviews (over)

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Essay-reviews

Soviet Air Power
Jonathan Alford

The Soviet Union may genuinely be convinced that it is only now overcoming the West's technological lead in modern aircraft and space vehicles—and be proud to have accomplished this feat. The West senses the dynamic in the Soviet programs and, finding no obvious slackening in that dynamic, believes that it in turn must continue to invest massively in military aviation to prevent the Soviet Union from rushing ahead.

Lessons of Russian Terrorism
Abraham Ascher

The roots and directions of terrorism are numerous, and the phenemenon can undermine a political system, as the history of Russian radicalism demonstrates. However, history shows that if governments act firmly without overstepping the bounds of legality and decency, terrorism can be defeated in countries with a reasonably stable social order.

Uzbek Studies and Uzbekistan
James Critchlow

Social scientists in Uzbekistan have shown surprising interest in research on their country by what they call "bourgeois falsifiers" in the West. Extensive citations of "erroneous" Western studies often serve to project the views of an emerging modern Uzbek national intelligentsia on Soviet domestic political issues. Over the longer term, one may see the development of a critical dialogue between Uzbek and Western scholars in which Moscow's role becomes that of a bystander.

Marxism and Culture in Italy
Clara M. Lovett

Italy-watchers, in focusing on Italy's party and governmental politics, have largely overlooked attempts at the "organization of culture" by the Italian Communist Party and other Marxist groups. Marxist cultural penetration in Italy is highly significant, although observers differ over its precise extent.

Foreign and Domestic Policy Linkage in Romania
Mary Ellen Fischer

Throughout the 1970's, Romanian foreign and domestic policies were not only linked but interdependent. Recent changes in the international setting and increasing domestic difficulties may affect Romania's assertive position in world affairs as the 1980's begin.

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Workers and Party in Poland

By Jan B. de Weydenthal

On July 1, 1980, the government of the Polish People's Republic (PPR) introduced an increase in the price of meat and meat products. A day later, on July 2, the decision was announced publicly, through a nationally broadcast interview with a minor government official. Immediately after the introduction of the price increase, even before the announcement was made, strikes broke out in a number of industrial plants throughout the country. In the aftermath of the announcement, strikes spread to other factories and industrial centers.

Two months later, on August 31, representatives of the workers and the government signed a formal agreement to settle strikes in several hundred separate enterprises in the coastal city of Gdansk and its environs. The signing ceremony was televised live throughout the country. The agreement provided for an acceptance by the government of the establishment by the workers themselves of "new, independent, and self-governing trade unions."[1] It also included an official guarantee that the workers' right to strike would be written into the law, as well as formal assurances on far-reaching economic concessions.

On September 6, less than a week after the signing of the Gdansk agreement, Edward Gierek, veteran leader of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) and its First Secretary since 1970, was abruptly removed from all party executive positions. His dismissal was announced in a terse communique issued by the party Central Committee (CC) following a special meeting during the night of September 5-6: "In connection with the serious illness of Edward Gierek, the Central Committee has relieved him of the functions of First Secretary, Secretary of the Central Committee, and member of the Politburo."[2] Gierek was immediately replaced by Stanislaw Kania, since 1971 the party leader in charge of internal security forces and the army and since 1976 a full member of the party Politburo.

These three separate, but closely related episodes are among the most dramatic moments of what has recently been described by new party leader Kania as "the greatest crisis in the history of People's Poland."[3] They also highlight the profound changes that have taken place in Poland's politics within the last few months, changes that have basically manifested themselves in the emergence of the workers as a major social and political force in the public arena, and in a perceptible decline in the authority and power of the established leadership. Furthermore, as the removal of Gierek indicates, there has been a growing realization within the party itself that a new departure from existing policies and operations is urgently needed.

As a result of these and other fast-moving events, the exercise of power in Poland has become more complex. It has been transformed into a whole range of problems related to the character, conditions, scope, and timing—an important problem in its own right—of political evolution within the system. Furthermore, it must now proceed in what would seem the most precarious of circumstances, in which a solution to the country's continuing economic difficulties appears remote and in which the intentions of the Soviet Union are perhaps the supreme imponderable. Few would doubt that the immediate stakes in Polish

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[1] The text of the agreement was published in *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), Sept. 2, 1980. For an English-language translation, see *August 1980: The Strikes in Poland*, Munich, Radio Free Europe Research, October 1980.

[2] Polish Press Agency (PAP), Sept. 6, 1980.

[3] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Oct. 5, 1980.

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politics have changed greatly in the last few months.

The fundamental question remains, nevertheless, how a lasting accommodation between society and the party, as well as the well-being of the country, can be achieved. As will be seen in the succeeding sections, the mutual distrust between society and the party lies behind many of the developments in the recent strike movement, efforts to restore a modicum of trust are a central feature of the party's current efforts to reestablish its authority, and success in this respect is crucial to any attempts to establish clearly and openly formulated principles for the country's future evolution. As long as this fundamental question remains unresolved, therefore, the prevailing confusion and uncertainty as to the future will grow, and any prospects for stability will diminish.

[4]For a discussion of the role of the workers in Poland's politics, see J.B. de Weydenthal, "Poland: Workers and Politics," in Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati, Eds., *The Favored Class*, London, Allen & Unwin, forthcoming.

The Strikes

Conflicts between the workers and the political authorities in socialist Poland have a history as old as the system itself.[4] Widespread demonstrations of labor unrest, which frequently took the form of strikes, were relatively common during the late 1940's, the formative years of Communist rule in Poland. Since that time, there have been several major outbursts of worker discontent. Each instance was touched off by specific economic grievances on the part of the workers. Each occasion, too, was marked by increasing sophistication and cohesion among the workers. Only within the last 10 years or so, however, has the workers' protest movement begun to act collectively, with

Representatives from more than 400 factories assembled at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk as an Interfactory Strike Committee negotiates with the Polish government in late August 1980.

—Jan Delden-Pressens Bild/Photoreporters.

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explicitly political overtones and with an open concern for general questions of national economic policy.

A major workers' revolt rocked the political system of socialist Poland for the first time in June 1956. Originating in the specific economic demands of workers at a large plant in the city of Poznan, it mushroomed into mass demonstrations after the police attacked the protesters. The brutality of the repression contributed to the emergence of a broad consensus, among both the public and important elements in the party, on the need for reform. Within several months, in October 1956, the old-line party leaders of the Stalinist era were replaced by a new leadership under Wladyslaw Gomulka.

In subsequent years, scattered strikes occasionally broke out in industrial plants throughout Poland. However, they were easily contained by the government through temporary and localized measures of appeasement.

The first major manifestation of a thoroughly politicized workers' protest action was a massive industrial revolt in 1970–71. The event that triggered the workers' protest was an announcement on December 12, 1970, of sweeping increases in the prices of food and fuels. But the revolt was also directed against the entire program of official economic policies, particularly the government's plans to change the system of remuneration and to streamline production through the threat of forced unemployment. The government's attempt to suppress the protesters in Gdansk by force set off a chain reaction of demonstrations and strikes throughout the country. Eventually, the continuing unrest provoked a national political crisis which toppled Gomulka and brought Gierek to power, forced a gradual repeal of the government economic program, and ended only in mid-February 1971 with the cancellation of the price increases.

The next massive demonstration of the workers' continuing resolve to defend their economic interests came in June 1976. The story itself was familiar. Just as it had done in 1970, the government suddenly announced drastic food price increases without so much as an attempt to prepare the public. As then, the government's action provoked an immediate outburst of worker discontent. Within a few hours of the announcement, there were strikes throughout the country, including Gdansk and other cities on the Baltic coast, Warsaw, and other industrial cities. There were also incidents of violence, notably in the city of Radom and at the large Ursus factory near Warsaw. This time, however, the official reaction was swift: less than 24 hours after the government decision had been made public, the price increases were rescinded.

A cross erected by striking workers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk in August 1980 to commemorate fellow workers who died in the December 1970 uprising.

—Lehtikuva/Photoreporters.

In many respects, the June 1976 workers' protest was even more important politically than the revolt of 1970–71. It repeated the earlier workers' success in preventing the implementation of government policies. This, more than anything else, exposed the vulnerability of the system to social pressure. Furthermore, the protest furnished an example of ways in which other social groups could enhance their participation in and influence over the political process. More important still, the workers' success in forcing a reversal of official policies seriously impeded economic decision-making by the government, influenced the general policy orientation of the leadership, and directly contributed to a major decline in its authority.[5]

This loss of authority came at a time when Poland's ambitious growth strategy of the early 1970's was be-

[5] Jan B. de Weydenthal, *Poland: Communism Adrift*, The Washington Papers, No. 72, Beverly Hills, CA, and London, Sage Publications, 1979.

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Polish shoppers in a queue outside a Warsaw meat store in August 1980.

—Marc Bulka and Frances Apesteguy/Gamma-Liaison.

ginning to unravel.[6] External factors were partly responsible, for example, for raising the costs of energy and raw materials imports and for difficulties in increasing exports to the West. At the same time, internal problems—not only the impeding of economic decision-making but also a languishing agricultural sector, the overly ambitious investment schemes of previous years, and sheer economic mismanagement—made it impossible to halt the slide. Toward the end of the 1970's, consequently, the situation had deteriorated to the point where Poland was heavily in debt to the West (more than US$14 billion by the end of 1978)[7] and the economy was shrinking (national income actually fell by about 2 percent in 1979, a development unprecedented in the country's postwar history.)[8]

For the average Pole, the country's economic problems meant a drastic decline in the standard of living. Basic prices for food and housing did not go up, for the government felt constrained not to raise them. But there were chronic shortages of food and consumer products, repeated energy and transportation failures, and increasing inflation—by official admission, more than 8 percent in 1978.[9] In these circumstances, social dissatisfaction grew rapidly.

The long-term political implications of these developments were certainly not lost on the country's leadership. Indeed, owing to the growing realization that any further delay in reasserting its authority could only cause greater decay, the government was moved to take action. The meat price increases of July 1 and their subsequent public announcement were clearly political in intent—meant to affirm the government's capacity to make difficult decisions and stick by them in the face of social opposition.

The basically political meaning of the price in-

[6] For a recent comprehensive survey of Poland's economy, see *Poland 1980: An East European Economic Country Study*, a collection of papers submitted to the US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Sept. 1, 1980.

[7] Roman Stefanowski, "Poland's Western Debt: A Progress Report," *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report 251, Nov. 22, 1978.

[8] Cited by Zbigniew Fallenbuchl in *Poland 1980*, p. 15.

[9] de Weydenthal, *Poland Adrift*, p. 40.

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creases was demonstrated by the elaborate preparations for their introduction. Announcement of the decision was preceded by a long propaganda campaign, in which press articles and statements by political leaders presented the meat price increases as part of a series of comprehensive economic changes aimed at improving efficiency and raising productivity.[10] The increases were to be introduced gradually in different parts of the country, it was claimed, and the eventual profits would be used to improve the lot of the lowest-earning groups in the population.

The political intent was also apparent in the fact that the increase affected only 2 percent of the meat on the market. This increase was to be imposed indirectly, by transfering certain categories of meat and meat products from ordinary shops, which have maintained stable prices since the beginning of the 1970's, to so-called commercial shops, which sell meat at premium prices, usually double the official prices. Set up in 1977, these shops initially handled only 0.5 percent of meat sales; in 1978, this volume grew to 8 percent, and in 1979 to 18 percent.[11] None of these earlier shifts away from ordinary to commercial outlets had been officially and openly announced by the government, and there is no reason to believe that the government could not have shifted additional quantities of meat to the higher-price shops in the same manner. By the same token, such a move would not have had the apparently desired political effect.

Introduction of the price increases triggered an immediate reaction from the workers. The first sporadic work "stoppages," as they were euphemistically called by government officials and the media, took place on the very day that the price changes were implemented. They later spread throughout the country, setting the stage for the growth of a massive strike movement that was to affect the operations of both the government and the party as well as to rock the system over which they presided. This strike movement developed in two distinct stages, in which the pattern and scope of the workers' demands were the key determinants of social strife.[12]

Stage One. The first phase, which extended into mid-August, was characterized by spontaneity. According to the available information, the first strike broke out in several departments of the Ursus plant near Warsaw.[13] Subsequently, strikes occurred throughout the country. No organizational pattern was discernible. In some places, entire working crews joined in; in others, only some of the personnel were involved. There is still little reliable information on the number of individual plants and factories in which strikes took place. But there is every reason to assume that within several weeks of the announcement of the price increases, no large city or important industry was left unaffected by some form of strike action.[14]

The motivation behind the workers' actions was widely reported to have centered on demands for higher wages and/or other forms of benefits to compensate for the increased meat prices.[15] In this respect, the 1980 strike goals sharply differed from those of earlier instances of workers' protest against government policies, such as the 1970–71 and 1976 upheavals. Then, the workers' efforts had centered on preventing the implementation of official decisions. Now, there was no indication that any of the strikes were directed against the government's decision or that the workers made any demands for its revocation. Instead, it appears that the workers were ready to accept the government's policy, provided that their own economic interests did not suffer.

The strikes were remarkably peaceful in nature. Not a single outbreak of violence was reported. The atmosphere throughout was marked by the workers' calm insistence on presenting their demands to management and then negotiating compensatory measures with its representatives. No detailed information is yet available on the specific forms of these bargaining sessions. It is possible that the mechanics of the negotiations differed from one plant to another. It seems, however, that the workers either elected or appointed their own representatives for talks with management. Most negotiating was conducted locally, without direct participation by state or party officials. The settlements reached in the weeks after the price changes oscillated between a 5 and 15 percent increase in wages. In some cases, these settlements also included modifications in work norms, with the net effect of increasing the workers' benefits.[16]

[10] The food price increases were signaled first by then Prime Minister Edward Babiuch in his address to the Sejm (Parliament) on Apr. 3, 1980. See *Trybuna Ludu*, Apr. 4, 1980; and ibid., May 28, 1980, for further details.

[11] See "Polish Commercial Shops Increase Their Meat Allocation," *Radio Free Europe Research*, Polish Situation Report 14, July 9, 1980.

[12] For a detailed description and analysis of the strikes, see *August 1980*.

[13] *Robotnik*, July 12, 1980. *Robotnik* is an unofficial biweekly publication printed under the auspices of the Committee for Social Self-Defense (KOR).

[14] For a listing of enterprises affected by strikes, see ibid., July 12, July 22, and Aug. 15, 1980.

[15] See "July 1980" in ibid., July 22, 1980; Hella Pick in *The Guardian* (Manchester), July 15, 1980; and Christopher Bobinski in the *Financial Times* (London), July 14, 1980.

[16] Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Worker-Management Bargaining in Poland," in *August 1980*, pp. 38–41.

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Another feature of the incipient strike movement was its basically proletarian character. In the first few weeks, no other stratum of society was either directly or indirectly involved in the workers' activities. No established institution helped them in the bargaining sessions or provided them with any form of support—neither the official trade unions nor the Conferences of Workers' Self-Management, which served as bodies of collective decision-making at the enterprise level. Instead, it was reported, "the official trade unions [were] brought into wage negotiations on the management side by the authorities."[17]

In this context, it is important to note that the only groups both willing and determined to support the workers' cause were tiny dissident organizations. In particular, members and active sympathizers of the Committee for Social Self-Defense (KOR) served from the very beginning of the strikes as the principal source of information for the Western press and the country.[18] There is no doubt that they were helped in this task by the workers themselves. This cooperation between the workers and the dissidents appears to have been crucial in the initial stages of the strike movement, and probably contributed significantly to its expansion and success.

The most important factor in the development of the strike movement, however, was the ambiguity of the party and government response to the workers' actions. No clearly defined position on the strikes was ever taken by the authorities, who, while obviously hostile to those developments, preferred to ignore their existence. In retrospect, it can be argued that the authorities simply miscalculated. For many government and party officials, the main problem was merely to ensure that the price increases would be implemented. They anticipated that this implementation would involve a certain economic price and, as the rapidity with which the bargaining between workers and management started seemed to indicate, were prepared to pay it. For them, the potential political benefits for the government in strengthening its authority clearly overrode any concern over economic losses. Indicative of this attitude was a comment made by a government official to a Western press correspondent: "The precedent has been set for further price increases, and that is important."[19]

It was this preoccupation with authority-building, combined with a strong undertone of disregard for social protest, that eventually was to undermine the posi-



Edward Gierek, leader of the Polish Communist party from December 1970 to September 1980.

—Vincent Mentzel.

tion of the leadership. The immediate difficulties arose from the very tactics which the government used to assure the implementation of the price decision. The decision had been introduced gradually, at different times in different parts of the country, evidently in order to prevent any nationwide and simultaneous social protest. But this approach also opened the way for a protracted process of new protests and new negotiations. It should have been clear to government officials that the bargaining precedent set in one factory would be used by other workers to obtain the same results. Yet no adjusting measures were adopted, and none, it seems, were even contemplated.

Instead, the authorities made repeated, but largely abortive, attempts to halt the workers' demands. On July 9, soon after the initial series of negotiations with the workers had been completed, Gierek proclaimed to a special meeting of top political and economic activists, without the slightest mention of the negotiations themselves, that "any broader increases in salaries" would not be accepted.[20] The word "broader" presumably meant that those wage increases that had already been granted to the workers

[17] Christopher Bobinski, in the *Financial Times*, July 15, 1980.

[18] *Robotnik* was the only newspaper in Poland to publish information about the strikes. There was no coverage by the official press.

[19] Reuters News Agency, report from Warsaw, July 5, 1980.

[20] Radio Warsaw, July 9, 1980.

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would stand, but that no further compensation would be envisaged. This speech was broadcast nationwide on television the next day.

Predictably, Gierek's statement, which was followed by similar press commentaries, had no effect upon the workers; the factory negotiations continued unabated. If anything, the ineffectiveness of the leadership's appeals for wage restraint, as contrasted with the continuing success of the workers in their bargaining with management, merely contributed to a growing conviction among workers that the authorities remained inert and lagging behind events. It was only a matter of time, therefore, before the workers' demands became more militant and politicized.

Stage Two. On August 16, representatives of 21 separate enterprises from the coastal area near the city of Gdansk decided to set up an Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS), with its headquarters at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk. In its first communique, issued on the same day, the MKS solemnly proclaimed:

The goal of the MKS is to coordinate the demands and the strike action of [associated] factories and enterprises.

A text of the demands and proposals [postulatow], *constituting a joint resolution of [separate] strike committees, has been prepared. It has been decided to continue the strike until the fulfillment of the demands and proposals of the [striking] crews. The MKS is delegated to enter into negotiations with the central authorities. The end of the strike shall be determined by the Interfactory Strike Committee.*

Following the completion of the strike, the MKS shall not dissolve itself; [instead it] shall monitor the implementation of the demands and [shall] organize the Free Trade Unions.[21]

This action marked the beginning of the second phase of the strike movement.

The new stage, which was to extend until the end of August, was characterized by the workers' conscious attempt at large-scale self-organization. In contrast to the earlier strikes, which had been somewhat inchoate and geared to localized action, the workers' movement now became more cohesive and purposeful, with a massive growth in group consciousness and occupational solidarity. In fact, the very word "solidarity" was adopted as the strikers' principal slogan, providing them with a sense of conceptual and operational unity. This sense of unity had its practical expression in the establishment of coordinating committees that directed strike efforts in a number of plants and factories simultaneously.[22]

Concurrently, the strikers broadened their demands from basically economic issues to include more political ones. Economic problems, particularly demands for wage increases, naturally continued to occupy an important place in the workers' programs. However, the main emphasis was now put on the need to change the political relations within the existing system in such a way as to ensure direct participation by the workers in decision-making on issues affecting their interests.

Interestingly, the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Gdansk MKS indicate that the timing of this shift from spontaneity to organization, and from economic to political concerns, was entirely unplanned. The emergence of the Gdansk MKS was preceded by two days of strikes related to the workers' demands for higher wages, a standard feature of all strikes since the beginning of July, as well as to demands for the reinstatement of two previously dismissed employees and for official permission to erect a monument commemorating the workers killed in December 1970.[23] All these demands were met by management after two days of negotiations with the representatives of an ad hoc elected strike committee. The committee then voted to end the strike. Yet, after the vote, its members saw that the work crews were opposed to the termination of the strike and were demanding that the basic financial provisions of the agreement be extended to other enterprises in the region. The workers' determination to carry on the action was reinforced after the arrival of delegates from other factories. It was only then that the Interfactory Strike Committee was formed.

Once established, the Gdansk MKS found fertile ground for its activities. By August 18, less than two days after the committee's formation, the number of local plants associated with the strike action had grown to 156; it was later to increase to more than 600.[24] More important, the example of Gdansk was followed in other parts of the country. Within days, MKS's had been formed in Elblag, Szczecin, and Wroclaw, all large industrial centers. Not all factories in those areas went on strike; in fact, most continued their work. But all declared their readiness and de-

[21] *Strajkowy Biuletyn Informacyjny*, Aug. 16, 1980. *Strajkowy Biuletyn Informacyjny* was an irregular publication of the workers in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk.

[22] For details, see a statement by the Gdansk Interfactory Strike Committee, issued in Gdansk on Aug. 23, 1980.

[23] *Solidarnosc*, Aug. 30, 1980. *Solidarnosc* was a strike newsletter published in the Gdansk shipyards.

[24] Ibid. See also ibid., Aug. 31, 1980.

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termination to support the Gdansk organization. After several weeks of intermittent strikes throughout the country, the workers had apparently become so confident of their own power and so aware of the government's inability to contain their activities that the strike movement developed a momentum of its own.

Within this movement, the Gdansk MKS played an important role as both an organizational model and a trend setter. It was a relatively large body, consisting of two delegates from each of the strike-bound enterprises. To secure the effectiveness of its operations, the MKS elected a small presidium—first of 13 members, and eventually of 19, the increase reflecting the rapid expansion of its functions.[25] The chairman and principal spokesman of the presidium was Lech Walesa, an experienced veteran of the 1970–71 strikes in Gdansk and an active participant in an unofficial, dissident trade union movement operating in the coastal area for several years before the outbreak of the strikes.[26] Walesa, who had been dismissed from his job in the Gdansk Lenin Shipyard in early 1979, was reinstated on August 14 and immediately took over the direction of the strike. A chief negotiator on behalf of the shipyard's strike committee, he was also instrumental in setting up the MKS and in providing it with firm leadership. All the other members of the presidium were representatives of various strike committees from the Gdansk area.

The first act undertaken by the Gdansk MKS was the publication of a list of demands addressed to the authorities. This list consisted of 16 separate points, later to be expanded to 21. They related to three principal groups of problems regarded by the strikers as essential for their movement.[27] The first set of points, defined as nonnegotiable and fundamental, demanded official acceptance of "free trade unions which would be independent from the party and the management," as well as formal recognition of the workers' right to strike. The second group, essentially political, included calls for "respect of the principle of free expression," for the release and rehabilitation of political prisoners, and for a public announcement of the establishment of the MKS as well as the publication of its demands. In addition, the MKS called for the public release of "full information" on the socioeconomic situation in the country and for open debate on an eventual program of internal reform. The third set, consisting of 15 separate demands, dealt with basically economic matters. These demands ranged from a call for an across-the-board wage increase to compensate for the rise in prices, and an appeal for the elimination of commercial shops, to a resolution for a five-day workweek. The full list of demands, rapidly communicated to other MKS's and strike committees throughout the country, was widely adopted as the program for the entire labor movement. More specifically, it subsequently served as a negotiating platform for the strikers in their talks with the government.

Before those talks began, however, serious problems had to be resolved. The main difficulty was the government's open hostility to both the new workers' organization and its program. This was compounded by the workers' unwavering insistence that the authorities accept their main demands, particularly those related to independent unions and the right to strike.

The initial government reaction to the establishment of the Gdansk MKS was clearly antagonistic. It is true that on August 17 the government appointed a special commission to deal with the strikers. Yet it immediately became obvious that the objective of this commission, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Tadeusz Pyka, was not so much to establish contact with the strikers as to undermine their position. During a visit to Gdansk between August 18 and 20, neither Pyka nor any other member of his commission met with MKS representatives. Instead, the commission opened separate negotiations with semiofficial delegates from several industrial plants. Nevertheless, the attempt to represent those negotiations as formal bargaining between the government and the striking workers failed in the face of the determined opposition of the MKS. As the resolve of the strikers to carry on with their action only intensified following this attempt to outmaneuver them, Pyka was forced to return to Warsaw with empty hands. On August 20, he was removed as head of the government commission. The following day, this position was taken over by another Deputy Prime Minister, Mieczyslaw Jagielski.

It was clear, however, that the failure of Pyka's mission owed less to his lack of diplomatic subtlety, which had been undeniable, than to the intransigent position of the government itself. Immediately following the establishment of the MKS, the authorities adopted a series of intimidating measures, including cuts in telephone communications between Gdansk and the rest of the country, a massive press campaign against allegedly "antisocialist forces" active in the Gdansk factories, and harassment of individual delegates from various strike committees associated with the Gdansk MKS.[28] On August 18, in a nationwide television ad-

[25] Ibid., Aug. 23, 1980.

[26] For a short biographical sketch of Walesa, see *August 1980*, pp. 338–40.

[27] *Strajkowy Biuletyn Informacyjny*, Aug. 20, 1980.

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dress, party leader Gierek ruled out acceptance of any demands that could challenge the "bases of political and social order" in Poland.[29] Moreover, he declared that, insofar as those demands could affect the essential interests of the state, no one should expect any "concessions, compromises, or even a hesitant stance" from the authorities. On the very next day, Jan Szydlak, the head of the official Trade Unions' Central Council, took a similar position. Speaking in Gdansk to activists of his organization, he pointedly assured them that "we [the party] shall never give up power, we shall never share power with anyone."[30]

There was little indication, however, that his warnings had any effect on the workers. On August 19, *Solidarnosc* (Solidarity), a strike newsletter published at the Lenin Shipyard, dryly reported that 253 enterprises had joined the Gdansk MKS.[31]

The immediate political effect of the growing conflict between the strikers and the authorities was a dramatic increase in tension throughout the country. On August 17, Poland's Catholic Primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski publicly appealed for "calm and reason . . . and honest work with a sense of responsibility and conscience." His remarks were carried on national television three days later.[32] On August 20, 64 intellectuals sent an open letter to both the workers and the government, calling on the two sides to find a peaceful conclusion to their disputes.[33] The workers' response was immediate. Walesa extended an invitation to some of the signatories to come to Gdansk and serve as advisers to the strikers. This invitation eventually led to the establishment of a committee of experts, which was to provide important help to the workers in the clarification of their arguments.

The response of the authorities, in turn, was less accommodating. It came in the form of widespread arrests of dissidents throughout the country, a move presumably intended to limit the flow of information about the strikes to the country and the world.[34] Yet this move clearly failed to weaken the resolve of the strikers. It became increasingly obvious that either the authorities would have to approach the Gdansk MKS directly, or the country would come dangerously close to a major catastrophe.

The first signs of a breakthrough emerged on August 22, when Deputy Prime Minister Kazimierz Barcikowski established contact and began negotiations with the MKS in Szczecin. The next day, Deputy Prime Minister Jagielski agreed to start talks with the strikers in Gdansk. In both cases, the talks were broadcast live and in their entirety over local factory radios.

At the same time, the authorities took symbolic steps to mark what is now clearly seen as the passing of the previous political era. On August 24, during a special session of the party's Central Committee, four Politburo members—Prime Minister Edward Babiuch, propaganda chief Jerzy Lukaszewicz, trade union boss Jan Szydlak, and the main economic planner, Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk—were suddenly relieved of their posts. Deputy members Tadeusz Pyka, the compromised negotiator from Gdansk, and Zdzislaw Zandarowski, the head of the party organization section, met a similar fate. All six had been directly involved in policy formulation with respect to either the economy or the party's relations with the workers. More politically significant, all had been members of the party's inner circle of Gierek loyalists. After their departure, it was clear that Gierek's power would be sharply curtailed and his authority within the party seriously undermined. In retrospect, it is obvious that the Central Committee plenum of August 24 marked the end of the Gierek era in Polish politics. His subsequent removal from the leadership merely gave formal recognition to this reality.

Gierek's defeat was perhaps particularly painful to him personally, for in the process he was forced both to accept the return to the party's high councils of two long-standing opponents and critics, Stefan Olszowski

[28] *Trybuna Ludu*, Aug. 18, 1980; also *Solidarnosc*, Aug. 30, 1980. See also Anna Sabat and Ryszard Kolaczkowski, "Poland's Changing Information Policy: Where Is It Heading," *August 1980*, pp. 159–68.

[29] Radio Warsaw, Aug. 18, 1980. The text of Gierek's speech was published in *Zycie Warszawy*, Aug. 19, 1980.

[30] As quoted in *Solidarnosc*, Aug. 30, 1980.

[31] *Ibid.*, Aug. 19, 1980.

[32] For details, see Ewa Celt, "Cardinal Wyszynski Speaks to Workers," in *August 1980*, pp. 133–36. On August 26, Cardinal Wyszynski delivered another sermon in which he criticized the authorities for their failure to develop effective economic programs and expressed his understanding for the strikers, but also called for calm and reason in solving the crisis. The sermon was aired on national television after some portions had been censored by the government. On August 27, Poland's Catholic Episcopate issued a special statement strongly supporting the strikes and the workers' demands for independent trade unions. All pronouncements by the Church leaders were of great importance to the workers, who saw their actions as fully consistent with the principles of their faith. Portraits of the Pope, crosses, religious pictures, and other symbols associated with the Church were prominently displayed by the strikers in the factories and during the negotiations with government representatives. Catholic masses were held daily in the Gdansk shipyards.

[33] The letter was published in *Solidarnosc*, Aug. 26, 1980. Among the signatories were several prominent scientists, numerous writers, and journalists. Within days of its publication by the strikers, the letter became a symbol of solidarity between the Polish intellectual community and the strikers. By the end of August, 239 signatures had been affixed to the text.

[34] By August 30, several Western press agencies reported that more than 30 dissidents had been arrested since the beginning of the strikes on the coast. On Aug. 30–31, 1980, *Trybuna Ludu* published a long article on the alleged role of "antisocialist forces" in fomenting the labor unrest.

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and Tadeusz Grabski,[35] and to admit fundamental mistakes in policymaking. More to the point, however, was his statement that

Our party wants to correct its policy honestly, taking to heart the criticism and proposals of the work crews and of all society. We want a genuine broadening of the public's participation in deciding on matters of the workplace, towns and villages, the entire country. . . . We are ready to discuss these issues with the public and with workers' representatives appointed during the strikes. We are ready to meet their demands halfway. We cannot, however, make unrealistic promises; neither can we accept proposals aimed at the foundations of our nation and state.[36]

With this statement by the still titular party leader, the party formally accepted what had long seemed inevitable: official negotiation with an organization created by the workers themselves.

This formal step did not signify that the issues raised by the workers' demands were to be immediately resolved. On the contrary, Gierek's explicit reservations about "unrealistic promises" and "proposals aimed at the foundations of our nation" suggested that the party had maintained its opposition to any concessions that might result in a fundamental change in the system. Yet it was also obvious that the authorities' attitude toward the strikers constituted a new departure. From that moment, negotiations progressed in earnest.

The talks themselves were undeniably intense and at times dramatic.[37] On numerous occasions, it seemed that the exchanges would stop and the conflict would once again intensify. In time, however, it became clear that the earlier atmosphere of open hostility had somewhat abated, and the two sides were more tolerant of the differences between them.

On August 30, a formal settlement of the strike was signed by the representatives of the government and the strikers in Szczecin. Almost simultaneously, a tentative agreement was reached in Gdansk. Later in the day, at two separate but concurrently held meetings, the settlement there was formally approved by the party's Central Committee and the MKS. The long process of negotiation between the authorities and the autonomous workers' groups appeared to be over.

The Agreements

The ceremonial signing of the worker-government agreement took place in Gdansk on August 31. Carried live on national radio and television, it was the first time that the entire country had been able to see and hear the strike leaders dealing with the authorities. That fact alone was significant. At a bare minimum, it served to emphasize the importance of determination and self-organization in the successful defense of specific interests. Few could expect that this message would be lost on the Polish public and the leadership as well.

Of the two separate agreements reached by the workers in Szczecin and Gdansk, the Gdansk agreement was undoubtedly the more important. Although it was basically similar to the Szczecin settlement, it was more detailed and more specific. It was subsequently to serve as the model for similar settlements throughout the country. On the face of it, the Gdansk agreement symbolized a major victory for the workers. All their demands were either fully or at least partly accepted. At the same time, both the language of the document and the content of some of its crucial provisions clearly indicated the acceptance by the workers of certain rules and principles defended by the government.

Nowhere was the compromise more apparent than in the provisions concerning the establishment and the political position of workers' representative organizations. The agreement affirmed "the need to set up new, self-governing trade unions which would be the authentic representative of the working class." This need was justified by an explicit workers' claim that the existing trade unions had failed to provide adequate defense of the workers' interests. However, the workers also affirmed that the new unions would "observe the principles defined in the Constitution of the PPR" and recognized that "the PUWP plays the leading role in the state." The principle of the party's leading role in public life, enshrined in the Constitution itself, has long been considered by many groups in Polish society as discriminatory against those not members of the party. Its essence is in the party's self-asserted right to set the direction for society's ac-

[35] Olszowski had been removed from the party Politburo and Secretariat at the Eighth PUWP Congress in February 1980. He was later named Poland's ambassador to the German Democratic Republic. Grabski had lost his seat on the Central Committee at the same congress. Both men had been critical of Gierek and his associates. At the Central Committee plenum of August 24, Olszowski was again elected to both the Politburo and the Secretariat, and Grabski regained his place on the Central Committee. The latter also became a Central Committee secretary on September 6, following the removal of Gierek from the leadership.

[36] *Trybuna Ludu*, Aug. 25, 1980.

[37] The talks were broadcast live over Gdansk regional radio. For the English-language translation of the negotiations, see *August 1980*.

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Labor leader Lech Walesa (using a large pen bearing the image of Pope John Paul II) and Polish Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Jagielski initialing an agreement reached during intense negotiations at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk in late August 1980.

—Alain Dejean/SYGMA.

tivities, to select the personnel that supervise and control those activities, and to regulate the flow of political participation in matters related to state work. With regard to the workers' organizations, acceptance of this principle could effectively undermine any true independence in their operations.

Equally vague was the definition of the future relationship between the new unions and the government. The very concept of the unions, which are to "defend the social and material interests of the workers," established them squarely as a force potentially competitive with the government, which until then had served as the sole overseer of the country's economy. Yet nowhere in the agreement was there any specific definition of the respective prerogatives or duties of those two organizations. Instead, the role of the government with respect to the new unions' activity was generally presented in terms of a guarantee to provide the necessary conditions "for fulfillment of the basic functions" of the unions as well as of "full respect for the independence and self-government of the new unions as regards their organizational structure and their functioning at all levels of their activity."

Moreover, there was no clear resolution in the agreement of the problems that might arise from the coexistence of official and independent union organizations. The document provided for the organization of new unions, to be set up under the direction of the strike committees, which were to transform themselves at the conclusion of the strike into founding committees of the new self-governing trade unions. Their eventual emergence, however, did not imply any immediate change in the structure and role of the already existing unions, which had always been dominated by the party and the government. The agreement vaguely affirmed "the possibility of establishing cooperation between the [two types of] unions." At the same time, by defining the new unions as the "authentic representative of the working class," the agreement gave the clear impression that the existing unions, no matter how they were changed, would never enjoy the trust and support of the workers. If nothing else, this was bound to set the stage for a future contest between the two types of organizations.

Notwithstanding the vagueness of these formulations and the doubts arising from them, it was clear

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that the agreement promised major improvements in the areas of social policy in general and in the economic position of the workers in particular. Of the general provisions, which frequently had strong political overtones, the most important were the government's formal guarantee of the workers' right to strike, its official assurance on the immediate release of all political prisoners, its specific promise to present to the Sejm, "within three months," a draft law restricting censorship, and its pledge to allow the public radio broadcasting of Catholic services on Sundays.

As for specific economic provisions, the agreement imposed an obligation on the government to "prepare a concrete program" for a change in economic policies, to "define the minimum wage levels," to assure safety standards in factories, and to assure an "improvement in health services" throughout the country. Furthermore, the government promised that "a gradual rise in wages, primarily in the wages of the lowest paid, [will] be introduced for all working people." At the same time, it accepted the principle that "consumer goods price increases must be slowed down through greater control of the state and private sector, in particular by halting so-called silent price increases."

A particularly important aspect of the provisions relating to economic matters was a definition of the specific time-frame within which they were to be implemented by the authorities. By the end of September, for example, wage increases were to be in place for workers and white-collar employees. By the end of October, the government, together with the trade unions, was to have presented a program of additional wage increases, beginning on January 1, 1981, for the lowest-paid workers. By the end of the year, major decisions were to be announced on such matters as cost-of-living raises, the length of the workweek, supplies of meat and other consumer products, child-care centers, housing, retirement age, and increases in family assistance, pensions, and maternity benefits.

Another significant feature of the document was the strongly formulated principle of egalitarianism in social relations. This was especially obvious in the provisions related to "leveling family assistance" for all groups of workers and "elimination of special sales," provisions that were aimed at eliminating the financial privileges extended by the government to the armed forces and militia, as well as to party officialdom. (These groups have long been reputed to enjoy considerable economic and social benefits, much greater than those of the rest of the population.) Finally, there was a strong emphasis in the agreement on the need to phase out the special, high-priced shops and to restrict the number of goods sold in commercial outlets accepting payment only in foreign currency.

The signing of the agreements did not bring an immediate end to the social strife in Poland. Major strikes continued in different parts of the country long after the settlements on the coast. Several new ones also broke out—notably in the Silesian mining industry, which has long constituted the mainstay of Poland's economy, but in other parts of the country and in other sectors of the economy as well. The politically telling point in all these instances of continuing unrest was that the workers seemed motivated not so much by a desire to obtain additional financial benefits as by the apprehension that the provisions of the Gdansk and Szczecin agreements would be restricted by the government to the coastal areas alone. (In fact, the applicability of the agreements had nowhere been defined, although it was later widely presumed that they were to apply to the entire country. In any case, the government failed to assure the population about that provision. This negligence led to strikes, which, more than anything else, revealed once again the workers' persistent distrust of the authorities' policies and intentions.) The strikes subsided only after a new series of negotiations between representatives of the government and the workers from various areas and industrial centers had been concluded and the formal extension of the Gdansk and Szczecin agreements to other industrial sectors had been agreed to.[38]

Viewed from the perspective of Polish, and even socialist, politics, the agreements in Gdansk and Szczecin constituted a true milestone. They marked the first occasion in the history of the socialist system that Communist authorities had formally agreed to the principle of a social group's being allowed to organize itself in a body that would operate outside the direct control of the party and the state. This more than anything else makes current Polish developments unique.

One must also bear in mind, however, that the Polish "experiment" still remains in the sphere of concept rather than practice; and it is in the area of practice, in the actual implementation of the terms of the settlements, that the main problems could develop. At this point, little more than two months after the signing ceremonies, the fate of the agreements is

[38] For a vivid description of a prolonged strike prompted by management maneuvers to avoid the extension of the Gdansk agreement's provisions to a textile factory in Bialystok, see Joanna Siedlecka's article in *Kierunki* (Warsaw), Oct. 19, 1980. The strike was settled only on September 8 and only after the management was forced to give its explicit acceptance of the provisions of the Gdansk agreement.

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still in question. If anything, as the next section will show, it has been overshadowed by the larger issue of the party's attempts to restore discipline in its own ranks and to reach a modus vivendi not only with a wary working class but with other segments of society as well.

Fragmentation

The distinguishing feature of Poland's politics in the immediate aftermath of the strikes has been fragmentation. The political system appears virtually paralyzed by its inability to integrate diverse social groups into a cohesive community. Society is still gripped by a widespread malaise. The economy continues to experience severe difficulties, and a major downfall has been averted only thanks to considerable assistance from abroad. There is a perceptible lack of a clear concept, particularly among the authorities, of the direction the country should take. The net effect of this situation has been a growing feeling of confusion and uncertainty as to the future evolution of the country's politics.

Nowhere has this sentiment been stronger than in the party itself, which, as the dominant institution of the system, has long been identified in the public mind with the system itself and which was thus particularly affected by the workers' strikes. The party's main problems have been twofold. First, the framework of social activities that influence the country's politics has shifted away from the party's control as new groups, particularly the workers, have emerged as separate forces in public life. To expand on this point, it is important to stress that the strike movement was organized and led without any influence from the party and even in spite of its open hostility. That is not to deny that some party members were active in the strike; however, their involvement in the movement developed despite rather than because of their party affiliation.[39] Their activities, therefore, could hardly be conceived as conducive to any potential rapprochement between the party and the movement itself.

Second, ever since the outbreak of the strikes in July, the party has been undergoing gradual disintegration, with a loss of organizational cohesion and internal discipline. This process has become particularly apparent in both the local and central leadership, with several contradictory tendencies emerging as to

Maciej Szczepanski, member of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and President of the Polish Radio and Television Committee, was dismissed from his government post on August 24 as a result of charges of corruption.

—EUPRA.

methods of dealing with social unrest. Internal divisiveness has been compounded by recent revelations of widespread corruption within the party's ranks. The most spectacular case to date is that of Maciej Szczepanski, formerly both head of the Polish radio and television network and a Central Committee member. Szczepanski has been formally accused of extensive misappropriation of public funds, of holding private foreign-currency accounts abroad, and of having a flagrantly immoral life-style. Yet, while his case continues to be investigated by various agencies, it has become apparent that similar abuses have been perpetrated by other officials and party activists.[40]

To contain the growing threat of a further decline in

[39] It is worthwhile in this connection to recall that the party's leadership was openly hostile toward the strikes and the strikers throughout July and August.

[40] See "Polish Party Declares War on Internal Corruption," *Radio Free Europe Research*, Polish Situation Report 17, Sept. 19, 1980.

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From the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), held in Warsaw, October 4–6, 1980: at the microphone, Stanislaw Kania, who replaced Edward Gierek as PUWP First Secretary on September 6.

—Vioujard/Gamma-Liaison.

its control over the system and to arrest the spread of the internal malaise, the party has developed a wide-ranging strategy in which an apparent acceptance of operational changes is combined with a strong emphasis on institutional continuity. This strategy has already produced a three-pronged approach: first, a thorough change in the composition of the leadership and intensified efforts at internal consolidation; second, a partial redefinition of the party's political role; and third, an adoption of new social policies.

With respect to the first type of action, major steps have been taken, involving the removal of several Politburo members regarded as particularly responsible for the government's faulty labor policies. Some of these politicians were ousted during the fateful Central Committee plenum of August 24; others were eased out after the conclusion of the main agreements with the strikers. Of particular importance was the removal of Gierek on September 6. His departure, ostensibly caused by a sudden illness, served as a signal to both the party's rank-and-file and the public that the style and practice of rule associated with Gierek's name had ended.

The attempt to secure internal party consolidation has taken a variety of forms. A continuing campaign of explanation and consultation has been conducted through a multitude of party conferences and meetings in different local organizations throughout the country. The functions delegated to the party control organs charged with supervising the work and behavior of political activists and functionaries have been expanded. A gradual but constant recruitment drive has been conducted by the new leadership to fill positions of influence within the party.[41]

However, whether those actions will succeed in consolidating the party remains hypothetical. The

[41] Since the beginning of September, 11 first secretaries of provincial *(wojewodztwo)* party committees and scores of other local officials have been removed from positions of power in the party. Their posts have been taken by new people, who presumably owe their allegiance to the current party leadership.

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stormy and prolonged debate during the October 4–6 meeting of the Central Committee clearly suggested that the objective of securing internal consolidation had not been achieved.[42] As if to confirm that impression, all major decisions related to possible changes in the party's organization and political work were postponed by the Central Committee until a special party congress, to be held at the beginning of 1981.

Moreover, this same meeting, held a month after Gierek's fall, appeared to indicate that the party remains as split and divided as it was before the change in leadership. Indeed, the sharp exchanges of views during the discussion suggested that factions may have emerged within the Central Committee, in which some members appear to advocate sweeping changes in the leading bodies and party rules, and others remain opposed to any drastic reorientation in policies and methods of operation. It is certainly too early to make a firm assessment of the political implications of these developments, but it is clear that several individual party activists and officials have emerged as potential leaders of specific political orientations. Some Central Committee members, such as Tadeusz Fiszbach, first secretary of the Gdansk party organization, appear to argue that only a clear acceptance of significant social change, a genuine restructuring of the party organization, and a redefinition of party policies can resolve Poland's current problems. Others, such as newly elected party secretaries Tadeusz Grabski and Stefan Olszowski as well as the well-known political journalist Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, seem to have taken the position that the party's primary task should be to streamline the country's economy rather than to make internal organizational changes. Still others, particularly Mieczyslaw Moczar, the Chairman of the state's Supreme Control Council, appear to emphasize the urgent need to purify the party ranks of corrupt and compromised elements before any program of policy changes is adopted.[43]

The situation is further complicated by the widespread discontent and ferment in local party units throughout the country. In part, this ferment has reflected a hesitation by regional party officials to accept

This summer's events have brought Mieczyslaw Moczar (left) and Stefan Olszowski (right) back into the political arena.

—EUPRA and Katherine Young.

the new reality of social self-organization, for fear that it will lead to a further weakening of the party's role and authority. More important, the ferment has also arisen from increasingly militant demands by rank-and-file party members in many industrial centers for the rapid introduction of changes in economic and political life.[44]

With respect to its attempt to redefine its political role and, indeed, to forge and maintain lasting bonds with society, the party has bombarded the public with a constant stream of reassuring speeches by party leaders and articles in the party press. Their common theme has been a promise to accept far-reaching changes in social relations, providing that those changes do not interfere with the established principles of the leading role of the party. Perhaps the most typical, and also the most authoritative, was a speech by the new party leader, Stanislaw Kania. Addressing a Central Committee meeting on October 4, Kania said:

Our party is vitally interested in the development of social autonomy and the independence of social or-

[42] For details, see J.B. de Weydenthal, "CC Plenum in Poland: Continuing Uncertainty," *Radio Free Europe Research,* RAD Background Report 241, Oct. 10, 1980.

[43] In the late 1960's, Moczar was the acknowledged leader of the Partisans, an authoritarian, nationalistic, and anti-Semitic faction within the party. After playing an instrumental role in removing Wladyslaw Gomulka from power in December 1970, Moczar was pushed into political obscurity by Edward Gierek. Since the fall of Gierek, Moczar has emerged as one of the most vocal critics of the previous leadership. It is widely assumed that, owing to his long tenure as Chairman of the Supreme Control Council, Moczar has detailed information about party and state officials. This information has presumably strengthened his position in the current hierarchy of power. On November 3, Moczar was elected Chairman of the ZBoWiD (Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy), a mass organization of veterans. Moczar's control over ZBoWiD in the 1960's is generally considered to have been crucial to his political influence in those years. For the details of Moczar's activity in the 1960's, see Jan B. de Weydenthal, *The Communists of Poland,* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1978, pp. 114–16, 123–51.

[44] For details, see Maria Adamiecka in *Gazeta Robotnicza* (Wroclaw), Oct. 30, 1980. See also Jacques Estager in *L'Humanité* (Paris), Nov. 6, 1980; and Bernard Marqueritte in *Le Figaro* (Paris), Nov. 7, 1980.

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ganizations. This, of course, means not independence from the ideology and policy of socialism, but the independent shaping of opinions and views on specific questions and problems. . . . Not only are social autonomy and the leading role of the party not contradictory, they are complementary.[45]

Along with these efforts at redefinition of the party's political role, the new party leadership has developed a new approach to the issue of social participation in public life. To illustrate this point, it is worth recalling that the Polish sociopolitical environment has long been characterized by the party's dominance over all aspects of organized social activity, especially by the official insistence that no form of public activity can develop independently of the party's direct control and supervision. In the aftermath of the strikes, which dramatically demonstrated the party's inability to contain a broadly based movement of social activism, that insistence appears to have been modified. As its current policy seems to attest, the party leadership has concluded that a certain degree of unrestrained public activity will have to be allowed. Having accepted this, it has directed its efforts primarily toward fostering positive attitudes toward the system among the public, apparently in the hope that positive attitudes will eventually evolve into a more durable commitment.

Perhaps the most important indication of these efforts has been the decision not to interfere with the workers' movement toward self-organization. Indeed, the authorities have shown a high degree of cooperation with the workers in that area. On September 14, barely two weeks after the completion of the first agreement with the strikers, Poland's Council of State issued a decree on the legal registration of the new trade unions.[46] Such registration would effectively grant the workers' organizations formal status within the institutional system. By early November, 21 "new, independent, and self-governing" trade unions had had their charters formally approved by the courts, thus securing for themselves the right to self-organization.[47]

But to acknowledge the cooperative posture of the authorities with respect to the movement of self-organization does not exclude the possibility that this attitude may be basically tactical. Indeed, two developments seem to demonstrate that the leadership is determined to regulate and shape the scope of social activities to such a degree as to make them ineffective and politically insignificant.

The first is the official insistence, frequently repeated in government and party statements, on the strict conformity of the social organizations' work with the principles upon which the existing system of power relations is based. For example, an authoritative article in the party's daily newspaper pointedly reminded readers that the essence of all social activity depended on

the clear acceptance of the socialist ownership of the means of production, of the principles of the Constitution of the PPR, of the international alliances of our state, and of the leading role of the party in the country's life.[48]

The second development is the widespread proliferation of various organizations within the framework of the labor movement. This process started, of course, with the establishment of the Interfactory Strike Committees in August. Since the conclusion of the strikes, however, many other groups have emerged to claim the right to an autonomous existence. Some of those groups are simply the existing branch unions, which have long been directed by a centrally appointed council but are now striving for a separate position and self-defined program of activity. Others have been formed by workers at the factory level, within specific cultural and educational associations, and even within military formations. This trend toward worker self-assertion has been openly tolerated and, perhaps, even encouraged by the party, presumably in the hope that it will muddle the very issue of self-organization and weaken the activity of the unions that grew out of the strikes.

Party and Society

Yet, the party's hopes have thus far not been met, for the new unions have proved extraordinarily successful in consolidating their organization and in expanding the scope of their activity. At a meeting in Gdansk on September 17, several hundred delegates from a large number of factories and enterprises and representing some 35 individual founding committees of the new unions, decided to set up a National Coordinating Commission in order to facilitate the task of establishing self-governing workers' organizations throughout the country. The commission is to act as a "basically consultative and advisory body," with the principal objective of streamlining the activities of the

[45] *Trybuna Ludu*, Oct. 5, 1980.
[46] The text is in ibid., Sept. 15, 1980.
[47] PAP, Nov. 10, 1980.
[48] *Trybuna Ludu*, Sept. 27, 1980.

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Members of the Coordinating Committee of Solidarity (Solidarnosc) meet on October 28, 1980, to press the demand expressed in the signs at the right: "We Demand Registration Without Changes in the Statute."

—Marc Bulka/Gamma-Liaison.

new unions and advising with regard to union organization.[49] It consists of some 50 members, representing founding committees from all over the country, and is chaired by Lech Walesa, the leader of the former Interfactory Strike Committee in Gdansk.

According to the organizational statute adopted at the commission's first meeting, the union organization is to be based on a network of strong regional unions in major industrial centers across Poland. Each regional union, in turn, is to include several branch unions formed along the lines of specific industrial activities (such as mining and transport). The work of the entire organization is to be closely coordinated. The name "Solidarity" was chosen for the movement as a whole.[50]

On September 24, the leaders of Solidarity's National Coordinating Commission formally applied for registration with a provincial court in Warsaw. Shortly thereafter, however, the court raised several objections to the content of the application, principally to Solidarity's failure to make specific reference in its statute to the leading role of the party.[51] The chief judge of the court publicly asserted that such recognition was an indispensable requirement for the unions' registration and claimed that all the other newly registered unions had included, in their statutes, a clause about the leading role of the party. Solidarity refused to accept the court's objection, contending that the ruling was political rather than legal in character.

At the root of Solidarity's refusal to include a clear recognition of the party's leading role in the state has been the conviction that if union leaders include any such clause, they will invalidate the character of their organization as a nonpolitical institution. Having clearly accepted the party's special position by signing the Gdansk agreement, the leaders of Solidarity now made a firm distinction between the political system itself and the workers' organization. They fully confirmed their willingness to work within the framework of existing political institutions and rules. But they also insisted on organizational autonomy, for they viewed

[49] John Darnton in *The New York Times*, Sept. 18, 1980.
[50] Jonathan Spivak in *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Sept. 18, 1980.

[51] For the text of an interview with the Warsaw court's chief judge, Stanislaw Pawela, see *Trybuna Ludu*, Oct. 20, 1980.

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the new "independent and self-governing" unions essentially in functional terms.[52] The new unions were to be independent from any state institution or political organization, and they were to be self-governing—that is, subject to interference from no other body in internal organizational matters. Walesa himself explained this position in a speech to a group of Silesian miners on October 20, when he asserted that "we intend to respect and support the Constitution, but we will not include that formulation [about the party's leading role] in our statute."[53]

Despite the arguments of the union organizers, the Warsaw provincial court registered Solidarity on October 24 only after unilaterally changing the statute in a way that threatened to limit Solidarity's independent status and restrict its operations. More specifically, the court inserted into the statute a provision recognizing the party's leading role in the state and removed a section dealing with the right to strike, replacing it with its own restrictive formulation.[54]

Solidarity immediately rejected this judicial intrusion. Meeting in Gdansk on October 27, three days after the court's decision, the National Coordinating Commission of Solidarity took several separate but related steps aimed at changing the court decision. First, the union organizers agreed to call upon the government to reverse those aspects of the court ruling that undercut the integrity of the statute—a move prompted by the union leaders' conviction that the court ruling was politically motivated and would therefore have to be amended by political bodies. This course of action failed when the discussions between Solidarity's representatives and Prime Minister Jozef Pinkowski, held in Warsaw on October 31, did not resolve the differences between the two sides.[55] Although the government seemed willing to grant some concessions—such as greater access to the media—it steadfastly refused to interfere with the work of judicial institutions.

Polish Premier Jozef Pinkowski (left) and Solidarity leader Lech Walesa shake hands after apparently inconclusive talks in Warsaw on October 31, 1980.

—Sabba/Gamma-Liaison.

Next, on November 4, Solidarity formally appealed the Warsaw court's ruling to the country's Supreme Court.[56] At the same time, its National Coordinating Commission called upon workers in all parts of the country to prepare for protest strikes in the event that the Supreme Court failed to annul the lower court's ruling. The strikes were to begin on November 12 in Warsaw and Gdansk only and were then to move every two days from city to city all across the country. This "rotational tactic" was designed to bring tremendous pressure upon the government but also to avoid any direct confrontation between the workers and the authorities on a nationwide scale.[57]

The threat of strikes, which would inevitably have heightened the tension throughout the country, was defused when the Supreme Court upheld Solidarity's appeal. At a special session on November 10, the court formally registered the Solidarity trade union organization on the basis of the original statute. At the same time, it accepted an appendix to the statute, which defined the bases of Solidarity's activities and relations with the PUWP.[58] The appendix consisted of two parts. One outlined the principal clauses of two International Labor Organization conventions that deal, respectively, with trade union freedom and the right to conduct collective bargaining (Poland has ratified both conventions). The other part was the full

[52] See the interviews with Lech Walesa in *Kierunki*, Oct. 5, 1980; and in *Sztandar Mlodych* (Warsaw), Oct. 20, 1980. See also the article by one of Solidarity's organizers in Warsaw, Jacek Szymanderski, "The Platform of Understanding," *Zycie Warszawy*, Oct. 29, 1980.

[53] As quoted by John Darnton in *The New York Times*, Oct. 21, 1980.

[54] For details, see *Trybuna Ludu*, Oct. 25–26, 1980. See also J.B. de Weydenthal, "Conflict Between the Unions and the Party Continues in Poland," *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report 261, Oct. 30, 1980.

[55] Bernard Guetta in *Le Monde* (Paris), Nov. 2–3, 1980; and Bradley Graham in *The Washington Post*, Nov. 2, 1980.

[56] *Slowo Powszechne* (Warsaw), Nov. 5, 1980.

[57] John Darnton in *The New York Times*, Nov. 7, 1980.

[58] For the text of the Supreme Court's preliminary opinion, see *Trybuna Ludu*, Nov. 11, 1980. The full justification of the court's ruling was to be made public in mid-November.

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A scene from a massive one-hour token strike on October 3, 1980, on behalf of the demands of Solidarity, Poland's new independent trade union. —EUPRA.

text of the first seven points of the Gdansk agreement of August 31, which included a statement on union independence and self-government as well as recognition of the party's leading role in the state.

The Supreme Court ruling represented a compromise between the the government and the union organizers. Walesa himself acknowledged as much when he declared at the end of the Supreme Court session that the ruling "testifies to a victory of common sense. Once again, we have reached an understanding among Poles."[59] The government spokesman reiterated that "the government guarantees and ensures full respect for the independence and self-government of the new trade unions both with regard to their organizational structure and with regard to their operations at all levels of activity."[60]

In the aftermath of the court's decision, the prospect of further massive protests and strikes appeared to diminish. This does not mean, of course, that the situation in Poland has finally stabilized after long months of social turmoil and political conflict. Instead, it appears that even though a major stumbling block in the relations between the workers and the government has been overcome, each side still faces an uncertain future vis-à-vis the other. The only encouraging sign is what seems to be a growing realization among both workers and government officials that a degree of mutual cooperation is necessary if Poland is to avoid a major social and economic downturn.

An equally important, and politically significant, concession by the party has been its cooperative attitude toward the country's Catholic Church. On September 21, Poland's national radio inaugurated its first regular religious service since September 1949, after a hiatus of exactly 31 years.[61] The official acceptance of regularly scheduled religious broadcasts on state radio, a major bow by the authorities to one of the Church's traditional demands, was a direct result of the agreement between the workers and the government. While this aspect of the matter has been officially played down, the government has itself recently initiated new talks with Church officials on the future place of the Church within the system.[62]

In fact, the only group that has constantly been ex-

[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.

[61] *Kierunki*, Sept. 28, 1980.
[62] PAP reported on Sept. 24, 1980, on a first meeting of a joint commission of government and episcopal representatives. On Oct. 21, Kania met in Warsaw with Cardinal Wyszynski. For details, see Bradley Graham in *The Washington Post*, Oct. 23, 1980.

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posed to antagonistic attacks from the party is the dissidents. A massive campaign had already started during the strikes, when the dissidents stood accused by both the media and party politicians of fomenting the strikes for their own purposes. This campaign continued and even intensified after the strikes ended.[63] The apparent aim was to drive a wedge between the workers and the dissidents in the hope that once such a separation was accomplished, the entire dissident movement could be isolated socially and eventually eliminated.

Key Factors

Whether the goal of regaining even a modicum of social support for the party will be achieved in the near future is hard to say. It can be said, however, that two key factors will inevitably play a primary role in the eventual denouement of the Polish drama. A major problem for the authorities is still, as it has always been, to find ways of solving the country's economic difficulties and to ensure a lasting improvement in living standards. Another is the attitude of the Soviet leadership, for no matter whether it comes to Soviet intervention or not, the very possibility has undoubtedly weighed heavily on the minds of Poles, party leaders and average citizens alike.

It is still too early to make any assessment of the current state of Poland's economy or to outline any prospects for the future. There is little doubt, however, that long-standing economic difficulties have become much worse. According to recent reports from Poland, the strikes, which were said to have occurred in more than 4,800 separate enterprises, have caused losses in the realm of 36 billion zlotys (approximately US$1.2 billion at official exchange rates).[64] Poland's total industrial production declined by more than 17 percent during August and September, as compared with the same period of 1979. To complicate matters still further, the income of the population has risen during the first three quarters of the current year by about 10 percent above that of the same period of 1979. Moreover, the pay increases that have stemmed from the implementation of the strike agreements — estimated at about 12 percent across the board—will only reduce market stability still further.[65] Even now, the national income for 1980 is estimated to be 2 percent below the plan targets; this will be the second year in a row that national income in Poland will fall.[66] There are widespread shortages of goods on the market, and prospects for continuing disruptions in industrial supplies will undoubtedly make the resolution of Poland's economic and social problems even more difficult in the future.

To avert a major crisis in the economy, the government has sought immediate help from abroad. It has obtained American credit guarantees of US$670 million for future purchases of agricultural goods, a loan from the Soviet Union of some US$690 million—this includes about US$280 million in convertible currency for the purchase of goods in the West—and a loan of DM1.2 billion from a consortium of West German banks.[67]

Yet these loans, primarily intended to provide short-term relief in a disastrous situation, can hardly be considered a lasting solution to Poland's problems. The country, after all, is now burdened by a huge debt of some US$21 billion to the Western countries alone.[68]

The other key element likely to affect Poland's future course is the attitude of other Communist states and parties toward the Polish domestic situation. Poland's membership in an East European community of nations, bound together by an ideologically defined concept of socialist unity, has always constituted a powerful regulatory factor in its internal development. Within this community, the Soviet party has always been the primary instigator and coordinator of all major Communist strategies. Just as has frequently been the case in the past, Soviet guidance is a crucial determinant in Poland's future evolution.

To date, the Soviet attitude toward political and social developments in Poland has been ambiguous. There has never been any doubt about Soviet interest in the events in Poland. There is also little doubt that the Soviet Union is generally apprehensive about the emergence of autonomous social organizations — especially autonomous trade unions—fearing that the leading role of the Communist party could be undermined. This apprehension is evident from a number of

[63] For details, see Anna Sabbat, "The Independent Labor Union Movement and KSS 'KOR,'" *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report 232, Oct. 6, 1980.

[64] See Associated Press report of Oct. 14, 1980. Subsequent reports estimated production losses in October to be about US$600–660 million. See PAP in English, Nov. 11, 1980.

[65] *Trybuna Ludu*, Oct. 31, 1980; and an interview with Maria Milczarek, then the Minister of Labor, Wages, and Social Affairs, in *Zycie Warszawy*, Oct. 16, 1980.

[66] For a comprehensive discussion of Poland's current economic problems, see Cameron Hudson, "Poland's Economy: November 1980," *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report 269, Nov. 13, 1980.

[67] *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 13, 1980.

[68] See an article by Marian Krzak, Minister of Finance, "Indebtedness and Consumption," in *Polityka-Eksport-Import*. No. 10, a supplement to *Polityka* (Warsaw), Oct. 25, 1980.

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articles in the Soviet press, which has made repeated allegations that the current unrest in Poland could have been either instigated or prolonged by "antisocialist and antinational forces."[69] In addition, according to occasional reports in the Western press, Soviet troops have held military maneuvers near the Polish border.[70]

It is also clear that the new party leaders in Poland have received and still appear to receive considerable support from Moscow. The ascendancy of Stanislaw Kania was warmly welcomed in a long and friendly letter from Leonid Brezhnev, head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the USSR (subsequently, however, some of Kania's speeches have been censored in the Soviet press).[71] Poland's Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Jagielski traveled to Moscow at the beginning of September to negotiate the Soviet loan and, during the visit, met with several senior officials, including Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin's chief ideologist.[72] For the time being, at least, the new Polish leadership has seemingly preserved a relatively large field for maneuver in domestic policymaking.

This judgment appears to have been bolstered by the results of a brief meeting on October 30 in Moscow between top party and government leaders of Poland and the Soviet Union. Attended by party leader Stanislaw Kania and Prime Minister Jozef Pinkowski from the Polish side, and by Leonid Brezhnev, Prime Minister Nikolay Tikhonov, Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, and several other officials from the Soviet side, the talks were said to have taken place in an "atmosphere of cordiality and identity of views, which characterize the relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Polish United Workers' Party."[73] They were reported to have centered on the issue of "the further development of Soviet-Polish relations." Both delegations confirmed during the discussions their mutual "determination to protect and strengthen the indissoluble fraternal ties linking the two peoples."

The Soviet leaders apparently gave their approval to the Polish authorities' performance in dealing with difficult problems at home. Brezhnev was reported to have conveyed to the Poles

the conviction of the Soviet Communists and working people of the Soviet Union that the Communists and working people of fraternal Poland will be able to resolve the acute problems of political and economic development facing them and, relying on the material and spiritual potential created in the years of the people's power, will ensure growth in the living standards of the working people, and the further all-round progress of People's Poland.[74]

Brezhnev's statement was accompanied, however, by a strong expression of concern, apparently shared by all those present at the meeting, over "attempts by certain imperialist circles to take subversive actions against socialist Poland and to interfere in its [internal] affairs." "Such attempts," the report of the meeting affirmed, "run counter to the Final Act of the Helsinki conference and contradict the interests of the European nations, the cause of peace, and cooperation on the continent."

A different source of Soviet concern could be the possibility that the Polish tendency toward institutional pluralism might gradually spread to other East European countries. Thus far, there has been no obvious indication that workers in those countries are ready to follow the example of their Polish colleagues. The reactions, instead, have come from the political leaders. In Hungary and Romania, officially sponsored discussions on the need to improve the market supply have been conducted in the press and in factories. There have also been some appeals by top Hungarian leaders to streamline the operations of the trade unions and to provide them with greater independence from the government.[75]

The most open and aggressive criticism of Polish developments has come from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Czechoslovakia. This not only has been repeatedly expressed in media commentary in both countries but has also been clearly manifested by party leaders, notably by the GDR's Erich Honecker, who several times has warned against the activities of "antisocialist forces in Poland" and implied that any "threat to socialism in Poland" would be strongly rebuffed.[76]

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[69] For a detailed discussion of Soviet press coverage of events in Poland, see Lawrence Sherwin's contribution to *August 1980*, pp. 237–52.

[70] *The Washington Star*, Sept. 19, 1980; and *The New York Times*, Sept. 11, 1980.

[71] Sherwin, in *August 1980*, pp. 251–52.

[72] Craig R. Whitney in *The New York Times*, Sept. 11, 1980.

[73] TASS, Oct. 30, 1980. See also Anthony Austin in *The New York Times*, Oct. 31, 1980; and Kevin Klose in *The Washington Post*, Oct. 31, 1980.

[74] TASS, Oct. 30, 1980.

[75] See, for example, an interview with Sandor Gaspar, the Secretary-General of the Hungarian National Trade Union Council, in *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), Oct. 19, 1980. For a comprehensive discussion of the situation in Hungary, see *The Economist* (London), Sept. 20, 1980.

[76] Honecker's warnings came in separate speeches to Communist party activists in Berlin on October 6 and in Gera on October 13. Both speeches were reported by Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), the East German press agency, on October 6 and 13 respectively.

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In Prague, the most outspoken critic of the Polish experiment in worker self-organization has been the Czechoslovakian party secretary in charge of ideological matters, Vasil Bilak. Speaking at a plenary meeting of the party's Central Committee in early October, Bilak linked the events in Poland to those of the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968 and attacked the organizers of Poland's independent unions as "tools" of imperialism, who "seek to weaken the leading role of the Polish United Workers' Party and to paralyze Poland."[77]

To these warnings and criticisms of the Polish political evolution one should add a recent attack by Romania's party leader Nicolae Ceausescu against "the serious violations [in Poland] of the rules of socialist ethics and equality . . . tendencies to get rich and make money by all means, to disregard the interests of the broad masses of people of the working class." This attack was accompanied by an equally strong criticism of the "so-called independent trade unions." In Ceasescu's view, the very concept of independent trade unions

has always served the interests of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. Working class and trade union unity has been and is the basic requirement of the revolutionary struggle, of the victory of the socialist revolution, of the building of socialism, of the strengthening of independence and sovereignty of any socialist country.[78]

Of course, Ceausescu's remarks may have been prompted by his concern about the situation in his own country and, in all likelihood, should not be considered part of a concerted campaign by Soviet-bloc "internationalists."[79] Still, the general tenor of his pronouncements as well as those of leaders in Berlin and Prague are indicative of mounting international pressure within the East European community of socialist nations for a greater consolidation of Communist rule throughout the region. The recent decision of the East German government to restrict tourist traffic between Poland and East Germany is part of the same trend.[80] Clearly, the political crisis in Poland, which began nearly five months ago with a mass movement of social dissatisfaction, has undergone a process of rapid externalization and has become a major problem for the entire socialist community.

The Soviet reaction to concern among its East European allies could be a renewed drive toward greater and more intense "fraternal cooperation" among all Communist parties in the areas of ideology and policy formulation. In the long run, such an emphasis on unification and policy coordination could become an important factor in the political development of Poland, a factor that would be impossible for party leaders, the workers, or the entire population to ignore.

[77] Czechoslovakian Press Bureau (CTK), Oct. 14, 1980. Bilak actually spoke to the Czechoslovakian party's Central Committee on October 7–8. The text of his remarks was not published until almost a week later.

[78] Ceausescu spoke to a session of the Romanian party's Central Committee on October 15. His speech was published by the Romanian press agency, Agerpres, on Oct. 16, 1980.

[79] This impression appears to be confirmed by Ceausescu's recent statements on Poland, delivered at a press conference in Stockholm. Questioned by Western journalists on Nov. 8 in Stockholm, Ceausescu declared that "the Polish government is strong enough and has the potential to solve the country's problems, even the economic problems. These are problems of the Polish people and the Polish party. Poland should be allowed to develop without any outside interference whatsoever." These remarks were carried in AP, Reuters, and United Press International reports from Stockholm on Nov. 8, 1980.

[80] On October 30, the East German authorities "temporarily" restricted tourist traffic with Poland. These restrictions are aimed primarily at individual tourists from both countries who, from now on, will have to produce an invitation from friends or relatives in the other country. The invitation must be endorsed by the East German police. These restrictions are to remain in force until the "situation in Poland is stabilized." For details, see Leslie Colitt in the *Financial Times*, Oct. 31, 1980.

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Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan

By Zalmay Khalilzad

Almost a year has passed since the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. To all parties involved, the year has been costly. Afghanistan's population has been faced with severe hardships; more than a million refugees have fled to Iran and Pakistan; a state of war governs life in the cities, with curfews and food shortages; badly needed experts, from diplomats to airline personnel, have left the country; and substantial civilian and partisan casualties have been sustained.[1] As for the USSR, its standing in the Third World has suffered from its first direct invasion of a Third World country since World War II. Relations with the West have also worsened, and embargoes have been imposed. Despite the costs of maintaining some 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan and of incurring as many as 15,000 casualties among these forces,[2] Moscow has not yet succeeded in subduing the Afghans. Indeed, only if one assumes that the sole purpose of the intervention was to avert the imminent emergence of a hostile regime in Kabul or to get rid of Hafizullah Amin, can Soviet strategy be deemed to have achieved its ends.

What factors led to the Soviet effort to take control of Afghanistan? What is the Soviet strategy for pacification of the country and for minimizing external support for Afghan partisans? What is the nature of the Afghan opposition, and what are the prospects for unity or division among partisan groups? The answers to these questions provide some basis for hazarding an assessment of the possible future course of the Afghan conflict.

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The Political Context

The Soviet invasion marked a major escalation in the USSR's long and persistent involvement in Afghanistan. As a result, today it is essentially the Soviets who govern Afghanistan—deciding on major appointments, setting policies for dealing with the national insurgency, and determining major internal and external policies (including major speeches by Afghan representatives at the United Nations).[3] What circumstances brought this major shift?

Soviet involvement in Afghanistan increased substantially after April 1978, when a coalition of the two rival factions of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) overthrew the Mohammad Daoud regime in a military coup.[4] Both factions, Parcham (headed by Babrak Karmal) and Khalq (headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki), were Marxist-Leninist and sympathetic to the Soviet Union, but on other matters, they had major conflicts.[5] Less than three months after the coup, these dissensions had reached the level of a total break, from which Khalq emerged victorious.[6] Some of Parcham's leaders were jailed; others, including Karmal, formed a rival group in exile in Eastern Europe.

[1] *Pakistan Affairs* (Washington, DC), Aug. 16, 1980, p. 1.

[2] ABC Evening News, Sept. 18, 1980. Already in July, Soviet casualties were estimated at between 8,000 and 10,000. *Sunday Times* (London), July 27, 1980.

[3] Soviet control over Afghanistan's diplomacy was reported to the author by a private source.

[4] For a detailed discussion of the 1978 coup, see Hannah Negaran (pseud.), "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Spring 1979, pp. 93–113.

[5] Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan Under the *Khalq*," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July–August 1979, pp. 34–50.

[6] See Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Superpowers and the Northern Tier," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1979–1980, pp. 6–30.

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

Signs of the Soviet-backed anti-insurgent effort in Afghanistan: at left, destruction wrought in a village by Soviet-flown MiG's; at right, Afghan partisans examine a bomb that failed to go off during an attack on a village by a Soviet MiG-21.

—Sipa Press/Black Star and David Kline/SYGMA.

Khalq embarked on a radical shift in the country's external and internal policies. Externally, the new government moved Afghanistan decidedly closer to the Soviet Union.[7] Internally, fundamental reforms were introduced. Some of these reforms, such as laws dealing with marriage and the situation of women, were long overdue. However, the reforms were badly planned and were combined with unpopular symbolic acts such as the adoption of a red flag. Despite regime denials, these acts convinced many traditional Afghans of the Marxist nature of the government and contributed to large-scale popular opposition. Over time, this opposition turned into a major antiregime insurgency.

As Afghanistan's internal situation began to deteriorate seriously and Islamic fundamentalists took power in Iran, the Soviet Union started to look for a way to salvage the Afghan situation. Their initial plan was to eliminate Hafizullah Amin, Khalq's strong man; blame the excesses of the regime on him; abandon some of the more unpopular policies; and establish a broadly based government, including Parchamis.[8] This plan failed and resulted in the elimination of Taraki by Amin in September 1979.

While Amin tried to salvage the internal situation and even improve relations with the West and Pakistan, the Soviets began to lay the groundwork for their invasion. Moscow gave refuge to those who had backed Taraki against Amin, stepped up contact with the Parchami exiles in Eastern Europe and brought Babrak Karmal to Moscow, increased the Soviet military presence inside Afghanistan by persuading Amin that he needed greater Soviet assistance in the conflict with the Afghan guerrillas, and bolstered Soviet military capabilities in areas of the USSR near the Afghan border.[9] These actions were clear warning signals of a major Soviet military move against Afghanistan's President Amin. After the invasion, several Western leaders expressed surprise at this Soviet move. In fact, however, information about the Soviet Union's preparatory steps was available to Western governments and to the public through press leaks.[10] But much of the international community, including the United States, either misinterpreted or ignored these signals for a great deal of the period prior to the invasion. There is no evidence than any major steps were taken by other states to induce a change in Soviet calculations and plans.

On December 27, 1979, the USSR made its move. On the pretext of an invitation from a regime that had allegedly overthrown Amin (and whose leader, Babrak Karmal, was not even in Afghanistan), the Soviet

[7] Ibid.

[8] For a discussion of circumstances leading to the Soviet invasion, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "Afghanistan and the Crisis in American Foreign Policy," *Survival* (London), July-August 1980, pp. 151-61, and William E. Griffith, "Superpower Relations After Afghanistan," ibid., pp. 146-51.

[9] *Dawn Overseas* (Karachi), Oct. 27, 1979, and *The New York Times*, Dec. 8 and 22, 1979.

[10] Ibid.

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

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Union entered the country in force. Soviet troops airlifted to Kabul captured major military installations, toppled Amin (who was killed in the confusion), and installed Karmal in power. Other forces moved to seize military bases in Mazar-e Sharif, Gardez, Jalalabad, Qandahar, Qonduz, and Herat (see map).[11]

Soviet Strategy in Afghanistan

Once in Afghanistan, the Soviets initiated a multipronged pacification strategy. This strategy has included a substantial emphasis on Islam; a major propaganda effort to blame the Afghan crisis on the United States and China; an attempt to keep the rival factions of the pro-Soviet PDP together; an effort to moderate some unpopular economic policies; an attempt to build a loyal Afghan armed force; the use of some 85,000 Soviet troops against a variety of religious, ideological, regional, and tribal opposition; and persistent intimidation of neighboring countries to prevent them from providing the Afghan opposition support and sanctuary.

Islam in Soviet tactics. Since the invasion, the Soviets have been engaged in a major ideological effort to win popular support for the new Kabul regime. They recognize the political power of Islamic revival in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and have tried to prevent it from taking an anti-Soviet character and to give it an anti-US orientation. In Afghanistan, emphasis on Islam has been a major part of the Kabul government's official statements. Khalq's all-red flag has been changed to one featuring the Islamic color of green. The government has established an office of "Islamic teachings," under Karmal's direction. Some religious leaders jailed under Amin were released after the invasion. Kabul's new rulers have also sponsored a series of meetings with local religious leaders from various parts of the country and have organized a national conference of "religious scholars and clergy" to persuade them that "respect for [the] sacred religion of Islam" is part of the government's program.[12]

Babrak Karmal himself has tried to outdo Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran in "dedication" to Islam. Each of Karmal's speeches begins with a reference to Allah and is interspersed with quotations from the Koran, chants of "Allahu Akbar" (God is Great), and references to Afghanistan's Islamic tradition.[13]

Babrak Karmal, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, meets with one of the delegates to a July 1980 conference of the country's Islamic ulemas and mullahs in Kabul.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Karmal has accused the United States, among others, of only pretending to be friendly to Islam:

My compatriots, it is the countries of America, Britain, and China who are falsely talking in the name of Islam. Is it not written in the holy Koran that the Jews no longer have the right to own a home? Is it not written that the Jews are the enemies of Islam? The US, Britain, and China, who are strengthening Israel, have become the friends of the Jews.[14]

Karmal has also argued that true Islam exists in Soviet Central Asia, and offered to pay expenses for Afghan ulemas and clergy who wished to see for themselves.[15] A delegation of 88 Afghan religious leaders was sent to the Soviet Union to "visit

[11] *The New York Times,* Jan. 23, 1980.

[12] The text of the "Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," as released by Afghanistan's mission to the United Nations and published in the *Newsletter* of the Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society, June 1980, pp. 48–52. See also *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Feb. 8, 1980.

[13] See, for example, Karmal's speech to Afghan elders, broadcast on Radio Kabul in Dari on June 18, 1980, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SAS*), June 20, 1980, pp. C/1–5.

[14] Ibid., p. C/2.

[15] See Karmal's address to a conference of Afghan ulemas and clergy on July 1, as broadcast by Kabul Radio in Pashto, July 2, 1980, in *FBIS-SAS*, July 7, 1980, p. C/3.

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mosques, miscellaneous places and to hold meetings with Muslims of the USSR" to see for themselves that the USSR is Islamic.[16] Karmal has even said that the "date of December 27 represents the intervention of God Almighty," and has called the Soviet "help" for the Afghans "an act of God."[17]

A propaganda blitz. Since the invasion, Soviet media have paid enormous attention to events in Afghanistan. The same themes are repeated, and the analysis is predictable. The goal has been to win popular support for Soviet actions, both in the USSR and in Afghanistan. This effort has become especially important as the military difficulties have increased.

Moscow's 42-hour-a-week broadcasts to Afghanistan in Dari and Pashto (the country's two main languages) and the Soviet-controlled Afghan propaganda machinery have tried to convince the Afghans and others that only a "limited Soviet military contingent" was sent to Afghanistan and then only at the repeated request of the "legitimate Afghan government"; that the overthrow and execution of Amin were carried out "by the Afghan army itself, supported by broad strata of the population";[18] and that the sole function of Soviet "assistance" was to defend Afghanistan against outside attacks.[19] Those accused by Moscow of attacking Afghanistan include the United States, China, Pakistan, Egypt, and Israel.[20] President Amin is declared to have been a CIA agent.[21] The US response to the Afghanistan invasion was described as part of a continuous effort by Washington to sabotage détente, to revive the cold war,[22] and to take up a "hegemonist course."[23] President Carter's State of the Union message in January 1980 was characterized as a declaration that the United States had the right "to intervene in practically any region of the globe where they see fit."[24] In a February 1980 speech, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev argued that the "US and Chinese interference in Afghanistan" was a threat not only to that country, but to the USSR as well"[25]—a theme that has been persistent in Soviet propaganda.

President Karmal has charged that the US and its allies had "worked out" a plan "so that 3-4 million people of Afghanistan would have been killed. Their designs," said Karmal, "were to have Afghanistan torn to pieces and divided into several parts. One part was to go to Pakistan, one part to China, and Kabul and its surrounding area were to go to Amin. . . ."[26]

The Soviets have asserted on many occasions that their troops will be withdrawn as soon as the causes for their presence (outside interference) are eliminated. Delay in the departure of the troops is blamed especially on the US.[27] (Soviet behavior belies such assertions. Moscow has rejected as "illogical" the British-sponsored proposal of the European Common Market for neutralization of Afghanistan with international guarantees if the Soviets withdraw,[28] and has refused to enter into negotiations about the fate of Afghanistan with a three-person committee appointed by the Islamic Conference.[29] It has shown a similar attitude toward several Iranian proposals.[30] And, as we shall see below, the Soviet military presence shows no signs of being a short-term phenomenon.)

In their propaganda efforts within Afghanistan, the Soviets and the Karmal regime have focused their attention particularly on Afghan youth. A new weekly publication known as *Darafshe Jawanan* (Youth Flag) has appeared, aimed at gaining support among the youth. The government has established a new school named the "Faculty of Workers" to train Afghan youth ideologically, and hundreds of Afghan students have been sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries. One important Afghan-Soviet undertaking is an agreement to send some 350 ninth graders a year to the Soviet Union for "vocational training."[31]

Elusive PDP unity. A major Soviet goal since the occupation has been to harmonize relations between the rival PDP factions—Khalq and Parcham—and to broaden the base of support for the regime by bring-

[16] Radio Kabul in Pashto, July 6, 1980, in *FBIS-SAS*, July 7, 1980.
[17] See Karmal's June 18, 1980, speech, loc. cit.
[18] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 7, 1980.
[19] Ibid., Jan. 6, 1980. See also Peter Kenez, "What Russia Is Reading About Afghanistan," *The New Leader* (New York, NY), Feb. 11, 1980; and Adrian Karatnycky, "In for the Long Haul: Reporting the Line in Afghanistan," *Commonweal* (New York, NY), May 23, 1980.
[20] *Pravda, Jan. 24, 1980.*
[21] Ibid., Jan. 18, 1980.
[22] Ibid., Jan. 5, 1980.
[23] Ibid., Jan. 25, 1980.
[24] Ibid., Jan. 12, 1980.
[25] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 25, 1980.
[26] See Karmal's June 18, 1980, speech, loc. cit., p. C/3.
Amin has also been accused of establishing contact with one of the main religious opposition groups, the Islamic Party, and of plotting to carry out another coup against the PDP. See *Kabul New Times*, Jan. 22 and 27, 1980.
[27] Brezhnev has stated: "The United States loudly demands a withdrawal of Soviet troops when in fact, they do everything to eliminate this possibility. Let the USA, together with Afghanistan's neighbors, guarantee this [stopping outside interference] and then the need for Soviet military assistance will disappear." *Izvestiya*, Feb. 25, 1980.
[28] Ibid., Feb. 21, 1980.
[29] *The New York Times*, May 22, 1980.
[30] Syed Shabbir Hussain et al., *Afghanistan Under Soviet Occupation*, Islamabad, World Affairs Publications, 1980, p. 192.
[31] *Kabul New Times*, Sept. 7, 1980.

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KABUL NEW TIMES

VOL. XVII NO. 3 Tuesday, January 1, 1980 (Jadi 11, 1358 S.H.) PRICE AFS 6

Sanguinary Amin band ousted

United PDPA ends reign of terror; murderer meets his fate

Historical statement of Jaddi 6, 1358

Babrak Karmal, Central Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the DRA





Part of page 1 of the January 1, 1980, issue of Kabul New Times, *announcing the installation of a new regime in Afghanistan headed by Babrak Karmal, of the Parcham wing of the People's Democratic Party (PDP). Pictured below Karmal were leading figures of the Revolutionary Council, including Assadullah Sarwari and Lt. Col. Mohammad Aslam Watanjar of the PDP's Khalq faction.*

—Arnaud de Wildenberg/Gamma-Liaison.

ing some nonparty members into government positions. Babrak Karmal, upon being installed as President, claimed the leadership of a united party. Several Khalqis, especially those who had been loyal to Taraki, were appointed to high positions in the regime. These included Assadullah Sarwari, who was named First Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President of the Revolutionary Council; Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi, Minister of the Interior and Member of the Central Committee of the PDP; Lt. Colonel Sher Jan Mazdooryar, Minister of Transport and member of the Central Committee of the PDP; and Lt. Colonel Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, Minister of Communications and member of the Central Committee.

However, there are many indications that the Soviets have not been successful in effecting complete integration of the two groups. Factional conflicts have been reported at all levels of the civil and military bureaucracy.[32] At the highest level, Sarwari—like Karmal himself in 1978—has been dismissed and relegated to the post of ambassador to a pro-Soviet capital, in this case Ulan Bator.[33] There have also been accounts of feuds and shoot-outs between the

[32] There are various roots of the traditional conflicts between Khalq and Parcham. For one, Khalq is largely dominated by persons of Pashtun background, whereas Parcham has a greater Tajik representation. Khalq has also tended to favor a more radical social and economic program than Parcham. See Zalmay Khalilzad's *The Return of the Great Game: Superpower Rivalry and Domestic Turmoil in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey,* Los Angeles, CA, California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, 1980.

[33] *The Economist* (London), Aug. 30, 1980. Sarwari was replaced by an unknown Khalqi figure, Abdorrashid Arian.

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two factions at lower levels of the military. For example, the appointment of a Parchami officer to replace a Khalqi one to command the 14th Armored Division in Ghazni reportedly contributed to that division's mutiny in August 1980.[34] In October, there were reports of shootings between the rival factions in the 4th and 15th armored brigades in the Puli-charkhi garrison near Kabul.[35]

Many Parchamis who suffered under Khalqi rule seem bent on taking revenge on those who had supported Amin and even Taraki.[36] For their part, Khalqis, who reportedly constituted two thirds of the PDP civilian membership and four fifths of the party's military wing,[37] regard Parchamis as usurpers and unqualified to rule.

Internal conflict has demoralized the PDP and further complicated the crisis of legitimacy and security for the Kabul regime. It is also a persistent headache for the Soviets. Too close an identification by Moscow with the Parchamis might bring Khalqis to unite in active opposition to the Soviet presence in the country.[38] The Soviet Union, on the other hand, may be trying to maintain ties with the Khalq wing as a reserve should Karmal fail to cope with the situation in Afghanistan. There is, for example, nothing to prevent Moscow from trotting Sarwari back from Ulan Bator or putting some other Khalq leader at the helm in Kabul should circumstances dictate.

Karmal's effort to broaden his regime's base has also failed. Initially, he argued that his government would be based upon a "national united front under the leadership of the working class." He also promised the establishment of "revolutionary tranquillity" and elimination of arbitrary arrest and executions, and assured Afghans that in his "New Model Revolution" citizens would be allowed to form "progressive and patriotic parties."[39] Karmal stated, too, that a Loya Jirgah (Grand National Assembly) would be called to ratify a new constitution for the country, and he appointed more than a dozen nonparty members to high government positions.[40]

Like the other elements of the Soviet strategy, this base-broadening has not been successful. For one thing, the establishment of opposition groups has not been allowed. For another, Afghanistan remains in a state of war, with the large majority of the population opposed to the Soviet occupation, an opposition expressed with varying degrees of activism. Karmal's efforts to win support have fallen largely on deaf ears because of the presence of Soviet troops. Until or unless the troops depart, the government in Kabul will suffer from a lack of legitimacy.

Economic policies. The Soviet-installed regime has attempted to win popular support by undoing some of the "radical" policies introduced by the previous government in the economic realm and by encouraging the private sector through extension of credit and increased payment for goods delivered to the government by private firms. Karmal has argued that "it is not our duty to practice socialism."[41] According to the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the government has returned "illegally confiscated" capital and shares. In addition, it has permitted direct business links with foreign firms under state control, and has lowered customs tariffs.[42] To encourage private-sector participation in trade, the government has reportedly turned 20 state-controlled import associations over to private merchants.[43] Afghan sources claim that imports by the private sector during the first four months of 1980 totaled US$88.3 million, an increase of more than 50 percent over imports of US$55.6 million in the comparable period of 1979.[44]

Afghanistan's main trading partners reportedly continue to be the Soviet Union, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, and India. In the early part of 1980, trade with Japan was running at three times the level for the comparable 1979 period. As for the USSR, one of its first acts after invading Afghanistan was to announce conclusion of a new agreement with the Karmal government to triple the export of natural gas to the Soviet Union (to 2.3 billion cubic feet a year). As in the past, the Soviets are getting Afghan gas at a price far below the international level. (After 1973, Iran charged the Soviets more than 50 cents a 1000 cubic feet, while as late as 1976, the USSR was paying only 34 cents a 1000 cubic feet to the Afghans.) It is estimated that at present the Soviets are giving US$2.83 a 1000 cubic feet for Afghan gas,

[34] Ibid., Aug. 8, 1980.
[35] *The New York Times*, Oct. 16, 1980.
[36] Among the Khalqis executed were 10 associates of Amin, including his brother and nephew. Ibid., June 19, 1980.
[37] *The Economist*, Aug. 8, 1980.
[38] There is already evidence of some isolated Khalqi opposition to the occupation. *The New York Times*, Oct. 16, 1980.
[39] *Kabul New Times*, Jan. 1, 1980.
[40] For details, see Richard S. Newell, "Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan," *The World Today* (London), July 1980, esp. pp. 257–58.
[41] *Kabul New Times*, Jan. 1, 1980.
[42] From an interview with correspondent I. Shchedrov, published in *Pravda*, Sept. 8, 1980, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Sept. 17, 1980, pp. D/2–4.
[43] *Manchester Guardian*, Feb. 10, 1980.
[44] Shchedrov interview, loc. cit.

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Crowds and onlookers during a shopkeepers' strike in Kabul in February 1980.

—Ariane/Gamma-Liaison

which is substantially below the US$3.97 Moscow has offered the Iranians. The Iranians, in turn, have been demanding more than US$5.00 a 1000 cubic feet for their natural gas.[45] (The natural gas agreement, incidentally, lends some weight to the argument that "hunger for Afghanistan's important and strategic minerals was an incentive for the Soviet invasion and attempt to annex Kabul to the Soviet bloc."[46])

Occupied by Soviet forces and in a state of civil war, Afghanistan continues to face major economic problems which have contributed to the regime's continued unpopularity. There are serious shortages of essential items, such as wheat, rice, and meat, in many parts of the country.[47] Remittances from Afghan workers abroad have declined. Work on several development projects financed by international organizations such as the Asia Development Bank has been suspended. Many months of turmoil, a Soviet military strategy that involves the destruction of villages harboring partisans, and the departure of many agricultural workers to Pakistan have contributed to a breakdown in the country's agriculture, a process set in motion earlier by a poorly planned land reform. Some have speculated that starving the population in the areas of greatest resistance through destruction of the region's agriculture might be a calculated Soviet strategy.[48]

Opposition to the Soviets has included shopkeeper strikes, the most important of which took place in February in Kabul and Herat. There have also been such strikes in Qandahar and other towns.[49] The insurgents often interrupt land transport. One road that has been frequently cut is the one linking Kabul to Jalalabad.[50] In addition, Ariana Afghan Airlines recently suffered the defection of nearly 250 personnel, including the country's chief pilot.[51] All these factors cumulatively have increased the country's economic problems, resulting in shortages and substantially higher prices.

Building loyal Afghan armed forces. A major element of the post-invasion Soviet policy has been to reconstitute an Afghan armed force of pre-1978 size

[45] *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), May 16, 1980.

[46] *Business Week* (New York, NY), Sept. 29, 1980.
This analysis also argues that the Soviet-sponsored coup of 1978 was itself designed to halt President Daoud's attempts to weaken Afghanistan's ties—including economic ones—with Moscow and to improve ties with Iran and the West. The basis for this judgment is a three-year-old geological study by Soviet experts that showed Afghanistan to possess substantial quantities of copper, oil, gas, barite, bauxite, beryl, iron ore, fluorspar, coal, and chrome ore. According to *Business Week*, this study has been translated by the UN Development Program.

[47] *Afghanistan Times* (Los Angeles, CA), March 1980, and *Asiaweek*, Feb. 15, 1980.

[48] See, for example, *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), July 21, 1980.

[49] *The Washington Post*, Feb. 8, 1980, and *Kabul New Times*, June 25, 1980.

[50] *The New York Times*, Aug. 21, 1980.

[51] *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 15, 1980, p. C/3.

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(more than 100,000 men) in order to minimize Soviet manpower losses. Already in the period between the April 1978 coup and the invasion, Afghanistan's army had experienced numerous purges of officers, a decline in morale, and a number of defections.[52] Since the invasion, the defections have continued. At the end of July 1980, the 14th Armored Division based in Ghazni reportedly mutinied. Effective regular Afghan military strength in September 1980 was estimated at less than 30,000.[53] The Russians cannot entirely trust even this small force, especially with weapons that might be useful for the partisans.

The Kabul regime has taken several measures to increase the number of Afghans fighting against the rebels. One has been to reduce the legal draft age from 22 to 20. Another is to ask many persons such as teachers, "the only breadwinner" in the family, and university students—all previously exempted from military service—to enlist.[54] Forced recruitment, however, will present the Soviets with the dilemma that unwilling recruits are potential insurgents.

The Soviet-backed regime has also been trying to organize a party-controlled militia consisting of young recruits. To increase incentives to join the militia and remain with it, the regime is reportedly offering a princely monthly salary in excess of US$160, more than Afghanistan's annual gross national product per capita.[55] According to Kabul reports, these militia were used during August-September in battles against the partisans in northern Afghanistan near Mazar-e Sharif.[56] Kabul is also sending large numbers of young Afghans to the USSR for military training.[57]

Soviet military operations. Many months after the invasion, the internal security situation in Afghanistan has not improved significantly. Soviet forces have found themselves forced to adapt to unexpected conditions. They appear to foresee a long struggle and to be developing a capability for an indefinite stay.

At first, the Soviet Union relied on large-scale ground operations involving use of tanks, armored vehicles, and large troop formations. These forces had difficulty in maneuvering in the mountainous terrain that the partisans use as bases for hit-and-run operations against the occupying Soviets and the Kabul regime.[58] Consequently, the Soviets have increasingly deployed helicopter-borne commandos, backed by columns of motorized infantry. Moscow has also employed fighter-bombers to soften up partisan targets ahead of commando strikes. There have been a number of charges that Soviet forces have used napalm, nerve gas, booby traps, antipersonnel cluster bombs (filled with thousands of needle-sharp arrows), and internationally outlawed dum-dum bullets.[59] The

[52] *The New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1979, and Jan. 1, 1980; and *New York Crescent* (New York, NY), Nov. 16, 1979.

[53] US Department of State, *Soviet Dilemma in Afghanistan*, Special Report No. 72, Washington, DC, June 1980. Others have placed the number of Afghan soldiers as low as 15,000-20,000. See Agence France-Presse (AFP), Hong Kong, report on estimates in New Delhi diplomatic circles, in *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 10, 1980, p. C/6.

[54] *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 10, 1980, p. C/6.

[55] *The Baltimore Sun*, Sept. 3, 1980.

[56] For references to the fighters of the "Democratic Youth Organization," see FBIS-SAS, Sept. 11, 1980, pp. C/1-3, and Sept 17, 1980, p. C/3.

[57] *The Economist*, Aug. 23, 1980.

[58] The hit-and-run operations also extend into the cities. One such urban group, called "Jan Nasaran" (Suicide Squad), operates in Kabul. Such groups have as their slogan the phrase "Russ Kushi" (Kill the Russians). *Afghanistan Times*, March 1980, p. 1.

[59] *The New York Times*, Jan. 8 and Sept. 11, 1980; *The Economist*, Feb. 16, 1980; *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Aug. 18, 1980.

(continued on page 32)



Colonel Abdul Rauf, a former leader in the Afghan Army, who joined the Islamic rebels in Kunar Province with 2,000 men. Before defecting, Rauf called in a Soviet helicopter, which was shot down by rebel forces.

—Steve McCurry/Gamma-Liaison.

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new Soviet strategy has caused the destruction of many Afghan villages and has contributed to a substantial increase in the flow of Afghan refugees to Iran and Pakistan.

It has been reported that the Soviets, apparently uncertain of how to contain the counterinsurgency, have called in Cuban and Vietnamese experts to help in the war against the fast-moving Afghan guerrillas.[60] Moreover, as the conflict has dragged on, the Soviet Union has gradually brought in "older and more experienced" troops to replace the young and largely inexperienced draftees who make up the bulk of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan.[61]

As of September 1980, the USSR had deployed in Afghanistan some 85,000 men and 320 combat aircraft (including more than 70 MI-24 helicopters, the weapon most feared by the partisans; more than 100 MiG-21's; some 30 MiG-23's; and several Ilyushin bombers).[62] In addition, the Soviets maintain a substantial force in Soviet Central Asia near the Afghan border for possible use in Afghanistan.

Initially, the Soviets took control of Afghan military bases in the Kabul area, and at Mazar-e Sharif, Gardez, Jalalabad, Qandahar, Qonduz, and Herat. Later the Soviets divided the country into seven military commands. Moscow's 201st Motorized Rifle Division, located in Qonduz and Feyzabad in the northeast, is largely responsible for that region's security. The 16th Motorized Rifle Division, based in Mazar-e Sharif, is responsible for the security of Balkh Province and the surrounding region. The 275th Division, operating out of Jalalabad, is responsible for the east-central region. The 105th Airborne Division and the 360th Motorized Rifle Division are responsible for the security of Kabul and its neighboring areas. The 54th Division (located in Herat) and the 68th Division (stationed at the airbase in nearby Shindand) are responsible for the security of much of western Afghanistan. The 357th Motorized Rifle Division looks after security in Qandahar.[63] In each of these military regions, the Soviets have several hundred commando forces as well. Although all such regions have a local PDP leader, they are in fact governed by Soviet generals.[64]

In addition, it would appear that the war against the Afghan insurgents has given the Soviet Union an opportunity to test in combat a variety of new weapons, including a new type of armored personnel carrier, new helicopters, new assault rifles, and new automatic grenade launchers. See *The New York Times*, Sept. 11, 1980.

[60] *The Times* (London), Sept. 19, 1980.

[61] Ibid.; also *The Washington Star*, Sept. 4, 1980.

[62] *The New York Times*, Oct. 9, 1980.

[63] Ibid.

[64] *Daily Telegraph* (London), Sept. 3, 1980.

Soviet armored personnel carriers at a strategic point along an Afghan road.

—Barrie Penrose/Camera Press.

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Other signs of increased Soviet capability for an indefinite stay in Afghanistan include the reported establishment of separate Soviet military headquarters and the construction of permanent underground storage facilities for fuel and ammunition. They are building at least one permanent bridge across the Amu Darya at Termez. They have constructed permanent communication facilities, upgraded Afghan airfields, enlarged existing helicopter gunship maintenance workshops, and begun construction on new airports. They are also reported to be considering plans to construct a railroad in Afghanistan linking Kabul with the Soviet rail system.[65] Finally, to "legitimize" the Soviet presence, Moscow has signed a status-of-forces agreement with the Karmal regime. This agreement is similar to those in effect between the USSR and several East European countries.

Soviet pressure on Afghanistan's neighbors. The USSR has exerted both implicit and explicit pressure on Afghanistan's neighbors in an attempt to limit their reaction to the Soviet invasion.

The Islamic countries were clearly shocked by the Soviet decision to intervene. Many regarded Moscow's actions as belying Soviet claims to be a supporter of national liberation movements. In the United Nations and in the Islamic Conference, they condemned the Soviet aggression against a small, nonaligned member of the international community. When various efforts to resolve the crisis on a regional basis came to no avail, the Islamic Conference voted, on January 29, 1980, to suspend Afghanistan from membership until Soviet troops are withdrawn from that country.[66] Pakistan and Iran joined the boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

Some regional actors are even providing limited assistance to the Afghan resistance movement. Saudi Arabia has announced it will extend US$25 million to the insurgents.[67] Pakistan is sheltering more than a million Afghan refugees and is furnishing sanctuary to several partisan groups (see the discussion below). Egypt has reportedly also been providing some military equipment and training to the Afghans.[68]

At the same time, many states in the region, particularly Arab states, tend to view the Afghan crisis as of secondary importance compared to the Palestinian problem. They regard a Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli dispute as beneficial to the cause of the Palestinians and hence do not want to jeopardize relations with Moscow because of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has played on this sentiment by encouraging the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to seek to mediate between the Kabul regime and several Muslim states.[69] Countries dependent on Moscow for substantial economic and military support, e.g., Syria (one could also mention India), have been careful not to antagonize the Soviet Union in their reactions to the Afghanistan intervention.

Other states have been restrained in their responses out of a feeling of intimidation. This is true of Pakistan and Iran, both of which the Soviets have explicitly warned against helping the Afghan opposition.[70]

Pakistan is particularly critical in this regard. The position that Islamabad takes regarding the Afghan partisans will have an important bearing on the success or failure of Soviet policy in Afghanistan. By continuing to provide sanctuary and limited support for groups fighting the Soviets, Pakistan can be an obstacle to the Soviet pacification strategy. On the other hand, Pakistan could help the Soviet cause if it acted to make things very difficult for the partisans.

Recognizing this, the Soviet Union has applied considerable pressure on Pakistan. Soviet aircraft have frequently violated Pakistan's airspace,[71] and Moscow has threatened to support political groups inside Pakistan opposed to the government of President Zia-ul-Haq, with an eye toward installing a government that would be hostile toward the Afghan partisans.[72] Several leading members of the opposition Pakistan People's Party, including Morteza Bhutto, the son of the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, have visited Kabul and New Delhi.[73] There is also the possibility of Soviet support for ethnic nationalists in the Pashtun (Pathan), Baluch, and Sind areas of Pakistan. The Kabul regime has been in touch with opposition groups in these areas, especially those unfriendly to the Afghan partisans, and Karmal has threatened open support for Pakistan's Baluch and Pashtun nationalists.[74] Finally, the USSR could conceivably

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[65] *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 10, 1980, p. D/5, and *The Washington Post*, Jan. 8, 1980. The report *Soviet Dilemma in Afghanistan* cited in fn. 53 above mentions a second permanent bridge under construction, but the author could not confirm this report.

[66] *Dawn Overseas*, weekly edition, Feb. 19–25, 1980.

[67] *The Middle East* (London), August 1980, pp. 36–37.

[68] *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1980.

[69] Some PLO members have openly praised Kabul's Soviet-installed regime. The author heard this expressed in an interview with Dr. Mohammad Ashahir, head of the PLO office in Moscow, broadcast on Radio Moscow's Persian-language service on Mar. 27, 1980.

[70] *The New York Times*, Jan. 8, 1980.

[71] According to Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq, there have been 200 violations of Pakistan's airspace by Soviet and Afghan aircraft. Ibid., Sept. 27, 1980.

[72] *Business Week*, Sept. 15, 1980.

[73] *MERIP Reports* (Washington, DC), September 1980, pp. 24–28.

[74] *The Middle East*, August 1980, pp. 36–37.

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Afghan rebels at Miram Shah in Pakistan prepare to return to the struggle against forces of the USSR and the Soviet-backed Karmal regime in Afghanistan's Paktia Province.

—Jim Sheldon/Contact.

move against Pakistani territory proper, for "defensive" reasons.

While the Pakistanis have generally held back from challenging Soviet air incursions militarily, they have protested shelling of Afghan refugee camps by the Soviet forces in Afghanistan.[75] Recently, Islamabad expelled the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan, Sarwar Azimov, on charges of subversion.[76] It also closed the Soviet press and information office in Karachi and asked the USSR to reduce the number of its embassy diplomats in Pakistan.[77] New restrictions on travel by foreign diplomats inside Pakistan likewise seem aimed primarily at persons from Soviet-bloc countries.[78]

But faced with various forms of Soviet pressure, the government in Islamabad has shown itself reluctant to allow significant amounts of Western weapons to reach those fighting Babrak Karmal's government and Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, it is unlikely to meet Soviet demands that it stop Afghan partisans from entering Pakistan. Indeed, it would have serious difficulty—as would a government hostile to the partisans—in completely controlling its border with Afghanistan.

Iran, too, seems intimidated by Soviet pressure. For example, Tehran has refused to permit establishment of a partisan-controlled Afghan radio station on Iranian territory.[79] Moreover, Iran's state of war with Iraq is not likely to increase Tehran's willingness to incur Soviet displeasure regarding the Afghan situation.

Moscow's Afghan Opposition

So far, we have focused on Moscow's strategy for Afghanistan. However, this strategy's success or failure, or at minimum the cost of pursuing it, will depend to a considerable measure on the nature of the domestic opposition to the Karmal regime.

[75] Pakistan's restraint may be wearing a bit thin. In one incident on Sept. 26, 1980, an Afghan helicopter was shot down, and two Pakistani security officers were killed. See *The New York Times*, Sept. 27, 1980.

[76] *The Washington Post*, Aug. 31, 1980.

[77] Reportedly, the Soviets were spreading anti-Zia publications in the Karachi area. Ibid.

[78] Ibid.

[79] From private interviews by the author with Afghan resistance leaders.

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This resistance to the Soviet occupation and the Karmal regime has taken many forms. We have already mentioned strikes by shopkeepers. Students and pupils also have demonstrated against the government, beginning in Kabul at the time of the February shopkeepers' strike. There were student demonstrations of a more violent nature in Kabul on April 25-30, 1979. Students have continued to express their displeasure by boycotting classes and participating in the distribution of "shabnama" (literally, night letters—mimeographed or handwritten statements critical of the occupiers and distributed secretly under cover of darkness).

In addition, there has been substantial open violence, ranging from spontaneous assaults on solitary Soviet soldiers in towns and attacks against Soviet and Afghan government personnel and offices in Kabul and other centers, to interruption of transport through acts of sabotage and harassment, to organized partisan operations against Soviet and "loyal" Afghan forces.

Although violent opposition to the occupation has spread all over the country, it has varied in intensity from region to region over time. Immediately after the invasion, some of the fiercest fighting took place in Badakhshan Province and the surrounding region, home of a number of anti-Soviet Central Asian Muslims who had fled the Soviet Union after the Russian revolution. Soviet forces have tried to isolate Badakhshan from the rest of the country, causing serious food shortages there, and have used some of their forces based in Central Asia in attacks against Badakhshi fighters.[80] Another region where considerable fighting took place early on after the Soviet intervention was in the Konar valley of eastern Afghanistan.[81]

From Badakhshan and Konar, the fighting spread, although in an uncoordinated way, to other parts of the country, including the areas surrounding Kabul. The opposition has in fact managed to maintain control of many parts of the countryside.[82] It has also at times challenged Soviet control of major cities. For example, Jalalabad and Herat came under partial opposition control during August and September 1980.[83]

However, it is in the Panjsher valley where the most serious fighting involving Soviet air and ground forces has taken place recently. As elsewhere in the Afghan countryside, the Soviet pacification effort in Panjsher has been a failure to date. Reportedly, the Soviets withdrew from the valley in September 1980 after suffering major losses.[84]

Principal Insurgent Groups

The groups leading the insurgency today are basically the same ones that attacked the Khalqi regimes of Taraki and Amin, calling them "Stalinist" and declaring their decrees null and void because of a lack of "an Islamic foundation."[85] The Soviet intervention has lent greater legitimacy to the opposition groups by giving them the role of fighters for the liberation of their homeland from foreign occupation. It is no longer an internal conflict, but a war for freedom and independence.

Although there are numerous groups involved in the struggle against Moscow, the best-known ones are motivated by Islam and headquartered in areas of Pakistan and Iran close to the Afghan border. Some of these have been active for many years against the spread of secularism and Marxist ideologies in Afghanistan. In the 1960's, they organized Jawanani Musalman (Young Muslims) and Nedai-Haq (Voice of Truth) groups and the Islamic newspapers *Gahiz* and *Nedai-Haq*. Leading members of Jawanani Musalman were Abdul Rahim Niazi, Gulam Mohammad Niazi, Abdul Rasul Sayyef, Rabbani Paghmani, Habibur Rahman, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, Sayffuddin, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Gul Mohammad.[86]

At present, the chief Islamic groups headquartered in Pakistan number six. One is the National Liberation Front, headed by Sebqatullah Mojadedi. He is from an old and well-known Afghan family, and has strong ties with some of the members of the traditional Afghan power elite. Another is the National Front for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Gailani, who was the main force behind a limited and largely unsuccessful Loya Jirgah meeting earlier this year in Pakistan.[87] Gailani also claims to be a descendant of the prophet and was until recently an important businessman. He has strong ties with the former

[80] Ibid.

[81] *The Economist*, Feb. 16, 1980, p. 47.

[82] *The New York Times*, Feb. 13, 1980, and *The Times* (London), Sept. 19, 1980.

[83] *Daily Telegraph*, Aug. 29, 1980, and *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 18, 1980, p. C/3.

[84] From personal interviews with opposition sources.

[85] *Istiqamat* (in Persian—a monthly magazine of the Afghan Islamic Movement in Iran), No. 5, Zehija, 1399 (1979), p. 8.

[86] Abdul Mohammad Momozai, *Russian Crimes in Afghanistan* (in Pashtu), Peshawar, Pakistan, Afghan National and Islamic Publishing House, 1980.

[87] Gérard Chaliand, "A Visit to the Afghan Rebels," *The New York Review of Books* (New York, NY), Oct. 9, 1980, pp. 21-23.

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

Leaders of five of the six Afghan Islamic groups that formed an Islamic Rescue Front at the January 1980 Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Islamabad. Pictured from left to right are Gulbuddin Hikmatyar of the Islamic Party, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement, Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Islamic Association, Ahmad Gailani of the National Front for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan, and Sebqatullah Mojadedi of the National Liberation Front.

—UPI.

monarch, Mohammad Zahir Shah. There are two factions of the Islamic Party. One group is headed by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, the other by Mohammad Yunus Khalis. Hikmatyar has been in Pakistan since before the overthrow of Daoud and opposed the former president. He has a well-organized party and set of cadres. The fifth group is the Islamic Association, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. He is a former theology professor at Kabul University with a long record of involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has ties with similar movements in other Islamic countries. Another body with a small following is the Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Mahammad Nabi Mohammadi.

The key group in Iran is the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, led by Mohammad Asef Mohseni Qandahari. He claims to be the leader of the Afghan Shiites and is ideologically influenced by the Khomeini revolution in Iran.

There are also several small secular groups active —largely within Afghanistan itself — against the Soviets. These include the National Socialists and the Maoists. Also, some prominent politicians of the pre-1973 period such as former Prime Minister Mohammad Yusuf have tried to become involved with those opposed to the Soviet occupation,[88] perhaps hoping to become a compromise candidate to head a future Afghan government if the Soviets withdraw.

The major Islamic groups—despite their common antipathy toward the Soviet Union and sympathy for Islam—have failed to form a stable front. Under pressure from the Islamic world, especially Saudi Arabia, the six major Pakistan-based groups formed an Islamic Rescue Front toward the end of January 1980.

[88] This was communicated to the author by private sources.

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Rasul Sayyef was accepted as the president of the new alliance. But it was not long before Hikmatyar withdrew from the alliance.[89] Major disagreements persist, and it is uncertain how long the other members will remain in the Front.

The reasons for lack of unity among Moscow's Afghan opponents are many. Besides personality conflicts, there are disagreements over leadership, the shape of a future Afghanistan, the role that the former king and former high-level Afghan officials should play, and relations with other political groups and countries.

Both Hikmatyar and Gailani have claimed to enjoy the largest number of supporters.[90] Hikmatyar's group is the best armed in terms of quantity and quality of weapons, and he is apparently unwilling to share these arms with others unless he dominates the alliance. His drive for leadership is opposed especially by Gailani, Mojadedi, and Nabi. By contrast, Rabbani and Khalis (who is known to have participated in actual fighting inside Afghanistan) are more sympathetic to Hikmatyar.

Ideologically, Gailani's group is the most liberal. The groups led by Mojadedi, by Nabi, by Rabbani, and by Khalis are successively more conservative. Hikmatyar is religiously the most orthodox. The ideological differences among the partisans are most pronounced with regard to the shape of a future Afghan government, the role of the former king, relations with other countries, and prospects for a negotiated settlement of the Afghan crisis.

Hikmatyar wants to establish an Islamic Republic in Afghanistan, similar to that in Iran. He opposes any role for the royal family in the conflict with the Soviets or in a future Afghan government. He has accused ex-king Zahir Shah (who is in Italy) and his family of being at least partially responsible for the current crisis in the country. He, at times, talks about a possible trial of the former king and some of the king's associates if an Islamic Republic is established in Afghanistan.[91] Rabbani and, to a lesser extent, Khalis are sympathetic to these views.

The other three groups have not specified the shape of a future Afghan government, preferring to concentrate on first getting the Russians out of Afghanistan. Gailani, however, is known to have close contacts with Zahir Shah and his family and to favor a political role for the former ruler in a future Afghanistan. Mojadedi and Nabi are not opposed to this idea in principle, but have repeatedly argued that they are not fighting for

[89] *The New York Times*, Mar. 17 and 28, 1980.
[90] *The Economist*, Feb. 2, 1980, and *FBIS-SAS*, Feb. 6, 1980, p. C/6.

[91] Of all opposition leaders, Hikmatyar is the one whose position has been most misunderstood. For example, analyst Richard S. Newell has mistakenly called Hikmatyar's group "secularly oriented." "Revolution and Revolt in Afghanistan," *The World Today*, November 1979, p. 441. Similarly, an article in *Third World* (Mexico City), February-March 1980, refers to a Hikmatyar "plan" to bring "Nadir Shah" back to the Afghan throne. Beyond ignoring Hikmatyar's antimonarchist positions, this assertion is preposterous, for Mohammad Nadir (the father of Zahir Shah) was assassinated in 1933.



Islamic Party guerrillas (note the photo of party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar in each scene): at left, partisans brandish weapons, including an RPG-40 antitank gun, beside a disabled Soviet-type armored vehicle near the village of Khana on the Kabul-Jalalabad road; at right, an outpost in the Kunar valley.

—Sipa Press/Black Star and Lehtikuva/Photoreporters.

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the royal family.[92]

Differences on relations with external powers and groups are substantial. Hikmatyar has close links with Pakistan's Jamaati-Islami and wants external support to come largely from the Islamic world. Rabbani and Khalis are sympathetic to him on this matter. Gailani, on the other hand, does not oppose assistance from and contact with non-Islamic powers. He has repeatedly called on Western powers to support the Afghan partisans in their conflict with the USSR. He is also known to have friendly ties with Saudi Arabia. On this issue, as on many others, Mojadedi and Nabi sympathize with Gailani. These differing orientations breed suspicion among the partisan groups regarding the amount of financial aid each group receives from external sources and what happens to that aid.

With regard to the Soviets, Hikmatyar avers that there can only be a military solution to the Afghan crisis and that a peaceful resolution involving negotiations with the Soviets is unlikely and undesirable. Khalis and Rabbani have expressed similar views. Gailani and the other two leaders have opposed "closing the door" on a possible negotiated settlement.

While the Pakistan-based groups receive considerable coverage in the international press, most of the fighting in Afghanistan has been conducted by localized ethnic, tribal, and sectarian groups, poorly armed and with rather tenuous links with the groups in Pakistan and Iran.[93] It is possible that new leaders might emerge from the ranks of those fighting inside the country. These internal groups come from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. Representing the dominant Pashtun elements are tribes such as the Waziris, the Momands, and the Mengals of eastern Afghanistan. Other ethnic elements that have been active include the Nuristanis, the Uzbeks, the Tajiks, and the Hazaras of central Afghanistan. The Hazaras are Shiite and constitute some 10 percent of the population.

The successes of the non-Pashtun groups, it should be notec, have introduced a new element into the Afghan political scene. Afghanistan's various ethnic and tribal groups have traditionally been suspicious of their central government, especially when it seeks to centralize the country. The Pashtuns, including those Persianized and those not, have dominated Afghan politics largely because of greater military capability (they have generally controlled the state's armed forces). However, the recent turmoil in Afghanistan has encouraged the emergence of several new centers of military power that any Afghan government will now have to take into account. The Hazaras, Tajiks, and Nuristanis are likely to push for a federal political system that would afford the various regions a large degree of internal autonomy. Failure to meet such demands might well lead to conflict among the various groups. This development would provide opportunities for manipulation by outside powers.

Politically, disunity has been costly to the partisans. It has posed impediments to winning international recognition and aid, to forming a broad-based government-in-exile, and to challenging, in forums such as the United Nations, the legitimacy of the Karmal government.

In military terms, lack of unity has had more ambiguous consequences. On the one hand, it has made coordinated military efforts among the various opposition groups difficult. On the other hand, the decentralized and sporadic nature of the opposition has made partisan forces less vulnerable to large-scale ground operations and quick defeat by the Soviets. While the Soviets control the Afghan state apparatus, it is Moscow's opponents who control much of Afghan society.

Militarily, the resistance has grown in effectiveness throughout the period of the occupation, compounding Moscow's problems. There are several indicators of this greater partisan effectiveness. For one, the opposition has recently moved from its bastions in the countryside to challenge Soviet control of several cities. Sustained fighting for control of Jalalabad and Herat took place in August and September respectively. There has also been fighting over smaller towns, including Sorubi and Aybak.[94]

Other indicators of greater effectiveness have been the appearance in partisan hands of better weapons and the demonstration by the partisans of an ability to build some rudimentary equipment inside Afghanistan. The partisans now have a few antiaircraft guns and antitank weapons, acquired either from defecting Afghan units or from purchase in the unofficial international weapons market. In addition, the Afghans have been producing and employing such simple weapons as Molotov cocktails.

There have also been reports of increased Soviet losses. For example, in recent fighting for the Panjsher valley, Soviet forces reportedly lost several aircraft and

[92] Discussion of the outlook of the various opposition groups is based on a number of direct conversations between the author and opposition sources.

[93] According to resistance sources, the latter do provide weapons to some of those fighting inside the country.

[94] See AFP (Hong Kong) dispatches of Sept. 12 and 16, 1980, in *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 17, 1980, pp. C/4–5. Sorubi is a strategic town midway along the highway between Kabul and Jalalabad. Aybak is the capital of Samangan Province, northwest of Kabul.

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

Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and Afghanistan's Prime Minister Babrak Karmal confer in the Kremlin on October 16, 1980, during an extensive visit by Karmal to the USSR.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

tanks without gaining control of the area.[95] The change in Soviet military strategy for dealing with the Afghan opposition, noted above, itself suggests greater Afghan effectiveness and failure of the initial pacification program.

Prospects

Several factors will play critical roles in determining whether the Soviet Union succeeds in liquidating or neutralizing the Afghan partisans. These include the policies adopted by Pakistan toward the insurgents, the extent of external support for the partisans, the success or failure of Soviet attempts to convert divisions among the insurgents into open conflict, Soviet efforts to establish a government in Kabul which commands a large armed force and has a wide base of support, and the scope and duration of the Soviet military commitment.

We have already seen that Pakistan is likely to continue to allow Afghan refugees to enter but to limit the amount of military aid going to partisan forces. Moreover, the Afghans face food shortages. Pakistan was not prepared for a flood of more than a million refugees,[96] and international assistance has not always reached the Afghans. These problems could seriously affect the fortunes of the resistance movement in Afghanistan.

If the various rival partisan groups, whether externally based or in Afghanistan, begin to fight each other on a substantial scale, that, too, could have an adverse impact on insurgent forces.[97] Recently, Kabul

[95] On the fighting in the Panjsher valley, see *Daily Telegraph*, Sept. 5, 1980.

[96] *Pakistan Affairs*, Aug. 16, 1980, p. 1.

[97] Up to now there have been very few reports of fighting among Moscow's Afghan opponents. *FBIS-SAS*, Aug. 1, 1980, p. C/1.

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has made a considerable effort to exploit conflicts within the opposition. Tribal leaders have received the greatest attention. Besides intimidation, Kabul has also used bribery.[98] This approach has not worked so far. In fact, Lt. Colonel Faiz Mohammad, Minister of Frontiers and Tribes, was killed recently while visiting local tribal leaders in Paktia Province.[99]

Should the resistance's effectiveness increase because of greater organization or the obtaining of arms such as portable antiaircraft and antitank weapons from abroad, its prospects might improve significantly. The Soviets might be forced to make an increased military commitment to the Afghan venture or accept a compromise settlement of the crisis. In the first case, the USSR might suffer reduced capability in other parts of the world as a result of commitment of new troops and matériel to the Afghan front.[100] The USSR might also experience domestic repercussions in regions where there exist, to borrow a Soviet term, Soviet "internal colonies"—i.e., among the Islamic populations of Soviet Central Asia. In these areas, despite Soviet assimilationist policies, Islamic consciousness continues to form a type of Islamic counterculture. Third, rising costs of the invasion might exacerbate factionalism in the context of a possible Soviet succession. One might also anticipate strains between Moscow and its Eastern-bloc allies. Finally, hostility to the Soviets might increase among Islamic countries and groups in the surrounding region.

In the second case, Soviet willingness to reach a compromise is likely to be reciprocated by at least some of the groups fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Such a move might in fact set the Afghan groups against one another.

The Soviet Union has yet to establish a stable government in Kabul with a substantial Afghan armed force. Indeed, as long as the Russians continue to occupy Afghanistan, Moscow may have serious difficulty in achieving these goals. Conflict within the ruling PDP and defections from the armed forces continue.

In Afghanistan, the USSR faces the following broad choices: (1) to annex Afghanistan, making it the 16th "Soviet Socialist Republic,"[101] (alternatively, the USSR might annex only parts of Afghanistan, especially those north of the Hindu Kush mountains—a region dominated by Turkic populations similar to those in Soviet Central Asia) and keep up the military effort until the opposition is destroyed; (2) to continue the military effort while attempting to establish a stable and servile government; (3) to reach a compromise with all or some of the Afghan opposition groups (some of whom are willing to negotiate with the Russians)[102] and accept an Afghanistan that, although independent and ruled by non-Communists, would follow a policy of neutralism tilted toward Moscow. Soviet policies so far show a preference for the second alternative. But as the war drags on, the Soviet Union might eventually choose one of the other two.

There are a number of conceivable outcomes to the Afghanistan crisis. These include a Soviet-dominated, pacified Afghanistan, a protracted war lasting many years, a neutral Afghanistan, or even the spread of conflict to Pakistan. Moreover, there are varying degrees of uncertainty concerning all the factors affecting the likelihood of each of these outcomes. However, no matter what ultimately emerges in Afghanistan, events there will probably have a substantial impact on Soviet strategy in the surrounding area, on regional politics, and on the internal situation of Afghanistan's Islamic neighbors.[103]

[98] *Daily Telegraph*, Sept. 3, 1980.

[99] *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 24, 1980, p. C/3. Afghan sources have suggested to the author that Faiz Mohammad was attempting to bribe local officials on this trip.

[100] The implications of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan for Moscow's ability to intervene in Poland have been suggested in Howard Teicher, "The Soviet Union in Afghanistan: The Political-Military Costs," *Leviathan: Middle East Inquiry* (Boston, MA), Fall 1980, p. 31.

[101] This Soviet option was mentioned by Alexandre Bennigsen in "Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam," *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1980, p. 49.

[102] Reported to the author by private sources.

[103] I have dealt with some of these issues in "Afghanistan and the Crisis in American Foreign Policy," loc. cit.

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Soviet Decision-Making and International Relations

By Uri Ra'anan

Over six decades after the establishment of the Soviet state and several decades since Churchill expressed his mystification concerning the mainsprings of Soviet policy, many Western foreign affairs observers and practitioners continue, surprisingly, to ask fundamental questions about the motivations and modalities of Soviet international strategy. Yet countless "Sovietological" studies have been written and published, and we have access to a voluminous, coherent Soviet literature on the topic that is reasonably candid (at least for the cognoscenti). Analysts of Soviet affairs find their patience tested when asked for the nth time "just why should Soviet leaders be acting as they are at the moment?" The questioners assume, apparently, that evidence concerning Soviet behavior ought to be discounted, unless it helps to explain Soviet motivations in terms consonant with Western concepts of "rationality."

It is in this context that one has to attempt, once again, to articulate the conceptual aspects and implementational modalities that are reflected in the international strategy of the USSR. Soviet policy evolves and operates within parameters that differ in essential aspects from the Western political framework. This factor is reflected both in the manner in which the leadership functions and in the criteria that may be applied when international issues are examined.

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Motivational Aspects

To start, perhaps, one ought to shrug off the hoary question whether the Kremlin is simply "Tsarist Russia writ large," or whether one is dealing with a qualitatively different entity, motivated by ideological considerations. Inevitably, the unaltered factor of geographic location makes for the repetition of the same place names in the history of the new Muscovy, as of the old. However, while this aspect has its impact upon certain military and other considerations, there is a difference between the two entities, not merely of degree, but of kind. Tsarist policy was not devoid of hegemonial aspirations, to be sure, nor was it lacking entirely in ideological imperatives (as illustrated by the "Holy Alliance" and the work of its agents in Germany and elsewhere).

When all is said and done, however, St. Petersburg was the capital of a relatively weak state, with limited, essentially territorial, objectives and capabilities; it was a "regional," as opposed to a truly "global" power. The USSR, on the other hand, at least during the last decade, has become one of two genuine superpowers, with authentically global dimensions (or "reach"), both conceptually and operationally. Whatever cynicism vis-à-vis the tenets of its revolutionary creed the Soviet elite may display—not to speak of the masses, whose aversion to indoctrination is matched only by their apathy—there remains a residual ideological factor, unmatched by any phenomenon of the Tsarist period, that plays a crucial role both in the Soviet analysis of the international situation and in the imperatives that motivate Soviet actions.

The reference, of course, is to the Dialectic. To be sure, traditional political theorists were familiar with the concept, if not with the term; however, there have been few regimes that have interpreted this concept as lucidly and coherently, and applied it as unrelent-

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ingly, as the Soviet leadership. The Dialectic has provided the Kremlin with a most useful criterion both for policy analysis and for the appropriate international operations; at the same time, it establishes the parameters of what is permissible and desirable at given stages of development. Concisely stated, the Dialectic suggests that change is a permanent feature of the social as well as the natural sciences, that it is the inevitable product of conflict, and that neither change nor conflict can be brought to an arbitrary halt of indefinite duration and of truly planetary dimension. It follows that politics abhors a total stalemate as nature abhors a vacuum, and an overall, long-term, global compromise is a meaningless concept, since those who cease advancing are relegated inexorably "to the rubbish bin of history." Indeed, the Western concept of compromise as a goal in itself—a by-product of the optimistic assumptions made by the spiritual fathers of our current civilization, reflecting the world view of the Age of Reason and Enlightenment—simply is not shared in the Soviet weltanschauung.

This asymmetry makes for obvious difficulties in negotiations between Soviet and Western representatives. If "agreement" is a desirable goal for one side, while a *favorable* deal is the aim of the other party, clearly Western negotiators become subject to considerable pressure, internal and external, to sign *some* document, whether intrinsically equitable or not.

Such mutually incompatible approaches toward the very concept of a final and durable settlement raise questions concerning strategies which assume, implicitly, that both parties share a desire for balance and for the perpetuation of an existing distribution of power and territory. Historical and dialectical materialism, moreover, provide the Soviet leadership not only with reasons why an ongoing stalemate is contrary to "scientific" laws, but offers a blueprint, or guide, how to extract victory from a given "correlation of forces." What is more, it posits that the eventual supremacy of the Soviet side is guaranteed, because of inexorable socioeconomic forces. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to comprehend the assumption that Soviet leaders must view an indefinite and truly global compromise either as feasible or desirable.

There is an additional factor pointing very much in the same direction. "Good Leninists," in their approach, as in action, display an innate penchant for the initiative as a major asset in political no less than in military affairs. The conditions of a thermonuclear age, if anything, have maximized the advantages enjoyed by the side that seizes and maintains the initiative in the international arena. The reason is simple. By taking action to seize a "pawn" on the global chessboard or score other unilateral gains, the initiator places the ball in the adversary's court, presenting him with two highly unpalatable—perhaps nonviable—options. That adversary either can resign himself to his losses, with inevitable "fall-out" upon his credibility as an ally and as a global competitor, or take escalatory steps, in which case he bears the onus of having moved toward a confrontation.

Since the initiative provides much obvious advantage and because, in any case, Soviet literature has never ceased to emphasize this factor, it is a source of bewilderment why some Western observers continue to view the "action-reaction" model as appropriate for analysis of Soviet behavior patterns. The most simplistic version of this model suggests that "if we take step A, they will react with move B," or, even more frequently, that "if only we refrain from act A, they will abstain from reaction B." This approach assumes, therefore, that Soviet leaders react primarily to *Western* moves or statements, whereas both Soviet publications and the history of Soviet moves in the international arena demonstrate Moscow's deep aversion to such a passive role.

The technology of our era has added a further factor favoring the initiative; the side which is confined to reacting, particularly in security affairs, in effect condemns itself to lagging behind qualitatively—to an extent that may prove crucial. A decade or so is by no means an unusually long period, nowadays, for the process that leads from a conceptual advance, via research and development, to production and final deployment of a new weapons system. A considerable portion of the time invested usually consists of the "submerged" part of the "iceberg," that is, the research and development stage, which tends to be difficult for an adversary to detect. The side that relegates itself to a merely reactive role, therefore, can decide upon appropriate countermeasures only when the opponent's latest breakthrough becomes fully "visible," i.e., when he proceeds finally to the production stage, after years of preliminary work. A time-lag of such dimensions, however, in an era when science and technology achieve one quantum jump after another with dizzying rapidity, imposes very serious political as well as military penalties upon the party content with a passive role.

There are very good reasons, therefore, why the Soviet leaders should not see fit to adopt an "action-reaction" model. From the history of recent decades, it may be deduced with a high degree of probability that Moscow is inclined to go ahead with technological

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development once it becomes theoretically feasible, on the logical assumption that "if we can do it, so can our adversaries, and, if they can, the chances are that they will." Thus, it would be out of character for Soviet decision-makers to delay deliberately the process of research and development until it could be verified that America actually had gone ahead, i.e., had reached the production stage.[1]

Models of the Soviet Political Process

It is no less divorced from real life to posit that decisions in these crucial areas are affected primarily by the input of Soviet "military-industrial lobbies." Such an "interest group model" is suggested by some analysts who realize the inadequacies of the "action-reaction" concept. The author of this article would be the last person to deny the importance of the factional element in the Soviet political process. However, factions in the USSR tend to be personality-oriented, i.e., they reflect a "feudal" relationship of mutual obligation and fealty between certain leaders and their appointees and clients, rather than representing mainly the vested interests of sundry civilian and military agencies. Indeed, the various factions try their best to obtain a foothold in as many bureaucratic institutions as possible, so that their concerns and allegiances frequently run athwart departmental frontiers.[2] In any case, it is less than realistic to view the lobbying activities by various constituencies that form part of daily life on Capitol Hill as a "mirror image" of Soviet behavior patterns, and to believe that Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, for instance, is spending his time trying to convince "legislators," whether in the Supreme Soviet or even the CPSU Central Commitee!

It should be recalled, moreover, that Soviet factions display little long-term commitment to issues as such. They are inclined to advocate certain policies only as long as they are competing with rival groups that propagate a different approach. Once such competitors are defeated finally and unmistakably, the victorious faction seems to feel minimal compunction about "picking up the fallen banners of the adversary from the battlefield." Consequently, while it may be possible, as will be seen later in this analysis, to manipulate such internecine rivalries from the outside so long as the contest is in full progress, there is no guarantee that advocates of more "moderate" tactics will not become "hardliners" once they are securely ensconced in power.[3] To be sure, such phenomena are not unknown in Western political life, but they play a role in the USSR that is different in kind, not merely in degree.

The Soviet "factional model" offers the West potential advantages. In this context, it is necessary to devote further attention to an aspect, already touched upon, in which crucial asymmetries between the two political systems come into play. The Soviet leadership, as has been noted, tends to regard bargaining and "deals" as means to an end, whereas the open society is inclined to regard negotiations and compromise as a desirable aim in itself. As a result, Western representatives find themselves at a disadvantage in East-West discussions, particularly at a high level or "summit." In most instances, the Western participant labors under self-induced pressures, with "public opinion" disappointed whenever meetings of this kind do not result in a document that can be ratified. The absence of such an outcome is regarded as "failure" by the open society, and commentators, in the media and elsewhere, will tend to focus upon this "lack of success"—i.e., the fact that no signing ceremony could be televised—rather than ask the relevant question whether the terms proposed were in the interests of their side.

That is one of the reasons why Western initiators of East-West talks appear to encounter fewer problems when paying heed to the following "ground rules": (a) a favorable outcome requires negotiating partners of comparable strength; (b) discussions should continue at a technical working level as long as necessary, proceeding toward "summitry" only when all differences have been resolved; (c) a positive result is an agreement that is entirely equitable in its stipulations, based upon full reciprocity in actions to be taken by the parties; and (d) the negotiation process itself, which may be regarded essentially as a tactic by one side, cannot be viewed as a strategic goal by the other. The real issue, therefore, is not whether one favors or opposes talks with the USSR, but whether one comprehends and takes into consideration the asymmetries mentioned or remains unaware of resulting pitfalls.

If these caveats are understood and noted, then Western planners, including participants in negotiations with the Soviet Union, may be able to take ad-

[1] Soviet technology, of course, frequently does lag behind—but not, as far as is known, because of any decision to adopt a passive role. For that matter, to which American initiatives was Moscow "reacting" when it began to develop "Cold Launch" or "ASAT" capabilities?

[2] For a detailed analysis of the "factional model," see Gavriel D. Ra'anan, *Factions and Their Debates over International Policy During the Zhdanovshchina: Ramifications for Ruling and Non-Ruling Communist Parties*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA, 1980.

[3] Ibid.

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vantage of the proposition, mentioned earlier, that the "factional model," rather than the "monolithic actor model," presents a realistic picture of the Soviet modus operandi. The usual assumption that the decision-making process in Moscow resembles some neat diagram of a straightforward chain of command, with someone at the apex reaching a conclusion, pressing a button, and the rest following automatically—is far too simplistic; moreover, if accurate, it would deprive the West of potential assets (that exist, even though rarely utilized). First, however, it has to be understood just why the "monolithic model" is inappropriate.

The fact is that the political process cannot be outlawed in a closed society by mere fiat or ukase. Political conflict and rivalries, rather than ceasing to exist, simply are driven into less open channels—as compared, for instance, with the legitimized existence of competing political parties in pluralistic societies. In theory, and in accordance with CPSU statutes, even factions (within the single party) are supposed to be nonexistent, i.e., they are illegal. In practice, of course, such entities are created constantly, and, if only by denouncing them, as in the case of the 1957 "Anti-Party Group," Soviet publications implicitly recognize their presence.

The organization of factions comes into play, inter alia, when the "Number One" in the leadership has died, is seriously ailing, or is otherwise "out of action," causing would-be heirs to feel that the time has come to engage in the contest for the succession. However, that is by no means the only occasion on which factional deployment comes into effect. The "Number One" himself has every reason for surreptitiously encouraging rivalry and competition among personalities and institutions just below the apex of leadership. This provides the simplest way of keeping potential contenders "busy with one another," thus preventing the formation of potentially dangerous power monopolies, particularly in the crucial security and defense agencies. Consequently, he may intentionally duplicate (or overlap) bureaucratic functions (and delimitations) in such sectors, as a method that is likely to precipitate antagonism and strife among potential contestants for his "crown." This phenomenon has surfaced in closed societies, time and again, irrespective of a particular polity's precise location in the ideological spectrum.[4]

The inevitable result of this process is the appearance of mutually antagonistic (and kaleidoscopically changing) coalitions of personalities, concerned less with issues than with jealousies and conflicts among individuals. Rival leaders and factions attempt to bolster their respective positions by creating "armies" of "retainers," strongly reminiscent of the feudal age. In effect, this means that persons close to the apex of power do their best to ensure the appointment of reliable friends and clients to key positions just below their own level, and these appointees, in turn, try to emplace their own dependents lower down in the hierarchy, and so forth. The result is a strikingly "feudal" chain of "overlord and client" relationships, with the former providing protection and "benefices," and the latter owing loyalty, service, and support, in return. Alliances between individual "lords" have been known to be cemented even by bonds of intermarriage, in truly "feudal" fashion.[5]

Thus, personal ties provide the basis of most Soviet elite alignments; however, these factions have been known, on frequent occasions, to exploit substantive issues as "ammunition" against one another, even if, fundamentally, they do not tend to be issue-oriented. The phenomenon described here appears to be the product of at least two factors.

In the first place, Soviet leaders are obsessed with the need for legitimation. In a sense, the "mantle of illegitimacy"[6] has been passed on from Lenin, who seized power in a coup and forcibly dispersed the democratically-elected Constituent Assembly; via I.V. Stalin, who appointed himself "successor" despite being "disinherited," as it were, in Lenin's "testament"; via N.S. Khrushchev, who pushed aside the "heir apparent" G.M. Malenkov—the latter, in turn, having "survived" two previous "crown princes," S.M. Kirov and A.A. Zhdanov—and staged a countercoup after being voted out of power by his colleagues in 1957; to L.I. Brezhnev, who acceded to the "throne" by placing his predecessor under "house arrest." Consequently, each pretender to the succession, knowing how high are the chances that he too will have to take over by more or less violent means, feels that he must demonstrate "legitimacy," utilizing criteria other than time-honored, established modalities of transfer of power—which, regrettably, are not to be found in the Kremlin. The only way of achieving this objective, in a state like the USSR, is for the contender to try and show that he is the sole orthodox "defender of the faith," i.e., the correct in-

[4] An example that comes to mind concerns the proliferation of mutually antagonistic agencies in the security and intelligence sectors of the Third Reich.

[5] Colorful examples of this practice in the GRU and elsewhere are given in Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers*, New York, NY, Doubleday and Company, 1965, passim.

[6] The author is indebted to his good friend Robert Conquest for this felicitous phrase.

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terpreter of "The Will of History"—as posited by "Marxism-Leninism." Conversely, in the pursuit of this aim, serious rivals have to be "unmasked" as schismatics, deviationists, or heretics. Issues, therefore, may be exploited usefully, as a *means* of demonstrating that the "line" advocated by a competing faction simply is incompatible with established ideology.[7]

There is a second consideration, however, that relates even more directly to tactics. During a period of intensified factional strife, it becomes particularly urgent, of course, to encourage supporters, demoralize the followers of adversaries, and attract the "wavers" and "neutrals" into one's own camp. The simplest method of rallying support is to "raise one's banners high on the battlefield," precisely like medieval warlords, so as to indicate that one has the upper hand and to provide a symbol around which supporters and dependents can gather. Under Soviet conditions, a similar function can be performed with more modern means by groups able to ensure access to the media. In other words, whether pictorially or verbally, each competing faction must be able to demonstrate that it possesses sufficient influence to have the media display its respective hierarchial symbols. In many cases, of course, this may amount to portraying significant changes in the order of protocol—for example, via seating arrangements, number of references in print to a particular name, prominence in receiving important guests or in signing major documents. More subtly, however, conflicting groups may seize upon a topical issue and attempt to "score brownie points" against one another by stressing differences in approach, often by means of special emphasis, additions or omissions in the wording of a slogan relating to the question concerned, and other forms of semantic manipulation.[8]

As posited earlier, the intent of the exercise usually is to demonstrate that "our" posture is ideologically orthodox and that "they" are suspect of heresy (if not worse). This does mean, however, that for the duration of a particular power struggle, the issue selected will command fairly consistent support—or opposition, as the case may be—from the factions "in the field." To reiterate, such consistency is likely to be maintained only as long as the contest is undecided, while it is essential to encourage supporters and to demoralize the clients of a rival by displaying power to "get a point of view across"—a demonstration that is not likely to be lost upon various "neutrals" either. Once adversaries are defeated and annihilated (at least politically), manipulation of the issue in question loses political significance.

Examples of this peculiar phenomenon in Soviet history are legion. The Stalin-Trotsky dispute over ultra-rapid industrialization, the Khrushchev-Malenkov "debates" over the priorities to be granted respectively to heavy industry and to consumer goods, and over the potential impact of nuclear war, are some of the items that may be subsumed under this category.

Soviet Factions and East-West Relations

Here it may be asked just how Western decision-makers can benefit from this factor, when it may require considerable time to discover that an internecine "debate" actually is unfolding, when it is unclear precisely who is advocating a line that is less uncongenial from a Western viewpoint, and when, in any case, the contending groups feel free to swap positions after a year or two.

Actually, the existence of a factional "debate" frequently can be ascertained, after a few weeks, with the aid of methodologies to be discussed below. Moreover, the personal identification of members of the competing groups is not necessarily relevant, and—in almost slavish obedience to the laws of the Dialectic—no sooner does faction A defeat faction B and (perhaps) adopt its slogans, than a new group B is likely to be formed and to enter the fray.

As far as the problem of how to detect the unfolding of an internal "debate" is concerned, it is instructive how frequently diligent analysis and research have uncovered such disputations, including even in the periods in which Stalin enjoyed uncontested sway (but when more than a single, monolithic "line" surfaced, perhaps because he himself encouraged his lieutenants to squabble). Detection, then, does not appear to be the problem. It is reasonable to ask, however, just how one can be sure that differences in the nuances of publicly expressed views really reflect incompatible approaches to a topic, rather than a change in a monolithic "General Line."

Here it is helpful to resort to the eighteenth-century Unities of the Theater—according to which credibility and verisimilitude demanded that plays should represent real actions confined to very limited geographic distances and periods of time. Additions and deletions in the wording of political slogans or other operational phrases, therefore, may be regarded as significant

[7]For examples of such tactics in 1955, see Uri Ra'anan, *The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1969, pp. 101–18.
[8]Ibid., Chapter 4.

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only to the extent that they emanate from different Soviet personalities more or less simultaneously. Such discrepancies, if they appear in statements made before very different audiences, at widely separated localities, and at intervals of months, rather than days, do not provide reliable indicators of factional dispute, but may be due to tactical considerations that are supported by a general consensus in the leadership.

To represent meaningful clues that a "debate" really is taking place, these discrepancies not only should conform with the imperatives of the Unities of the Theater, but must fall into a consistent and coherent pattern over a certain period of time. In other words, if a supporter of a particular approach is found to advocate, at least implicitly, a policy "20° to the right of the general line," at a time when someone else seems to be suggesting a similar departure "to the left," it is essential to make sure that these deviations continue to be followed with reasonable consistency on subsequent occasions (as "standard deviations" from the general course).

The author of this article has attempted to follow these imperatives in analyzing factional conflicts in different Communist societies,[9] with reasonably interesting results.

With regard to the earlier statement that the precise membership of particular factions, as well as their lack of really long-term commitments to specific issues, may not be highly relevant as far as Western policymakers are concerned, concrete examples may be helpful. During periods of relative balance in the Kremlin, because of "collective leadership" or other conditions in which factionalism flourishes, there have been repeated indications that the advocacy of a "forward," or militantly offensive, line by one group or individual, has triggered, apparently, expressions of misgivings, hesitancy, and doubt on the part of other personalities in the Kremlin.

For instance, as at least some observers realized at the time, the advocates of a Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, including, at one stage, Brezhnev himself, seem to have encountered reservations of this kind. Serious doubts apparently were voiced by some of Brezhnev's "colleagues," moved by a mixture of factional and bureaucratic considerations. (With regard to the latter, only one example has surfaced, namely, that personalities in charge of the departments of the Secretariat dealing with the international relations of the CPSU, expressed the concern that their "constituents," the various foreign Communist parties, might suffer from the political "fall-out" of a Soviet invasion of Prague.) It seems that the supporters of an armed incursion were unable, for some time, to carry the day. Their opponents were motivated, apparently, by the following consideration: If Brezhnev went ahead with his offensive and emerged unscathed, he would be politically invulnerable, whatever their own stance on the issue might have been; however, if they expressed their concern that an invasion might be fraught with international risks, and ensured that their misgivings were duly noted in the minutes, then Brezhnev would stand "unmasked," as an "adventurer," should the enterprise prove costly to the USSR.[10]

The interesting aspect of this and other instances is that, more often than not, the crystallization of a "forward" group seems to have triggered, almost automatically, the coalition of "cautious" elements, and that the latter have been eager to use as "political ammunition" whatever uncertainty might prevail in Moscow concerning the likelihood of Western counteraction. In other words, "anti-adventurist" leaders, however tactical and short-term their posture might be, and irrespective of the actual personalities involved, tend to have a vested interest in *maximizing* the specter of American power and potential Western countermoves, if only because that is the best way of intimating that their domestic rivals are tinged with "adventurism." After all, Khrushchev ignored warnings of this kind, engaged in his Cuban venture, and found himself facing two nonviable options—retreat or nuclear escalation—contributing, eventually, to his overthrow.

In the Czechoslovak case, the views of the "cautious" and the "bold" elements tended to balance each other in the initial stages and led to the decision to "test the waters" before proceeding further. This took the form of calculated intelligence leaks to the effect that ongoing Warsaw Pact maneuvers might be intended as a prelude to a military move against Czechoslovakia. The Western response, as interpreted in Moscow, seemed to follow the lines of "we don't believe that the USSR would want to act in this manner, but, if it did, we could not respond, since, after all, Prague lies within the Soviet sphere." Together with the signals emanating from the Czechoslovak command, to the effect that its divisions could not re-

[9] See, for instance, ibid., Chapters 4 and 5, and the author's Chapter 2 in *China in Crisis*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1968, as well as his article on "Moscow and the Third World" in *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January–February 1965.

[10] For a detailed analysis of the 1968 episode, see Major Roy W. Stafford, Jr., *Signalling and Response: An Investigation of Soviet-American Relations with respect to the Crisis in Eastern Europe in 1968*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA, 1976.

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sist the Red Army, these responses, as it were, provided "ammunition" for the "militant" elements in the Kremlin. They were able to gloat triumphantly, "you see, you are afraid of your own shadows, there are no real risks, either of Czechoslovak resistance or of major international costs, not to speak of a serious danger of superpower confrontation!"[11]

The real question here is not whether the Western response was appropriate, or even what alternatives were feasible, but rather whether Western decision-makers devoted any serious consideration to the possibility that there might be elements in Moscow, interested, for "domestic" reasons of their own, in making the most of at least a "decent ambiguity" in the Western posture—as opposed to a virtual "green light."

This example may help to reinforce the validity of the earlier contention that the personal identity of members of specific factions, and their long-term commitments to a particular issue, are less relevant than the evidence that such factions can be shown to have operated on a surprisingly large number of occasions (covering a wide variety of policy questions). The fact that, so often, *some* group in Moscow appears to have been prepared, for perfectly logical and selfish reasons of its own, to express reservations about foreign ventures and, in so doing, seems to have maximized the specter of potential Western countermoves, is of major significance. It is of less relevance who exactly belonged to which group, or whether today's "moderate" may be tomorrow's "hardliner."

Conclusion

The factional nature of the Soviet leadership, if borne in mind, presents options to other powers—as a potential "brake" upon adventurous tendencies that appear to be surfacing in Soviet actions and even in the literature (to mention only such comments as: "the principle to attack the enemy only when one is sure of success does not exclude, but presupposes the need of taking risks, even big risks, when this is required by the situation").[12] Certain elements in the Soviet elite may be beginning to feel that there are actions in the international arena, of a bold and militant nature, which, basically, no longer pose "risks" that would prove really *costly* to the USSR. Consequently, it could prove advantageous for other powers to be able to "manipulate" factional strife at the apex of the Soviet leadership, if only by supplying political "ammunition" to those who, in their own interests, would wish to demonstrate that their domestic rivals really are "adventurists." Groups in the Kremlin raising the "banner of caution" could show that the actions proposed by these rivals might involve very high international costs and that there were Western signals, not necessarily of a declaratory nature, intimating the gravity with which such ventures would be viewed.

The concepts outlined here, therefore, in the first place have obvious implications for the methodologies employed by the Sovietological "community," but are not entirely devoid of potential practical utility.

The Soviet leadership is likely to shape its policies for the 1980's in the knowledge that changing public attitudes in the United States can be expected to result in serious efforts to restore both America's defense capability and its deterrent credibility. Aware, therefore, that its apparent military and psychological/political advantages are likely to diminish as the decade proceeds, the Soviet regime may be tempted to "pick up key pieces on the chess board" before the West begins to close this perceived "window of vulnerability." In implementing this line, Soviet leaders are likely to be impelled by their penchant for the initiative, believing that an opponent who seems to be both reacting and trailing can be confronted with particularly unpalatable options. The temptation to pursue such a policy is likely to diminish only with a reversal in the "correlation of forces," as viewed in Moscow.

Under these circumstances, there is one particular aspect of the Dialectic favoring the West, namely, the growing contradiction between the imposing military might displayed internationally by the USSR and the increasing tensions within the Soviet "empire." These are to be felt economically, socially, ethnically, and, above all, in terms of lack of legitimacy and the absence of accepted modalities for the transfer of power. The "factional model," in a sense, reflects these internal vulnerabilities and offers the West options for the era of peril until the "window of vulnerability" can be closed.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] See, for instance, the chapter contributed by General Major M. I. Cherednichenko to the collective work published in the USSR in 1973 and translated into English by the US Air Force as *Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974.

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Limits of the Permissible in China

By June Teufel Dreyer

Since 1978, the Chinese leadership has been engaged in a massive experiment to change society. In an attempt to revive the Chinese economy, the leaders have drastically revised the standards of permissible behavior, thereby fundamentally altering the balance between toleration of dissent and maintenance of public order.

How the economy came to stagnate, and why the present leadership decided to enact these fundamental changes in the limits of the permissible, must be seen against the backdrop of China's recent past. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, China's already highly politicized society became even more politicized. Statements in the official media sanctioned standards of conduct seldom condoned, let alone encouraged, by an established government. Chinese were told that "to rebel is justified," and were admonished to "bombard the headquarters" of authority to drag out those whose thoughts and deeds did not meet rigid standards of ideological orthodoxy. Those who protested that such levels of toleration of dissent and disorder would damage production and lower living standards were castigated as "capitalist roaders" who preferred bourgeois comforts to revolutionary austerity.

In subsequent years, with most of those designated as "capitalist roaders" removed from office, China's self-appointed arbiters of ideological purity began to reshape party, government, economic, and mass organizations in line with their vision. The language of dissent continued to pervade the mass media—for example, "swimming against the tide" was encouraged, although outright social disorder was tolerated only when couched in terms of class struggle and directed against "careerists, conspirators, and double-dealers" who sought to wrest leadership from the hands of Marxist revolutionaries.

It was accepted that counterrevolutionaries would pretend to be revolutionaries, using the same language and feigning the same goals. In the terminology of the period, they were "waving the red flag in order to oppose the red flag." Under such circumstances, only knowledge of a person's inner motivation allowed one to judge whether that person was a true revolutionary. Marxists had typically regarded legal codes with suspicion, since they were associated with the bourgeois world; where the issue involved the determination of a person's innermost thoughts in order to distinguish revolutionary from counterrevolutionary, laws seemed even less useful. Courts and regularized legal procedures fell into disuse. Judgments were made by party and government officials, assisted by each individual's peer group. Inevitably, personal antagonisms and jealousies influenced the decision-making. It is likely that many persons were branded "bourgeois careerist counterrevolutionaries" because their judges coveted a possession of, or a job held by, the accused.

In an environment that praised austerity and carefully monitored words and deeds for antisocialist heresies, many people were reluctant to contribute either their labor or their ideas to try to improve society as a whole. There were few legitimized channels for dissent, and protest occasionally took the form of violence. In several areas of the country, outraged citizens resisted orders to work overtime without extra pay, or to give up their day of rest for the good of the

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state.[1] Other people reacted with passive resistance, complying minimally with work orders and occasionally indulging in small-scale sabotage.

Several influential members of the Chinese political elite felt that policies which denied the legitimacy of material incentives and demanded strict ideological conformity depressed both production levels and social morale,[2] but these individuals managed only to modify certain measures. Radical policies remained generally in force until the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976.

The leadership that assumed power in the People's Republic of China (PRC) after Mao's death perceived that it had inherited a revolution that had lost its élan, and a society that had lost its dynamism. Decrying the preceding government's attitude toward incentives, the new leadership portrayed the economy as stagnant or on the brink of collapse. It blamed the situation on the policies of former Defense Minister Lin Biao, who had been purged a few years earlier, and several members of the elite group prior to Mao's death, the so-called gang of four. The tendency of these individuals to substitute ideological for material incentives was described as anti-Marxist.[3] With reference to the legitimized expression of discontent, official sources held the gang of four's penchant for rigid ideological orthodoxy responsible for stultifying the workers' enthusiasm for socialism. They characterized the atmosphere thus created with a phrase from one of Mao's poems: "ten thousand horses stand mute." With regard to social order, the new leadership described widespread disruptions within the PRC as consequences of the confused desire of Lin Biao and the gang of four to create permanent revolution through permanent chaos.[4]

[1] See, for example, the disturbances reported by Fox Butterfield, "China Sends Troops to Troubled Plant in Major Coast City," *The New York Times*, July 29, 1975; by the *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), July 29, 1975; and by Xinhua, Sept. 10, 1979, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Sept. 12, 1979, p. Q/7.

[2] Former Premier Zhou Enlai is usually given credit for attempting to modify the extreme anti-incentive material policies of the ideologues who are symbolized by the "gang of four"—Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan. See, for instance, Deng Xiaoping's interview in *Expresso* (Lisbon), July 26, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 5, 1980, pp. L/1–4.

[3] *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing—hereafter *RMRB*), Oct. 3, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 4, 1979, pp. L/1–4.

[4] Xinhua, Oct. 31, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 5, 1979, p. L/13.

Hundreds of persons from China's provinces stage a sit-in near Communist Party headquarters in Beijing on October 13, 1979, after failing to get satisfaction regarding complaints about unemployment, poor housing, and wrongs suffered during Chairman Mao Zedong's rule.

—UPI.

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

At the December 1978 Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which launched the four modernizations campaign in China. From left to right: Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, Chairman Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, and Wang Dongxing.

—Eastfoto.

In essence, the post-Mao leadership proposed to create a dynamic society by readjusting three basic elements crucial to the functioning of any society—(1) incentives for the population to produce goods and services needed by the society; (2) channels through which citizens may express discontent with the system that governs them; (3) a degree of social order sufficient to enable the pursuit of production-oriented activities. In a stable society, these things should exist in equilibrium, but such an ideal balance is not always achieved. During the last years of Mao's rule in China, for example, both the incentives to produce necessary goods and services and the channels for expressing discontent may have been inadequate, and the resulting popular alienation threatened to disrupt social order. More critical, alterations in any one of the three elements will have profound effects on the functioning of the system as a whole. There is an inherent logical tension, for instance, between the expression of discontent and the maintenance of social order, with chaos or stagnation respectively the price for extreme reliance on the one or the other component. Likewise, incentives to produce tend to deteriorate when societies, on the one hand, attempt to enforce rigid control of dissent or, on the other hand, tolerate dissent at a level which does not permit the pursuit of productive activities sufficient to serve societal needs. The Chinese leadership, in proposing to alter all three elements, thus faced a delicate task of reequilibration, with the potential for disastrous failure at least as great as that for stunning success.

Initial Steps

Nevertheless, the new leadership undertook with alacrity the herculean task it had set for itself. First in its order of priorities was to discredit those whose policies had prevailed in previous years. Almost immediately after Mao Zedong's death, members of the gang of four, which included Mao's widow, were arrested and imprisoned. Lin Biao, though probably dead since 1971, was nonetheless linked with the gang in a massive denunciation campaign of more than two years' duration. Although Mao Zedong's name was not included in this movement to "expose and criticize Lin Biao and the gang of four," the official media clearly attacked policies which had been tolerated, and perhaps even espoused, by Mao during the last two decades of his life.

Apparently satisfied that this campaign had adequately discredited its enemies, the post-Mao leadership began a major effort to rectify the perceived imbalances within the Chinese state, and, in effect, to fashion a dynamic society by redesigning the mix of factors enumerated above. The first hints of the momentous changes in store emanated from the central working conference of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that convened in mid-November 1978. Formal ratification of the changes followed the next month, at the Third Plenary Session of the CCP's 11th Central Committee. Declaring that the nationwide mass movement to criticize Lin Biao and the gang of four had "in the main been completed victoriously," the plenum launched a new movement, to be known as the "four modernizations." The plenum's communique lamented the serious weakening of the national economy and announced sweeping changes to "release the socialist enthusiasm" of China's citizenry and "give effective protection to their democratic rights politically."[5]

Many of the measures adopted at the session and as a consequence of its decisions involved the strengthening of material incentives to production. For

[5] *Beijing Review* (hereafter *BR*), Dec. 29, 1978, p. 7.

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example, the state was explicitly forbidden to commandeer material, manpower, funds, and products from work units. For the next several years, agricultural taxes and the state's purchase of grain were to be based on 1971–75 quotas. Exercise of so-called "small freedoms"—including cultivation of private plots and pursuit of side-occupations by individuals, as well as the holding of village fairs—was expanded in scope. Cadres were told to "overcome egalitarianism" and to compensate workers in accordance with the amount and quality of work done.[6] To be wealthy was no longer to be considered shameful, but a mark of good work performance. One enriched the state by one's efforts, and any notions that this was antisocialist were simply mistaken.[7]

While the importance of these changes in incentives should not be minimized, similar measures had been taken before, albeit on a smaller scale. Moreover, such alterations pale in significance in comparison with the unprecedented changes related to the other two essentials of a dynamic society—i.e., the provision of channels through which the citizenry may express dissent and the maintenance of a degree of social order sufficient to enable the pursuit of production-oriented activities.

Establishing channels for the expression of dissent and ensuring an acceptable degree of social order are, of course, merely different aspects of a government's effort to exercise social control while avoiding social repression. The Chinese government expressed its commitment to such an end by declaring, in a phrase drawn from Mao Zedong, that it was necessary to bring about a society characterized by "stability and unity with liveliness and vigor." At the same time, the post-Mao leadership made clear that its notions of both acceptable channels of dissent and acceptable levels of social order differed sharply from those of the leadership during Mao's last years. By enacting sweeping changes in the use of force within Chinese society, it attempted to deal with the two issues simultaneously.

In many cases, these changes involved the complete overturning of past standards of right and wrong—the so-called reversal of verdicts—and radical alterations in the bounds of permissible behavior. One outstanding example concerned the Tiananmen incident of April 1976. During that year's Qing Ming festival to commemorate the dead, a large demonstration took place at Tienanmen Square in Beijing in honor of recently deceased Premier Zhou Enlai. In honoring Zhou, the demonstrators were simultaneously expressing support for Zhou's apparently handpicked successor, Deng Xiaoping. But the demonstrators were dispersed, with considerable violence, by a combination of militia, army, and public-security forces. Immediately thereafter, an official communique of the CCP Central Committee announced that, acting on Mao Zedong's proposal, it had unanimously agreed to appoint Hua Guofeng its First Vice-Chairman and, concurrently, Premier of the State Council. Simultaneously, Deng Xiaoping was dismissed from all his posts, and the Tiananmen incident was declared counterrevolutionary. Most Politburo members were subsequently reported visiting hospitals to comfort militia, army, and public-security personnel who had been injured in the fighting, and to congratulate them for their heroism.[8] Hence, when the CCP Central Committee announced in December 1978 that the Tiananmen demonstrations were "completely revolutionary,"[9] its decision was more than a

[6] Ibid., p.12.
[7] Radio Hailou, Sept. 20, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 27, 1979, p. O/6.
[8] *BR*, Apr. 9, 1976, pp. 3–7.
[9] Ibid., Dec. 1, 1978, p. 6.

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Zheng Feng fits a customer with Western-style clothing at a private tailoring shop in the Eastern District of Beijing in the summer of 1980.

—Eastfoto.

shocking reversal of a past judgment. It also called into question the legitimacy of Hua Guofeng's succession to Mao, the integrity of those Politburo members who had publicly associated themselves with the original decision, and the ability of Mao himself to distinguish revolution from counterrevolution.

A second startling reversal of past judgments that reflected badly on the Maoist leadership concerned the interpretation of the Cultural Revolution. During a particularly infamous period therein, known as the "February adverse current" of 1967, the army had been told to restore order and had done so in a manner that leftists had found unpalatable. Precisely 12 years later, the CCP Central Committee declared solemnly, if somewhat illogically, that the so-called "February adverse current" never existed, and that it was henceforth to be referred to as the "February main current."[10]

Other reversals of past verdicts were carried out as well. The persons who had been designated "rightist" in 1957 had this label removed. Similarly, all but a few of the 4 million people who had been classified "landlord" and "rich peasant" 30 years before, and whose offspring had suffered from the same designation, lost this stigma.[11] In addition, a large-scale reinvestigation of verdicts rendered during the Cultural Revolution was launched. Several dissidents who were early critics of the Cultural Revolution—most notably, the celebrated "Li-Yi-Zhe" trio—were released from prison.[12]

The rationale behind all these decisions was the same. It was argued that ending the ostracism from society of the individuals involved would arouse their enthusiasm for socialism, thus "mobilizing all positive factors" to achieve the four modernizations and "help[ing] to preserve stability and unity throughout the country."[13]

Institutional changes were also made with these ends in mind. A reappraisal of the entire PRC legal system began, it being explained that the gang of four's replacement of legal codes with mass movements and political persecution had created chaos.[14] The militia was likewise reorganized. Although originally designated the savior of the Tiananmen disturbance of 1976, it had literally disappeared for several months after the fall of the gang of four, presumably to be revamped. It was now said to have been a tool of the gang of four in the gang's drive to usurp power. Part of this sinister plot, according to official explanations, had involved arming the urban militia and allocating to it the duties of the public-security and fire departments. Therefore, these functions were to be separated again. The emergent, now often unarmed, militia also was to operate with a new command structure. Whereas control of the militia had been the purview of militia headquarters during the several years preceding the fall of the gang of four, control of the redesigned militia was henceforth to be shared equally by the party and the army.[15]

These institutional changes were accompanied by the party's tacit encouragement of the exercise of rights guaranteed to the people under Article 45 of the March 1978 state constitution. This article stated:

Citizens enjoy freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration, and the freedom to strike, and have the right to "speak out freely, air their views fully, hold great debates, and write big-character posters."[16]

Ensuing Problems

The result of these changes was the creation of an atmosphere which, while lively and vigorous, was far from the leadership's conception of stability and unity.

[10] *RMRB*, Feb. 26, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 28, 1979, p. E/7.
[11] *BR*, Jan. 21, 1980, p. 14.
[12] Agence France-Presse (AFP), Hong Kong, Jan. 14, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 16, 1979, p. E/4.
[13] *BR*, Jan. 21, 1980, p. 19–21.
[14] *RMRB*, Sept. 4, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 6, 1978, pp. E/4–5.
[15] See, e.g., Nie Rongzhen's speech to the National Militia Conference, Aug. 7, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 9, 1978, p. E/2.
[16] *BR*, Mar. 17, 1978, p. 13.

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Large numbers of people demanded the reversal of judgments made against them. While most of these concerned the Cultural Revolution period, many others involved cases that had occurred 20–30 years before.

The existing institutional structure of the PRC could cope with only a fraction of such cases. Consequently, frustrated petitioners staged demonstrations, often disrupting traffic and inhibiting people from reaching their workplaces. In their zeal to be heard, groups of aggrieved citizens attacked party and government offices and assaulted the occupants thereof.[17] Urban youth who had been sent to rural areas during the "down to the countryside" campaigns of the previous 20 years flocked back to the cities. Generally angry with the system that had exiled them, and having neither employment nor ration cards, many of them supported themselves by stealing. Often they operated in groups, as organized gangs.

Railway service was disrupted over a wide area, with trains forcibly halted. Bands of people, sometimes well organized and sometimes not, looted train cargoes or insisted that they be allowed to travel without purchasing tickets. Since the PRC relies heavily on railways to serve its transportation needs, disruption of service had serious economic repercussions.

Wall posters proliferated, with their authors demanding even greater freedoms than they had been granted. High-ranking figures within the PRC leadership were frequently excoriated in these posters; there were calls for democracy, human rights, and free elections as well. One poster predicted "an explosion like a bomb" on the April 5 anniversary of the Tiananmen incident if these rights were not granted.[18]

In January 1979, a small army of peasants, estimated at 38,000, descended on Beijing to protest their living conditions. Many found Western news correspondents to be sympathetic listeners; their sad stories and pleading faces became a regular feature of Western reporting on China.[19] The appropriateness of

[17] Radio Shanghai, Dec. 12, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 13, 1978, p. 240.

[18] Associated Press (AP), Hong Kong, Dec. 16, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 18, 1978, p. E/1.

[19] See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, "Peking Has No Room for the Thousands Asking to Return," *The New York Times*, Sept. 24, 1979, p. A–2.



People cluster to read the latest posters on Beijing's Democracy Wall in 1979.

—Vincent Mentzel.

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friendship, loans, and technology transfers to a country with the PRC's questionable record on human rights emerged as a lively topic of discussion in the Western press.[20]

Given the priority the Chinese leadership attaches to modernizing the country by the year 2000, and the perceived importance of Western aid to achieving this goal, the leadership became most apprehensive about contacts between aggrieved Chinese and Westerners. Moreover, the leadership was concerned that the existence of widespread citizen unrest might increase the risks of loaning money to China, thus adversely affecting the nation's credit rating and hindering the modernization program.

A Retrenchment

With problems of public order rising through the winter and spring of 1979, the government faced the delicate task of imposing a level of order and stability which would optimize economic activities but would not be interpreted as repressive or as going back on its promises to restore democracy. While pleading for the understanding of the masses, the authorities tackled the difficult job of setting new standards of permissible behavior.

Those with grievances were told to put the interests of the whole before their own. For example, it was pointed out that not everyone who had been transferred to the countryside could be allowed to return to the city. Although the unemployed were assured that every effort would be made to find jobs for them, they were warned that this could not be accomplished overnight. Moreover, petitioners were informed that it was unnecessary to come to Beijing for the redress of grievances. While it was admitted that "in the past some areas procrastinated in solving petitioners' problems, causing tremendous resistance," it was promised that this would not be the case any longer. Problems should be taken to local authorities.[21] Even in instances where justice had been denied, petitioners were not permitted to make trouble. The press warned: "those who use force to obtain redress of grievances will not receive benefits. Troublemakers are following the gang of four under different slogans."[22]

As many Chinese citizens doubtless noticed, this attitude ran directly counter to one of the leading slogans of the Cultural Revolution, "to rebel is justified." In due course, the slogan was officially ruled erroneous, with the explanation that rebellion was justified only in a nonsocialist society. To rebel within a socialist society, the Chinese leadership declared, was tantamount to holding that such a society has an antagonistic class structure, just as the old society had. Yet this, it concluded, was ipso facto contrary to Marxist principles.[23]

At the same time that rebellion itself was outlawed, standards for dissent were clarified. Four criteria were advanced to define the limits between acceptable, "revolutionary" behavior and unacceptable, "counterrevolutionary" behavior. One must not question (1) the leading role of the CCP, (2) socialism, (3) the dictatorship of the proletariat, or (4) Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought. Although the promulgation of these four criteria was helpful in setting standards for dissent, the exact meaning of the four remained ambiguous, for the government seemed to be redefining the meaning of each. In an attempt to clarify just one of them, the party's newest heir-apparent, Zhao Ziyang, suggested that socialism could be reduced to two principles: public ownership of the means of production and payment to each according to his or her work.[24] This fundamental reinterpretation of socialist doctrine was reported quite matter-of-factly, though it must surely have shocked those who had studied the Marxist-Leninist classics and had learned the Maoist interpretation thereof only a few years before. Meanwhile, Zhao's province, Sichuan, was experimenting with new, more innovative variations on Marxist-Leninist economics under an extension of the "small freedoms" program.[25]

Reinstatement of a formal legal system was also part of the leadership's effort to redefine the standards of the permissible. Meeting in June 1979, the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) laid out seven categories of law, including a criminal law and a law of criminal procedure. Some months later, at its 12th session, the NPC adopted a resolution on the continuing validity of all laws and decrees enacted since the founding of the PRC save for those that contradicted the 1978 constitution and the laws enacted by the Fifth NPC.

These decrees delineated more clearly than had

[20] Rene Vienet, "Human Rights: What Rating for China?" *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), May 11, 1979, p. 26.
[21] *RMRB*, Oct. 22, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 22, 1979, pp. L/1–2.
[22] Xinhua, Nov. 5, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 8, 1979, p. L/4.
[23] *Wen Hui Bao* (Shanghai—hereafter *WHB*), Feb. 11, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 1, 1980, p. O/1.
[24] Fox Butterfield, "An Upsurge in Crime Is Problem in China," *The New York Times*, Nov. 18, 1979, pp. 1 and 13.
[25] Radio Chengdu, Jan. 28, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 15, 1980, p. Q/2.

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been done at any time prior to the Cultural Revolution the rights of the defendant as well as those of the various government organs concerned with law enforcement. Extraction of confessions through torture was explicitly forbidden, as were the gathering of crowds to judge a person through "beating, smashing, and looting," and the arrest or imprisonment of persons without authorization. The defendant's rights to legal counsel and to appeal were guaranteed; appeals were tacitly encouraged by a provision that appellate courts were never to impose a heavier sentence than the original judgment.[26]

In addition to clarifying the rights of the defendant, the government enumerated seven categories of acts that would not be tolerated. These included disrupting public order, jeopardizing public safety, infringing on the rights of others, destroying public or private property, violating traffic control, and impairing the public health or cleanliness of the cities.[27] Punishments were also set forth, to be meted out in accordance with the seriousness of the crime. These ranged from surveillance, detention, confiscation of property, and fines, to loss of political rights, life imprisonment, and death.[28]

At the same time, government organs concerned with public order were reorganized or resuscitated. The public-security force, newly separated from the association it had had since 1973 with militia and fire prevention organizations, no longer had the right to arrest without authorization, and time limits were stipulated within which formal charges had to be pressed. The procuracy, which had been abolished during the Cultural Revolution, was revived. Whereas public-security organs were charged with investigation, provisional apprehension, and inquiry in cases involving criminal offenses, the procuracy was empowered to approve arrests, examine the allegations made by public-security personnel, and, if deemed necessary, initiate prosecution.[29] All cases were to be brought to trial; courts were forbidden to participate in the investigation or pretrial processes, or to make decisions without trials.[30]

[26] See Peng Zhen's explanation of the new laws, Xinhua, June 30, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 5, 1979, pp. L/11–16.

[27] Xinhua, Dec. 18, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 20, 1979, pp. L/9–10.

[28] *Guangming Ribao* (Beijing—hereafter *GMRB*), Jan. 6, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 23, 1980, p. L/9.

[29] Xinhua, June 30, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 5, 1979, p. L/14.

[30] Jiang Hua, "Judicial Workers Must First Study Laws to Carry Out Laws," *Hongqi* (Beijing), August 1979, in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), *Reports*, No. 74294, Oct. 2, 1979, p. 63.

A meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court on December 18, 1979, chaired by Jiang Hua (second from the left), President of the Court.

—Eastfoto.

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A major "reversal of verdicts": a memorial meeting in Beijing's Great Hall of the People on May 17, 1980, caps the rehabilitation of the late Liu Shaoqi, once a Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party as well as Chairman of the People's Republic of China. Since 1966, Liu had been denounced as "China's greatest capitalist roader."

—Eastfoto.

The triad of public-security organs, procuracy, and courts was to have fundamental responsibility for maintaining order and stability in society, but responsibilities in this area were not to be confined to these institutions alone. The reorganized militia was charged with helping in public-security duties, although these were no longer to constitute its major function. Judicial bureaus, another casualty of the Cultural Revolution, were revived and made responsible for setting the size and structure of courts, supervising and training judicial cadres, administering the work of legal and notary organizations, organizing and conducting education about the legal system, and handling the legal ramifications of foreign affairs. Lawyers' associations and the institution of people's assessors were resuscitated as well. Assessors, regarded as representatives of the masses, were now to sit with the judges at trials and (theoretically) to participate equally with them in deciding cases.[31]

All of these organizations were enjoined to shift from the previous emphasis on class struggle to concentration on improvement of China's economic performance through achieving the four modernizations. Mass campaigns were to be replaced by meticulous investigation and due process. Behavior was to be strictly in accordance with law, rather than in accordance with the spirit of party policy.[32]

While these attempts to demarcate the limits of permissible behavior were being made or contemplated, the regime continued to introduce new freedoms. For example, the same June 1979 session of the NPC that passed drafts of the criminal law and law of criminal procedure provided for the establishment of people's congresses at county level and above. Democracy was extended to permit direct election of representatives to county-level congresses, with the nominees to be 50 percent greater in number than the positions to be filled.[33] Previously, there had been only one candidate for each post.

[31] Xinhua, Sept. 24, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 26, 1979, p. L/1.

[32] *GMRB*, Nov. 10, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 14, 1979, p. L/1.

[33] Xinhua, June 30, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 5, 1979, pp. L/10–11.

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In addition to introducing new freedoms, the government continued its reversal of past judgments. CCP Central Committee Vice-Chairman Ye Jianying, in the keynote speech at celebrations marking the 30th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, formally repudiated not only the Cultural Revolution itself but the standards it had set for the country for a full decade after its inception.[34] And a few months later, in early 1980, the highest-ranking victim of the Cultural Revolution, former PRC Chairman Liu Shaoqi, was rehabilitated. In consequence, many thousands of people who had been convicted because of their association with him were rehabilitated too.

Popular Responses

These attempts to grant greater freedoms while clarifying the standards of permissible behavior and establishing the institutions to enforce those standards brought no immediate improvements in public order. Petitioners proved reluctant to have their grievances dealt with in the local areas where the alleged wrongs against them had occurred, feeling that once out of sight of national and provincial-capital authorities, they would be out of the minds of the authorities as well. In Tianjin in November 1979, a petitioner caused a major traffic jam by lying down in front of a high official's car to prevent his leaving the office. Many in the surrounding crowd murmured approvingly that "it is necessary to create an uproar or no one would pay attention to them and no problems could be solved."[35] Petitioners had other reasons for wishing to take their grievances to higher authorities. Many of the local authorities had been personally involved in making the original decisions that had caused the grievances. They would therefore naturally be loath to admit they had been wrong by reversing themselves.

Indeed, the sheer number of cases raised when past judgments of right and wrong were reversed is staggering. In Beijing, for example, official sources disclosed that more than 90 percent of the municipality's leading cadres, and one fifth of its cadres as a whole, had been wrongly accused during the Cultural Revolution.[36]

Announcement that these judgments had been reversed implied that those who had been judged correct before were themselves guilty, and caused doubts in many people's minds about the existence of any permanent standards of behavior. Many wondered, both publicly and privately, whether the gang of four might not return and reimpose its standards[37]—at which time the roles of prosecutor and prosecuted would again be reversed. Such fears must surely have been increased by warnings in the official media that remnants of the gang's followers continued to exist, awaiting an opportunity to reemerge.

These doubts were probably reinforced by the seeming vacillation within the government itself on the freedoms it had granted. Official attitudes toward wall posters provide an excellent illustration of changing government views. The right to air opinions through posters was formally granted by the March 1978 constitution, and in the closing days of that year Deng Xiaoping defended even the occasional misuse of that right. Stating that "it does not matter if some incorrect views are among them," he argued that "wall posters and the frank airing of opinions are necessary to emancipate people's minds, develop democracy, smash the repressive mindset of Lin Biao and the gang of four, and inspire [the people] to accomplish the four modernizations."[38]

By March 1979, Beijing wall posters were restricted to a part of Xidan Street; adjacent areas were whitewashed.[39] Posters also disappeared from Democracy Walls in other cities, including Tianjin, Wuhan, and Lanzhou. An order forbade poster writers to criticize high-ranking officials.[40]

About the same time, two leading dissidents were arrested. One of these, Wei Jingsheng, was accused of giving military secrets to some of the foreigners who frequented the Xidan area. The other, Fu Yuehua, had allegedly accused her party secretary falsely of rape. Noting that both these charges had surfaced rather late in the proceedings against Wei and Fu, *The Economist* opined that the accused had been singled out as examples for reasons other than those contained in the formal charges. Wei was apprehended because he had criticized not just the malfunctions of the socialist system but the system itself, and had

[34] *BR*, Oct. 5, 1979, p. 15.

[35] *Tianjin Ribao* (Tianjin), Nov. 14, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 4, 1979, p. R/1.

[36] Xinhua, Oct. 6, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 11, 1979, p. R/1.

[37] *RMRB*, Nov. 21, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 28, 1979, p. L/4.

[38] AFP, Hong Kong, Nov. 28, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 29, 1978, p. E/1.

[39] The timing of the decision to restrict wall posters and arrest dissidents may not have been accidental. In December 1978, a Beijing wall poster predicted that a huge demonstration in favor of human rights, "an unstoppable wave which will explode like a bomb on April 5 next year," would occur on the anniversary of the Tiananmen incident. (AFP, Hong Kong, Dec. 16, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 17, 1979, p. E/1.) For whatever reasons, Apr. 5, 1979, passed quietly, with only subdued commemorative demonstrations favorable to the present government.

[40] AFP, Hong Kong, Mar. 31, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 2, 1979, p. L/3.

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even discussed his criticisms with foreigners. Fu had organized a peasant rally in Beijing, and the potential for a linkage between disgruntled intellectuals like herself with China's aggrieved peasant millions represented a threat the leadership could not tolerate.[41] Both defendants received harsh sentences.

In November 1979, a month after Wei and Fu were sentenced, the Xidan Street Democracy Wall was closed entirely, and its operations were transferred to Yuetan Park, which was less easily accessible and far from areas frequented by Westerners. The government explained that the large number of people who had congregated at Xidan Street to write and read posters had caused traffic problems, and that the constitution had guaranteed only the right to wall posters, not the right to put them in any particular place. This explanation did not, however, account for the further restrictions placed on posters: those wishing to exercise their right were now required to register their names, addresses, and work units. Further, they would be held responsible for the contents of the posters.[42]

Evidently many people remained unconvinced that the transfer had been effected out of concern for the traffic flow on Xidan Street. A Communist newspaper in Hong Kong sought to reassure its readers by quoting an old phrase: "if the wine is good, no one is afraid of trudging over a long distance."[43]

Even these restrictions on wall posters did not have the effect that the party leadership desired. In February 1980, the CCP Central Committee's Fifth

[41] "The Little Touch of Gulag Chairman Hua Leaves Behind," *The Economist* (London), Oct. 20, 1979, p. 63.

[42] Radio Beijing, Dec. 6, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 7, 1979, p. L/1.
[43] *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), Dec. 7, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 10, 1979, p. U/1.



The trial of Chinese dissident Wei Jingsheng on October 16, 1979, at Beijing Intermediate People's Court. In the publicly televised trial, Wei, editor of a journal posted for several months on Democracy Wall on Xidan Street, was sentenced to 15 years in prison and deprived of political rights for an additional 3 years for allegedly giving foreigners information on Chinese troop deployment and casualties in the February 1979 conflict with Vietnam.

—Eastfoto.

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Plenum announced that, "to help eliminate factors causing instability," it had proposed deletion of that section of the state constitution guaranteeing the so-called "four big" rights: to speak out freely, air views freely, hold great debates, and write big-character posters.[44] This guarantee was deleted by the National People's Congress at its September 1980 session. Official sources explained that "it would be completely wrong for anybody to think that the abolition of the 'big four' [rights] implies limiting the masses' democratic rights [which] are solemnly specified in our constitution and nobody can violate them."[45] Skeptics might, however, have pointed out that until a few weeks before, the constitution had also "solemnly specified" the "four big" rights. At any rate, wall posters were denounced because of their association with the gang of four and because they had damaged public order and economic progress.[46] In lieu of drawing up posters, citizens were urged to express their views at people's congresses at all levels, at government offices, and by letters to newspapers.[47]

Mass cynicism was another key factor in the social order situation. Instance after instance testifies to citizens' unwillingness to believe either in the rights granted to them or in the legitimacy of the state's instruments of coercion. Guangdong peasants were quoted as saying that "policies are laid down when times are difficult, changed when times improve, and criticized when a new movement comes along."[48] And in Inner Mongolia, the masses complained that "policies fixed in the spring are abandoned in the fall."[49]

The government's own investigations confirmed the truth of these allegations. In several areas, cadres had accused those who tried to exercise newly granted economic freedoms of showing capitalist tendencies, and had confiscated their crops or wares. In others, cadres had refused to provide the rewards that had been promised for overfulfilling production plans, and had restricted domestic sideline occupations.[50] Such cadre actions were blamed for seriously inhibiting the masses' enthusiasm for socialism. Undoubtedly these actions also caused distrust of the party's stated policies.

Artists as well as peasants and workers proved skeptical about exercising their new rights. For example, the internationally renowned writer Ba Jin stated that "even when I am writing hard today, I still think whether this might constitute another crime in reversing verdicts."[51] The government's repeated urgings to intellectuals to emancipate themselves from the shackles imposed under Lin Biao and the gang of four indicate that many continued to be reluctant to do so.

Cynicism about the government's motives reinforced genuine uncertainty over the permanency of standards, and gave rise to increasing lawlessness among certain segments of the Chinese population. Though some of the apparent increase in criminality can be attributed to the government's greater willingness to publicize existing difficulties, the official media throughout 1979 explicitly stated that public-security problems were rising. In September, the Ministry of Public Security sponsored a lengthy conference of directors of public-security bureaus from all areas of China;[52] in November, it hosted a National Urban Social Order and Security Conference.[53] With the regular instruments of domestic coercion—public-security, militia, and judicial organs—unable to handle the situation adequately, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was called out. As of December, army patrols were reported on 24-hour patrol duty in the major cities of most provinces.[54]

The situation confronting the authorities was complicated. Opposition came from many sources. Common criminals, the unemployed, disaffected youth, political dissidents, and "counterrevolutionaries" were obvious sources of public disorder. Also to be expected were crimes occasioned by the greater economic freedoms that had been granted to help stimulate production. For example, the government's encouragement of group cooperatives in the service industries led to a proliferation of small hotels. Some of these came to be used for gambling, prostitution, smuggling, or other illegal activities. Smuggling was likewise facilitated by the increased exchange of goods between China and other countries and by the larger number of tourists and businesspersons entering and leaving China. Black-marketeering increased, as did illegal emigration.

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[44] *BR*, Mar. 10, 1980, p. 10.

[45] *Nanfang Ribao* (Guangzhou—hereafter NFRB), Apr. 5, 1980, p. 3, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 15, 1980, p. P/5.

[46] It should be noted, though, that the 1975 constitution, promulgated at the height of the gang of four's power, did not grant the right to write posters. See *BR*, Jan. 24, 1975, p. 17.

[47] Xinhua, Apr. 17, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 17, 1980, p. R/1.

[48] *Radio Guangzhou*, Oct. 3, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 5, 1979, p. P/15.

[49] Xinhua, Feb. 29, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 4, 1980, p. L/16.

[50] *NFRB*, Dec. 9, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 18, 1979, p. P/1.

[51] *Wen Wei Po* (Hong Kong), Jan. 15, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 18, 1980, p. U/1.

[52] Xinhua, Sept. 7, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 10, 1979, p. L/4.

[53] Xinhua, Dec. 8, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 13, 1979, p. L/2.

[54] See, e.g., AFP, Hong Kong, Dec. 23, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 27, 1979, p. L/7, and Guiyang Radio, Dec. 15, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 18, 1980, p. Q/2.

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

Army units on nighttime patrol on Shanghai's Nankin Road in 1979.

—Vincent Mentzel.

More surprising were the problems caused by groups of people who would not ordinarily be expected to disrupt social order. In November 1979, the Shandong media reported that some 2,000 local residents had invaded a state-run orchard. Carrying jute bags, sacks, and baskets, they quickly appropriated an estimated 125,000 pounds of apples for themselves, plus 3,000 yuan in cash, two carts, and a wristwatch. The offenders also assaulted orchard workers and stripped them of their belongings, including bed sheets and quilts.[55] A second, smaller incident was reported in Anhui Province later the same month. This incident resulted in the arrest of 58 fruit thieves.[56] In Beijing, hospitals complained that medical personnel were frequently beaten up by patients or their family members, thus "disturbing the normal working order of hospitals."[57]

As 1980 began, two more serious incidents involving ordinary citizens occurred in Anhui. A production team, headed by its female leader driving the team's tractor, marched on the provincial Academy of Agroscience and stole some 50,000 bricks.[58] In another area of the province, a dispute which began when a police officer questioned a boy he saw picking up fish at a lakeside soon escalated into a riot involving a thousand people. Damage to state property was estimated at more than 23,000 yuan.[59]

Although none of the above incidents involved firearms, many citizens did possess weapons. A military subdistrict in Shanxi reported the theft of a variety of weapons, including hand grenades.[60] Several areas issued orders strengthening gun control,[61] with Heilongjiang banning the private manufacture of firearms.[62] In some cases, the transfer of arms to private hands was approved by party officials. On Hainan Island, a quarrel between the children of two neighboring villages spilled over to their elders and led to the party branch secretaries' issuing militia weapons to their respective villagers. A pitched battle involving nearly 700 persons ensued.[63]

As might be expected, the PRC's instruments of coercion, faced with a large number of lawbreakers and uncertain of the standards to be applied, did not function well. Mass media criticized the courts for dealing too leniently with offenders, with the authoritative *Renmin Ribao* adding that in some areas state laws and regulations were simply being ignored.[64] Even where the courts meted out fair judgments, there was strong resistance to implementation of their verdicts. Responsible personnel, fearing subsequent reversals of party policy, reportedly felt that "if we take no action, you can do nothing against us."[65]

There was a general tendency to avoid becoming involved. Press reports described public-security forces as "inhibited" or "passive," and in need of "emancipating their thinking."[66] The reluctance of public-security forces to act was doubtless reinforced by frequent reports of their personnel being publicly set upon and beaten by crowds of citizens.[67] There were also numerous media references to bystanders who turned their backs while others were being robbed and assaulted. The militia, which had ,been criticized for misusing its public-security role during

[55] Radio Jinan, Nov. 7, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 14, 1979, p. O/3.
[56] Radio Hefei, Nov. 29, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 4, 1979, p. O/1.
[57] *Beijing Ribao* (Beijing—hereafter *BJRB*), Nov. 17, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 11, 1980, p. R/5.
[58] Radio Hefei, Feb. 3, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 5, 1980, p. O/2.
[59] Ibid., p. O/3.
[60] Radio Xian, Nov. 20, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 27, 1979, p. T/1.
[61] See, for example, Radio Guangxi, Nov. 23, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 28, 1979, p. P/6.
[62] Radio Harbin, Dec. 5, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 7, 1979, p. S/1.
[63] Radio Haikou, Mar. 21, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 25, 1980, p. P/7.
[64] *RMRB*, Dec. 11, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 12, 1979, p. L/5.
[65] *RMRB*, Jan. 10, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 23, 1980, p. L/10.
[66] *RMRB*, Sept. 1, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 5, 1979, p. L/1.
[67] *Tianjin Ribao*, Nov. 14, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 30, 1979, p. R/5.

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the reign of the gang of four, was no less reluctant to become involved.[68] There were reports as well of the army failing to accept responsibility for public security work.[69]

Efforts to Improve Public Order

The government's response to the failure of its instruments of coercion to cope with public-security problems had three aspects. (1) It threatened countermeasures against negligent personnel and institutions. (2) It attempted to reinstill a sense of responsibility for public order among the masses. (3) It tried to deal with the causes underlying many problems of social order.

With regard to the first, ranking PLA commander Qin Jiwei warned that members of army patrols who stood "with their arms folded and remain indifferent" while people were injured would be held responsible.[70] Public-security forces were similarly admonished. The militia was told that its involvement in public-security work in previous years had not itself been wrong, but that the problem had been the manner in which it had carried out that work. The new line implied that so long as militia units acted in accordance with the law, they need not fear official censure.[71] Those who were reluctant to carry out court verdicts were reminded that they were themselves subject to prosecution under Article 157 of the new criminal law.[72] As for the party, a county-level party secretary in Tianjin who failed to act on a higher-level party committee's order to reverse a verdict in which the secretary had himself participated was relieved of his duties. *Renmin Ribao,* hinting that the situation was not unusual, called for careful study of the phenomenon of a lower-level party organization's setting itself up against a higher-level one.[73] And the nation's courts were instructed to hand down harsh sentences against those who disturbed public order—even at the risk of making "inevitable" errors.[74]

Government attempts to reinstill a sense of responsibility for public order among ordinary citizens took both collective and individual forms. The former involved chiefly the reactivation of the public-security functions of China's mass organizations. As 1980 began, urban neighborhood offices, urban neighborhood committees, mediation committees, and public-security committees were resuscitated. Each of these was to be under the jurisdiction of the local public-security (police) station, and all of their members were to be elected for terms of one or two years.

To some extent, the duties of the four organizations overlapped. The neighborhood office was to serve mainly as a link between residents, as represented by their committees, and the government. That is, it was to channel the views expressed by neighborhood committees to the government, and vice versa. The neighborhood committee, in addition to collecting and passing on residents' views to the neighborhood office, was charged with mobilizing the residents to obey laws and government orders, supervising public-security work, and resolving disputes among residents.[75] Mediation committees were to settle civil disputes and minor criminal cases which arose in their areas. (In one county near Beijing, grass-roots mediation committees aided by judicial assistants were subsequently reported to have succeeded in resolving 97 percent of disputes brought to them. These dealt with such matters as quarrels between households, divorce, dereliction of duty, corruption, and waste.[76] Since they were immediately available to the aggrieved parties, mediation committees were often able to deal with problems before the two sides' views became irreconcilably hardened. And by resolving issues before they reached the courts, the committees relieved some of the pressure from the understaffed and overworked court system.) Public-security committees were to function as auxiliaries to the formal public-security forces. Members were to keep watch over their neighborhoods and to report any suspicious activities to the authorities. They were to have the right to make arrests, but not to interrogate or detain those apprehended.[77] (While the members of such committees were supposed to be elected because of their close ties with the masses, as 1980 progressed numerous references to the beating up or threatening of public-security activists by friends of people upon whom the activists had informed indicated that committee members were not especially popular in their communities.) Although many difficulties kept these mass organizations from functioning optimally, the or-

[68] See, for example, *Yunnan Ribao* (Kunming), Mar. 27, 1978, and Radio Guangzhou, Jan. 9, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI,* Jan. 10, 1978, p. H/7.
[69] *RMRB,* Jan. 23, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* Jan. 24, 1980, p. L/2.
[70] Ibid.
[71] *Yunnan Ribao,* Mar. 27, 1978, and Radio Guangzhou, Jan. 9, 1978, in *FBIS-CHI,* Jan. 10, 1978, p. H/7.
[72] *RMRB,* Jan. 10, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* Jan. 23, 1980, p. L/10.
[73] *RMRB,* Apr. 25, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* Apr. 28, 1980, pp. R/2-4.
[74] AFP, Hong Kong, Dec. 3, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI,* Dec. 5, 1979, p. L/1.
[75] For a description of the organization and functions of these four bodies, see Xinhua, Jan. 10, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* Jan. 16, 1980, pp. L/1-2, and Xinhua, Jan. 19, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* Jan. 24, 1980, pp. L/2-9.
[76] Xinhua, Feb. 28, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 28, 1980, p. R/5.
[77] Xinhua, Jan. 19, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI,* Jan. 24, 1980, p. L/8.

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ganizations did at least involve groups of ordinary citizens in the peacekeeping process.

The government also announced that individuals as well as groups would be held responsible for maintaining social order. In Harbin, a man who refused to help public-security personnel apprehend the pickpocket who had taken his money was stripped of his party membership and publicized by the national media as a negative example.[78] Concomitantly, the Ministry of Public Security warned that people who assaulted on-duty personnel or took revenge on informers would be "severely punished without mercy."[79] On a more positive note, citizens who helped apprehend criminals received public praise and, occasionally, small cash rewards.

As for attempts to tackle the root causes of disorder, the government followed a multi-pronged approach. In Shenyang, Politburo member Li Desheng visited public-security bureau substations to learn about residents' problems, and inquired about the availability of food, coal, and gas.[80] Similar investigations took place in other parts of the country.

Efforts were also made to find jobs for the unemployed. Young people who had been deprived of normal educational opportunities when schools were closed during the Cultural Revolution received particular attention in this regard. Unskilled and resentful, they had accounted for a large proportion of criminal activities. Young criminals were assured that there was a way back into society for them. Work-study schools were established in many cities to teach the offenders a trade, while efforts to instill in them a more positive attitude toward society were under way. And rallies were held in which reformed delinquents vowed to make up for lost time by pursuing their studies with extraordinary vigor. The government even set forth role models for youth. Lei Feng, a soldier who had died in the line of duty while in his early 20's, had been the focus of other such campaigns after his death in 1962. Now, in 1980, young people were again admonished to emulate Lei Feng's hard work, self-discipline, and adherence to law and order.[81]

Results

By the time of the 1980 spring festival, these efforts to improve social order seemed to be succeeding.

A work-study school for juvenile delinquents, in Changning District of Shanghai.

—Eastfoto.

Several provinces reported falling crime rates, with Heilongjiang claiming a spectacular 20 percent decrease.[82]

However, the government was far from complacent over the results achieved. Particularly worrisome to authorities was the degree of sympathy dissidents seemed to enjoy within the party. Deng Xiaoping, in a major speech delivered to 10,000 party cadres at Beijing's Great Hall of the People in January, asked rhetorically why it was that "certain secret publications" were printed so beautifully. Noting that their authors could not possibly possess printing plants, Deng concluded that the publications could not have appeared without the support of party members, and that many of these were apt to be cadres.[83]

Dissidents, of course, constitute a very small number of persons. So apparently do each of the other social elements that have generated instability. As described by Minister of Public Security Zhao Cangbi, these elements consist of:

. . .remnants of the Gang of Four, both organizationally and ideologically . . . as well as newly emerging elements who engage in beating, smashing, and looting, all kinds of hooligan gangs and criminal offenders, and counterrevolutionaries who maintain contacts with

[78] Radio Harbin, Apr. 2, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 4, 1980, p. S/1.
[79] Xinhua, Feb. 9, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 11, 1980, p. L/2.
[80] Radio Shenyang, Jan. 12, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 16, 1980, p. S/2.
[81] Xinhua, Mar. 20, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 21, 1980, p. R/1.
[82] Radio Harbin, Feb. 25, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 27, 1980, p. S/1.
[83] As reprinted in *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), Mar. 1, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 11, 1980, p. 12.

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foreign powers and Taiwan's special agent organs and engage in underground activities. There are also the so-called "democrats" and "people with different opinions" who openly oppose the CCP's leadership and socialism.[84]

While the statements of Zhao and numerous others clearly embody recognition that resistance comes from many disparate groups that have little in common with one another, there is still a persistent concern that circumstances may induce these elements to unite. As Zhao Cangbi has put it: "Although these people are very different in nature, they are unstable factors, and they may gang up under certain conditions to become a destructive force, causing disturbances and losses to the state."[85]

In this connection, the implications of certain types of lawlessness cited above, though not commented upon publicly by the authorities, must certainly be the cause of some anxiety. The Anhui production team's theft of bricks under the direction of the team leader and the Hainan pitched battle in which opposing villages were led by their respective party secretaries are both examples of disorder which was based on social units approved by the party itself, and in which these units were led by persons the party had officially sanctioned as leaders. Given the persistence of traditional Chinese loyalties to one's small group, the potential for organized resistance to government policies is serious.

This concern aside, however, deterioration of the social order no longer seemed as imminent as it had. During the spring of 1980, public-security conferences tended to concentrate on rewarding activists rather than on haranguing against enemies of the people. Although problems of social order continued to be discussed by the media, such discussions appeared less frequently and lacked the note of urgency that had characterized most discourses of this sort during the previous year.

Moreover, despite some fears that too much freedom might cause famine,[86] the economy did well in 1979. The State Statistical Bureau announced that the total value of industrial output for 1979 exceeded that of 1978 by 8.5 percent, with plans met or exceeded for 89 out of 100 major products. Agricultural output rose by 8.6 percent in value terms over the same period, with reasonable increases in livestock production.[87]

Though by no means as high as the government's original hopes, these were creditable gains. The news of economic progress accompanied by declining problems of social order must surely have strengthened the new leadership vis-à-vis those who were critical of its plans for revitalization of society and the economy.

Ultimately, though, the success or failure of the post-Mao government's efforts to revitalize Chinese society will depend on its success in convincing the PRC's citizens that it intends to continue the economic and social freedoms it has so recently granted them. Recent developments have served to reinforce already existing doubts about the government's intentions.

For example, several loopholes have appeared in the new legal system, which had been touted as protecting citizens from arbitrary arrest and detention. During the late spring and early summer of 1980, several provinces, pleading heavy case loads and a shortage of trained personnel, extended the lengths of time an accused person could be detained without trial.[88] Perhaps even more important, public-security organs were sentencing thousands of people to "reeducation through labor" camps without trials. The camps are clearly prisons, yet many of their inhabitants' offenses appear to have been as minor as loitering or unemployment. Other inmates are dissidents who have criticized government policies.[89]

To have spent time in such a camp seriously jeopardizes one's future. Given a surplus of labor, work units are extremely reluctant to hire someone with a tarnished past. Similarly, it becomes very difficult to find a marriage partner. With reduced opportunities to secure outside employment or spouses, many inmates are obliged to stay in the camps even after they have served their terms, and to marry other inmates. Doing so virtually guarantees that they will become permanent residents of the camps, where wages are far lower than normal and where one's social status is reduced as well.

Such an existence is not likely to induce one to give one's best efforts to raise socialist production, or to enhance one's loyalties to the state. If continued on its present scale, the practice of sentencing people to labor camps could create a hereditary caste system not unlike that which in practice grew out of the "rightist" designations of 1957 and "landlord" and "rich peasant" classifications of 1949. These, it will be

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[84] Radio Beijing, Apr. 25, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 28, 1980, p. L/9.
[85] Ibid.
[86] *BJRB*, Dec. 3, 1979, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 5, 1979, p. L/1.
[87] *BR*, May 12, 1980, pp. 12–15.
[88] Radio Jinan, May 28, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 30, 1980, p. O/4; Radio Changchun, June 9, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 11, 1980, p. S/2.
[89] Jay Mathews, "China Revives Labor Camp System," *The Washington Post*, June 1, 1980, pp. A/1, A/27.

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A poster on a Beijing fence in 1977 typifies the campaign to discredit and hold accountable the gang of four.

—Black Star.

recalled, had finally been removed in 1979 in order to raise their designees' enthusiasm for socialism.

During the spring of 1980, the government also called for "iron discipline without preconditions" to obtain the unity necessary for economic construction.[90] These and other actions caused many Chinese to become painfully aware of parallels between the present environment and that of 1957. In that year, the liberal "hundred flowers" period was abandoned in favor of the antirightist movement, which aimed at silencing ideological dissent. Major targets of the antirightist campaign were those people who had spoken their views most freely during the "hundred flowers" period. Then, with dissent silenced, the government began a major effort to raise economic production—the Great Leap Forward. Recognition of these parallels has caused many Chinese to fear that a new rectification campaign is in the offing.

Despite these fears, the actions of the government thus far amount to a modification of recent policies rather than the precipitous reversal witnessed in 1957. Economic freedoms continue, with some even being expanded. In Tibet, where ill-advised policies caused 1979's harvest to be the worst in recent memory, the Central Committee informed peasants that "individual interest comes first, followed by the interests of the state and collective."[91] Peasants were even permitted to conduct external trade directly—including the signing of contracts for delivery of goods to foreign countries.[92]

And, despite frequent grumbling about the baleful effects that newly liberalized standards of literature and art are having on society, the government persists in backing the new standards. In the words of the First Party Secretary of Sichuan, China's most populous province:

This [negative] view does not tally with the actual situation. One would be very unfair if one were to attribute problems cropping up in society at large, including a small number of young people, all to literature and art,

[90] *GMRB*, June 5, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 23, 1980, p. L/16.

[91] Radio Lhasa, June 14, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 17, 1980, p. Q/2.

[92] Xinhua, June 22, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 24, 1980, p. Q/5.

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or to describe today's films and novels as devoid of all merit.[93]

There are, then, indications that no new rectification campaign that would reverse past policies is in the offing. However, the burden of proof will be on the government. It has to convince the Chinese people that recent changes in policy represent simply policy modifications enacted with their best interests in mind, rather than abandonment of promised freedoms.

One test will be the conduct of the oft-postponed trial of the gang of four. The gang has been pilloried in the mass media for several years, and a guilty verdict is hardly in doubt. This prejudgment, though anathema to Western principles of jurisprudence, is less likely to offend most Chinese. The prosecution must, however, present its case in such a way as to persuade the Chinese people that the government is observing the provisions of its own criminal law, and that the trial represents more than the retaliation of victors against their vanquished rivals. In an obvious effort at such persuasion, the Chinese press has recently carried detailed accounts of the painstaking gathering of evidence, stating that confessions will not readily be believed, and that the accused shall not be considered guilty unless there is full and conclusive evidence against him or her.[94]

Also important for the government's credibility will be its willingness to deal with popular complaints that only ordinary people are prosecuted, whereas high officials are allowed to flout the law. These charges that the judicial system "only attacks flies but not tigers" have become persistent, with delegates to the National People's Congress openly complaining that the officials responsible for the recent capsizing of an oil rig in Bohai Sea have not been punished sufficiently.[95] Convincing the Chinese population that the same standards will be consistently applied to all may ultimately add more to the government's credibility than the suppression of dissidents has subtracted from it.

[93] Xinhua, June 18, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 18, 1980, p. Q/1.
[94] Xinhua, Sept. 29, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 30, 1980, pp. L/1-4.
[95] *RMRB*, Sept. 18, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 30, 1980, p. L/12.
[96] Xinhua, Apr. 20, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 22, 1980, p. L/2.

Conclusions

On the basis of preliminary results, the government's rather drastic revisions in the standards of permissible behavior must be judged a qualified success. It has been argued above that impediments to the smooth functioning of society under these new standards have included mass cynicism, resulting from the many swings in policy in the past; opposition to the present leadership's policies by those who are ideologically sympathetic to its deposed rivals; and vacillation within the leadership itself over the component elements of these new standards. Mass cynicism will probably decline if future changes in policy are minimized, for the passage of time will reinforce the legitimacy of present standards. In addition, however, the government will have to make good on past promises and enforce compliance with existing rules. The accomplishment of these goals, of course, will require continued efforts to discredit dissenting ideological views and the maintenance of a high degree of consensus within the present leadership.

Current policy appears to attach considerable importance to all these factors. In a speech delivered in the spring of 1980, Zhao Ziyang announced that there would be no large-scale reforms this year or next. Explaining that "in a reform, a slight move in one part may affect the situation as a whole, because it will cause many chain reactions," he emphasized:

. . . we must not commit the same mistake that we did in the past when "a free rein leads to chaos, chaos forces us to rein in, and once we rein in, the thing becomes dead." We must not become hesitant and retreat once there is some sign of disturbance and trouble.[96]

Nonetheless, maintenance of the policies laid down over the last two years, despite the evident determination to implement them in at least their basic outlines, is very much dependent on the vicissitudes of elite politics within China. As repeated experience has shown, these are apt to be uncertain and remain essentially beyond prediction.

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Books

Soviet Air Power

By Jonathan Alford

ALEXANDER BOYD. *The Soviet Air Force Since 1918*. Briarcliff Manor, NY, Stein & Day Publishers, 1977.

ROBIN HIGHAM and JACOB W. KIPP, Eds. *Soviet Aviation and Airpower: A Historical View*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1977.

ROBERT P. BERMAN. *Soviet Air Power in Transition*. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1978.

SIPRI. *Outer Space: Battlefield of the Future*. New York, NY, Crane, Russak & Co., 1978.

IN BRITISH LAW, possession of an offensive weapon is a crime—presumably because carrying it implies a conditional or even unconditional intention sooner or later to use it. In much the same way, it is often assumed by many that the Soviet Union would not have acquired what is by any standards one of a number of singularly offensive-looking weapons—in this case Soviet Frontal Aviation—if it did not sooner or later intend to use it offensively. So, it is argued by some, intent is automatically established.

But consider an alternative formulation. Indeed, it is precisely the defense which the man found in possession of an offensive weapon would probably give to the court. He was, he says, frightened of being attacked in such an unsalubrious part of the city and therefore was carrying the weapon to deter any potential aggressors. He would never use this (admittedly offensive) weapon unless somebody was intent on doing him harm. What the judge and jury must decide, I suppose, is whom to believe and whether the circumstances justified the need to arm in self-defense. What is more, the judge is unlikely to be persuaded of innocent intent if the man carrying the weapon has a criminal record.

This is really the problem when we look at the Soviet Union. Whether the weapon is offensive or defensive is immaterial, for air power of the kind we observe—and are helped, if we need help, to observe by the books under review—has both offensive and defensive components. What we have to decide is why the Soviet Union has invested an enormous amount of treasure in this and other components of military power. Should we listen to the Soviets when they say that they have done it because they feel threatened? Or should we take into account their previous record—the most current example being the invasion of Afghanistan—and assume sinister motives?

The difficulty, of course, is that we cannot afford to get the answer wrong, and seeing what we see, we would be foolish to accept the benign interpretation at face value. To be sure, the USSR feels threatened and can legitimately call history to witness that other powers have from time to time attempted (if unwisely) to invade Russia. But, as we are frequently reminded, intentions can change much more rapidly than military capabilities can be acquired. Therefore, there is absolutely no certainty that the weapon forged to defend the Soviet Union might not at some point in the future be used for other purposes. Furthermore, if Soviet leaders concluded that Soviet military power, whatever the motive for its acquisition, could be employed to transform the USSR's external environment irreversibly in the Soviets' favor, the temptation to use such a weapon might be powerful—especially if the West had accepted the benign interpretation at face value and allowed military disparity to grow to the point where a Soviet victory seemed possible.

LET US RETURN for a moment to the hypothetical court case being brought against the man with an offensive weapon. He, in his defense, says it is not an offensive but a defensive weapon. But, says the prosecution, it has a distinctly offensive character: it would only be useful for striking somebody down. Not so, pleads the prisoner. It may look offensive to you, but to me it is

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defensive because if someone looks to be raising his hand against me, I shall defend myself by striking him before he can strike me. What is your verdict? Guilty or not guilty?

This quandary of interpretation seems to me to be at the heart of the West's military relationship with the Soviet Union. Very often—all too often, perhaps—we hear the comment that the Soviet Union possesses more military power than it can possibly need to assure its own defense, and that the only other thing it can need that power for is aggression. This argument seems to me to miss one essential point. The Soviet Union appears on the evidence to subscribe now to a military doctrine of striking first when threatened. It is not alone in subscribing to such a doctrine, and given the size and consequent indefensibility of the Soviet Union, preemptive deterrence in the conventional sense is a perfectly logical doctrine to pursue. The trouble, of course, is that it makes other people profoundly nervous. We in the West may have no intention whatever of invading Russia, and it probably looks to us as if that would be a very foolish enterprise. But given Soviet suspicion and distrust, Moscow may not see things quite the same way. So what it may quite genuinely regard as a deterrent to Western adventures appears to the West as a very threatening collection of military hardware which *could* be used not for deterrent purposes but for aggressive purposes. So it is felt necessary to huddle together in NATO and, individually and collectively, arm ourselves.

One can see the ramifications of this security dilemma in many different areas of military competition, but it has been evident at its starkest in the NATO decision of December 1979 to introduce new intermediate-range nuclear systems in Western Europe. We in the West justified this decision in part on the grounds that the systems we had were becoming outdated, in the sense that our aircraft looked much too vulnerable on the ground, and that the growth of Soviet air defenses (interceptors and surface-to-air missiles) made it seem that penetration by Western strike aircraft was far from assured. Moreover, we deemed the Soviet Union intent on achieving superiority in long-range theater nuclear systems (witness all those impressive new aircraft and missiles), so we opted for a rather modest deployment of new long-range systems to restore what we regarded as a deteriorating balance of capabilities. But what the Soviet Union sees in this decision is the encroachment of *American* nuclear power, creeping round the edge of SALT in a manner that—because of the short flight time of Pershing II missiles—appears distinctively threatening to Soviet security.

Although the action-reaction phenomenon does not explain everything about arms procurement decisions taken in East and West, it does explain a good deal, especially in the European context. If the West ever needed to offer public justification for investing in F-15's, F-16's, Tornados, or Jaguars, the growth of Soviet aircraft reach and the impressive array of fast and capable aircraft presented in the reviewed volumes would be sufficient evidence. Yet that is a most unsatisfactory situation, for it locks us into a spiral from which we cannot escape.

It is precisely the greater range and payload of modern aircraft that renders it so difficult to break out of the spiral by negotiation. Arms reduction in Europe makes little sense for West European powers if the threat emanates—as it now does—from airfields deep within the Soviet Union. It would be foolish to be comforted by the thought that Soviet air power had returned to the Soviet Western mili-

Reviewers in This Issue

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tary districts if, as a quid pro quo, American air power returned to the United States. The geographical asymmetry of the superpowers with respect to Western Europe is an uncomfortable fact.

ACTION-REACTION certainly explains part of the dynamic of the arms race, but it must be acknowledged that arms are not procured just because of a perception of inferiority. They are also procured because of industrial and bureaucratic pressures on governments. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Soviet Union. Even if Soviet leaders were to acknowledge the effects on the West of aggressive Soviet procurement plans, it is rather doubtful whether they would be in a position substantially to amend those programs.

This point seems to be missed in the first two of the volumes reviewed here, *The Soviet Air Force Since 1918* and *Soviet Aviation and Air Power*. While cataloging the impressive historical growth of Soviet aviation—and indeed the growth was designed to impress—these studies give little sense of the internal dynamic, of the bureaucratic politics, of the inertia in the Soviet system, and of the way in which the Soviet defense industry functions in response to the economic controls of centralized planning. Simply because there are a number of design bureaus, a number of designs are carried through to prototype. Simply because the factories exist and cannot easily make anything else, production norms are set in economic plans and met. Simply because there seems to be no way of turning off the tap, aircraft—and better aircraft at that—flow off the production lines.

Indeed, there is evidence of a vicious circle at work. Production targets are set not in relation to any obvious military requirement but in relation both to industrial capacity and to previous production norms. One must always make more and not less. New aircraft must fly higher or faster because that is what progress is all about. More height and greater speed become the way of glorifying the socialist revolution.

Also reinforcing the process is sheer Soviet embarrassment regarding performance in other economic sectors. Because the Soviet Union is a superpower only in the military dimension, it constantly feels the need to demonstrate its ability to amass military power as a symbol of the success of a revolution having little else to boast about. So, although the two volumes successfully document the growth of Soviet aviation, they provide little insight into the motivation behind this phenomenon.

IF THE READER is interested less in history than in the future, the best of these publications for him is Robert Berman's study, *Soviet Air Power in Transition*. One in a series of Brookings Institution monographs, this slim volume gives a clear and lucid picture of the way in which Soviet air power is in the process of changing shape and, in changing shape, presenting a rather awesome threat to Western interests. It contains some well-designed graphs and tabular information which, interestingly enough, show a trend over the period toward slightly fewer combat aircraft with substantially greater range/payload combinations and with higher speeds and increased penetration capabilities. This study is useful for the serious student of contemporary military affairs.

THE LAST VOLUME under review is quite different from the rest, because it is devoted entirely to space and not to air power in the sense in which that term is normally used. However, the title chosen for this volume by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)—*Outer Space: Battlefield of the Future?*—is much too sensational for a book which, in fact, coolly describes in a very coherent way the many important functions that satellites perform. It is a useful compendium of statistics on space launches and satellite performance, with enough technical explanation to satisfy a student of contemporary military strategy. Moreover, it seems to bring into focus the physical constraints on satellites and the quite serious limitations under which they must operate.

The SIPRI volume actually devotes little attention to warfare in space, and that is proper, given the fact that neither major user of space can at the moment contemplate the prospect of being able to conduct a successful preemptive strike against the great bulk of the other's space-based assets. That remains a hugely difficult endeavor, but unless this area of military competition can be closed off—perhaps by an agreement similar to the ABM Treaty—enormous sums of money may be spent on very destabilizing technologies.

THE DEVELOPMENT of Soviet military aviation and space technology is a demonstrable fact. The USSR has an impressive array of modern aircraft and space vehicles. The implications of the development are less clear. We cannot afford to make assumptions as to its ultimate purpose which err too far on the side of tolerance. It would be nice—and an awful lot cheaper—to let the Soviets go ahead and fulfill their production norms and give free rein to their design bureaus without worrying too much. But that would be taking a risk in a

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game where the penalties for incorrect judgment would be rather great.

The crucial asymmetry lies in what each side believes. One suspects that the Soviet Union is genuinely convinced that it is only now overcoming the West's technological lead—and that the Soviets are proud to have accomplished this feat. The West senses the dynamic in the Soviet programs and, finding no obvious slackening in that dynamic, believes that it in turn must continue to invest massively in military aviation to prevent the Soviet Union from rushing ahead. The spiral exists, and its existence is a sad commentary on man's present inability to conduct his affairs in a rational manner.

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Lessons of Russian Terrorism

By Abraham Ascher

ADAM B. ULAM. *In the Name of the People: Prophets and Conspirators in Revolutionary Russia.* New York, NY, The Viking Press, 1977.

VERA BROIDO. *Apostles into Terrorists: Women and the Revolutionary Movement in the Russia of Alexander II.* New York, NY, The Viking Press, 1977.

MARTIN A. MILLER. *Kropotkin.* Chicago, IL, and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1976.

MICHAEL PALIJ. *The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918–1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution.* Seattle, WA, and London, University of Washington Press, 1976.

WALTER LAQUEUR. *Terrorism.* Boston, MA, and Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 1977.

RUSSIAN RADICALS of the 19th and early 20th centuries continue to attract serious scholars. The preoccupation with these radicals stems, in large measure, from an urge to understand how one group of them, against all expectations, achieved power in 1917 and has spread its influence ever since. The disorders of the 1960's and the recent eruption of terrorism around the globe have further stimulated interest in the earlier revolutionaries, on the assumption that a study of the past would yield insights into the present. Finally, these Russians, a small band of fanatics who caused the state apparatus of a huge empire to tremble, were fascinating—if not particularly admirable—individuals.

No one who reads Adam Ulam's superb book can fail to be convinced that all these considerations justify his having written another account of Russian radicalism from the 1860's through the 1880's. While Ulam shows little personal sympathy for the *dramatis personae,* he is by no means an apologist for the Tsarist autocracy. In fact, he develops his critical analysis of the political conduct of the revolutionaries within a persuasive overall interpretation of Russian history that places blame for the catastrophe of 1917 on both the government and the opposition. Ulam argues that the radicals and the authorities alike behaved irresponsibly and foolishly during their first confrontations, the consequence being the ossification of the archaic, oppressive system of rule.

Invariably, the extremist rhetoric and violence of the radicals provoked the authorities into displays of "official stupidity and savagery" (p. 254). Instead of concentrating on sensible reform of Russia's institutions, the government sought to crush the terrorists—who numbered at most several hundred people—by resorting to arbitrary measures and cruel punishment of those it apprehended. Shortly after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, the government finally succeeded in decimating the revolutionary movement, but at a high price. Official policies thoroughly alienated the educated class, which adopted an attitude of "benevolent neutrality toward subversion" (p. 319). Ulam is right in maintaining that for the monarchy, this was the beginning of the end. It was only a matter of time until the entire structure of authority, increasingly devoid of popular support, would collapse.

Ulam's main concern is to describe and analyze the motives, thoughts, and actions of the radicals. Unlike most historians of the subject, he refuses to ascribe the revolutionaries' ardor simply to idealism, the urge to eliminate the palpable evils of Russian society and establish an egalitarian order. To be sure, some were moved by noble sentiments, but Ulam shows in a series of brilliant vignettes that quite a few were incredibly naïve and silly, while several were psychopaths. Some were driven by a lust for power; others, by a quest for adventure, or by "youthful ebullience"; still others, by a "religious fervor and faith in the people."

Ulam also refuses to accept the notion that the radicals' rebelliousness was largely a reaction against tyrannical parents. He cites exam-

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ples of revolutionaries deeply devoted to their parents, whose affection and kindness they cherished throughout their adult lives. The truth is that the theory of the "generation gap" sheds as little light on the behavior of the "rebels" of the 1860's and 1870's as it does on the conduct of terrorists a century later.

In addition to vividly bringing to life the main actors of the story, Ulam succinctly describes their intricate theories—which is to be appreciated by everyone who has struggled with their verbose and often inane prose. Equally admirable are his clear descriptions of the incredibly complicated plots and counterplots involving terrorists, policemen, agents provocateurs, and double agents. Ulam knows how to write exciting history without distortion or oversimplification.

Some readers may consider Ulam's anecdotes and ironic comments flippant and unfair because they frequently cast ridicule on the radicals. But aside from being inherently amusing, they are always designed to drive home a point. What better way to demonstrate Aleksandr Dolgushin's fanaticism than with the following story: "During his more than a year in jail, his wife gave birth to a son, but Dolgushin's first words to her when they were reunited were: 'How are things in France? Is Napoleon III still alive?'" (pp. 210-11). Equally telling is the story of the Populist who had deluded himself into believing that it would not be difficult to spread socialist propaganda among the peasants. He went into the countryside and told a group of them that "after the national uprising . . . all land, woods, etc., would be the people's, to do with as they would. At this seductive prospect, one of his listeners could not contain himself: 'Oh, how wonderful when we shall redistribute land! I shall hire two workers and live like a lord!'" (p. 232).

Ulam is not the first to describe the origins of the revolutionary movement in Russia. But his fine grasp of Russian history and politics, his psychological insights, and his literary skill have enabled him to write the most readable, perceptive, and convincing book to appear on the subject.

FOR A VERY BRIEF sketch of much of the material covered by Ulam—with a somewhat novel focus—the reader might wish to turn to Vera Broido's *Apostles into Terrorists: Women and the Revolutionary Movement in the Russia of Alexander II.* Broido is too good a historian to confine herself exclusively to the role of women, as the subtitle might suggest. She knows that Ekaterina Breshkovskaya, Vera Figner, and Vera Zasulich, to mention only a few, worked in close harmony with male radicals, and that it would do violence to the historical record to write only about the exploits of women. The author offers a plausible explanation of why men readily accepted women as equals in the movement. Russia of the 1870's was an "open and fast-changing society in which the position of men was almost as insecure" as that of women. Consequently, the latter's "bid for emancipation coincided with a parallel claim by men, and [women] were welcomed as partners and as comrades-in-arms" (p. 29).

Broido's work does highlight the fact that women played a remarkable and significant role in the development of Russian radicalism. At the same time, the book would have been even more interesting if it had contained longer and more searching biographical sketches of Broido's heroines. The author might then have attempted a composite analysis of the group she studies, which would have helped us to gain a deeper understanding of why women achieved such prominence in the revolutionary movement.

IN THE RUSSIAN revolutionary tradition, as in that of Western Europe, anarchism has generally been regarded as not only the most radical but also the most violent and irresponsible tendency. Many have believed that the word "anarchist" is synonymous with "bomb-thrower." The truth is that while anarchists have been prominent in all sorts of terroristic movements, quite a few have devoted most of their energies to nothing more subversive than the writing of tracts and books on the desirability of a stateless society. Peter Kropotkin, by the 1890's the most respected expounder of anarchism, belonged to this latter category.

Reputed to be a man of great integrity, simplicity, and goodness, Kropotkin came to be revered as an "anarchist saint," whose name could always be invoked to show that political extremists were not necessarily advocates of mindless violence. Martin Miller has provided an exhaustive and balanced biography of the man, in which Kropotkin emerges not as a saint but rather as a man of independent mind with some quixotic ideas and some that can most charitably be characterized as naïve or ambivalent.

Born in 1842 into a distinguished aristocratic family, Prince Kropotkin received an excellent education and seemed destined for a brilliant career in government service. After being graduated from the prestigious Corps of Pages, Kropotkin requested a military assignment in eastern Siberia, where his firsthand experience with bureaucratic arbitrariness led him to doubt the possibility of orderly re-

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form of Russia's archaic institutions. Although he developed a strong interest in geography, a field in which he became a recognized authority, he increasingly studied social and political questions. In 1873, he turned to anarchism, and after serving two years in prison for political agitation, he escaped, fled Russia, and spent the next four decades in the West. He returned to his country in 1917 and died four years later, disappointed with the Bolsheviks for having established an authoritarian order.

Kropotkin was essentially a theorist, and Professor Miller was right to devote much of his study to an exposition and critical analysis of the anarchist's ideas. In looking at Kropotkin's views, however, it is hard not to be perplexed by the fact that they have been taken seriously and that he has enjoyed a large following, both during his own lifetime and during the recent resurgence of interest in anarchism. His basic contribution to theory was the dubious notion that among animals as well as human beings there is a far greater natural propensity for cooperation and "mutual aid" than for competition or struggle for power. Armed with this "scientific" truth, Kropotkin argued that once state authority and economic exploitation were eliminated, human beings would live harmoniously, work to the full extent of their capacities, and take for themselves only those goods they needed for a comfortable existence (pp. 173, 181–98, 250–51).

Kropotkin's views on education were only slightly less eccentric. Persuaded that professional people were not performing useful services for the masses, he recommended that "all universities, academies, and institutions of higher learning" be closed and replaced by "workshops" in which physical labor would be combined with intellectual work. Somehow, the new institutions "would eventually achieve a standard of excellence comparable to the older educational institutions" (Miller's words, p. 103). It is noteworthy that recently the Chinese Communists acknowledged the impracticality of an educational system (instituted during the Cultural Revolution) based on similar principles. The Chinese appear now to be reviving the traditional type of university.

Kropotkin has enjoyed a generally favorable press in large part because, unlike Bakunin, he never glorified violence. Yet it should be noted that he did not categorically repudiate either individual terrorism or mass violence. He tended to be ambivalent on the subject—critical of some acts of violence and favorable toward others. Time and again, he attempted to draw a distinction between individual terrorism, which seemed to him useless, and massive slaughter that erupted spontaneously during a revolution, which he thought necessary for the destruction of the old order. But on occasion he ignored the distinction. For example, he defended the assassinations of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 and of the Austrian Empress in 1898. Given his conception of revolutionary morality, this is hardly surprising: "Morality is to be understood in the sense that today's morality is founded on immorality; the abolishment of immorality, through any means, will inaugurate morality" (Miller, p. 146). Kropotkin may not have been a firebrand on the issue of violence, but clearly he cannot be considered a dove.

ONE OF THE VERY FEW anarchists ever to exercise supreme power over a relatively large region was Nestor Makhno. Released in 1917 from Butyrka Prison in Moscow, where he had served eight years for his alleged role in the murder of a policeman, Makhno returned to his native Huliai-Pole in the southern Ukraine to become the leader of a sizable army of guerrillas. For over three years he waged war—against the Germans, against the Whites, and, finally, against the Communists, who, despite temporary alliances with the anarchists, proceeded to establish a highly centralized state. In 1921, Makhno, only 32 years old, was crushed by the Communists. He fled the country and died in 1935 in Paris, a broken man.

As Michael Palij's study reveals, Makhno had a fascinating, extraordinarily bizarre career. Unlike Kropotkin, he was concerned not with theory but with the implementation of his anarchist principles. A brilliant and daring chieftain, he led his troops—often numbering over 20,000 men—to several remarkable victories. As soon as he captured a city, he would open all the prisons and destroy them. In order to secure funds, he would recklessly print money, which had the effect of exacerbating the inflation in the region he controlled. To make matters worse, each bill carried a notation that no one would be prosecuted for forging it. Not infrequently, he got drunk. On one such occasion, his wife related, he "talked very much. Wandered drunk along the street with an accordion and danced. Exchanged curses with everyone. Fell asleep after talking and dancing."[1]

Clearly, Makhno was sufficiently interesting and important to merit a full-scale study, preferably a biography. Such a work could have shed light on the chaotic situation

[1] Quoted in William Henry Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917–1921*, New York, NY, Macmillan, 1935, Vol. 2, p. 236.

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in the Ukraine during the periods of the revolution and civil war. The reviewed volume is something less. Palij obviously has done a prodigious amount of research, but he unfortunately lacks the literary skills to do justice to his topic. Too much space is devoted to general Ukrainian history, which the author succeeds in making even more complicated than it actually was. His frequent listing of prominent Ukrainians without any discussion of their accomplishments is bound to frustrate most readers. Often Palij tries to make what he considers to be a significant point with a startling banality. Thus, he supports his contention that Makhno was not a "Ukrainian nationalist patriot" by telling us that "he knew very little about Ukrainian national leaders. He referred to Hrushevs'kyi [an eminent historian] as an 'old man' though he was only 51" (p. 75). The upshot is that Makhno does not emerge from these pages as a particularly striking presence, and the significance of the events in which he participated is not made as clear as it might have been.

THE RUSSIAN revolutionary movement did not have a monopoly on radical violence and terrorism, as Walter Laqueur's erudite and comprehensive study demonstrates. Terrorism existed in ancient Palestine and 13th-century Persia, in the secret societies of India and the Far East, and it exists today in many spots on the globe. However, the author focuses on systematic terrorism, whose beginnings he traces to the second half of the 19th century, when Russian revolutionaries assaulted the Tsarist regime and groups in other lands also employed terrorist methods in the quest of political goals.

Laqueur is quite objective in his treatment of this subject, one which often evokes strong emotions. Aware of the difficulty of defining the term "terrorism" with precision, Laqueur nevertheless insists on the feasibility of studying the phenomenon. His working definition — which seems eminently sensible—is that terrorism constitutes purposeful "use of covert violence by a group for political ends" (p. 79).

Throughout, Laqueur argues that to gain a sound understanding of terrorism, one must study the phenomenon historically. There are important differences between terrorists in various eras and countries, and very few generalizations about them all are satisfactory. Ultimately, local conditions determine both the course of terrorist activities and the likelihood of their success or failure. Utilizing the historical approach, the author tells us a great deal about the aims of numerous terrorist groups—most of them active in recent years—their doctrines, the structure of their organizations, their intelligence sources, the kind of weapons they use, and, perhaps most significantly, how they finance their operations.

While Laqueur emphasizes the complexity of the motives and activities of terrorists, he does extract some useful and suggestive conclusions from the vast array of factual material he presents. For one thing, he dismisses the contention that terrorism appears "wherever people have legitimate grievances" (p. 220). In actuality, he contends, it is much more likely to thrive in permissive democratic countries than in despotic states. And in totalitarian states such as the Soviet Union and China, the government's control over the population is so pervasive and punishment of lawbreakers so swift and harsh that rarely does anyone attempt to strike at rulers. However, it is inconceivable that there do not exist in such countries at least a few hundred people so disgruntled that they would be prepared to take up violent means to bring about political change if they dared.

Laqueur also argues, as does Ulam, that it is false to assume that all terrorists are idealists and humanitarians. What is one to make of Bernadine Dohrn, a New Leftist, who uttered the following words when she heard of the brutal murder of Sharon Tate: "First they killed those pigs, then they ate dinner in the same room with them, then they even shoved a fork into a victim's stomach! Wild!"? Or of the Arab assassin who declared that he longed to drink the blood of the prime minister of Jordan after he had murdered him (p. 125)? Moreover, there are many right-wing and fascist groups, none of which could be considered humanitarian, that have been at least as adept at terror as the extremists on the left. Sadism simply cannot be dismissed as one of the motives of terrorists of whatever ideological persuasion.

The one conclusion that Laqueur draws from his data that may arouse controversy is his contention that terrorism has not been particularly effective. "There is no known case in modern history," he writes, "of a small terrorist group seizing political power" (p. 221). This is true, of course, but as Ulam showed in his study, terrorists can do much to undermine a political system. Laqueur would insist that the Russian experience was an exception, that if governments act firmly without overstepping the bounds of legality and decency, terrorism can be defeated in countries with a reasonably stable social order. The great danger is that the authorities will—as did the Tsarist regime—use excessive and unnecessary force and thus martyrize

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the terrorists, bringing them the publicity and sympathy they crave.

These sensible conclusions, based on perceptive analyses of numerous terrorist groups, make Laqueur's book extremely timely and valuable. It is to be hoped that statesmen who have to cope with terrorism will read it and the Ulam work rather than rely on books that encourage them to draw the wrong lessons from history.

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Uzbek Studies and Uzbekistan

By James Critchlow

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF UZBEKISTAN. *Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane* (Social Sciences in Uzbekistan), No. 3, 1980, Tashkent, "Fän" Publishing House.

IN CONVERSATIONS with inhabitants of Uzbekistan and other Central Asian republics, Western visitors find one predominant theme—a curiosity about what the West knows of these areas, particularly what distinguishes them from the rest of the USSR. This solipsistic preoccupation recently took the form of a special issue of the Russian-language journal *Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane* (Social Sciences in Uzbekistan), published in Tashkent by the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan. The issue is devoted almost exclusively to reviewing the work of "bourgeois" (mostly US) writers on Soviet Central Asia.

All but one of the reviewers in this special issue are senior officials in the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences. The reviews are not devoid of predictable biases and an occasional exaggeration, as in the claim that American researchers are now making "wide use" of materials published in Uzbek, although only this reviewer is mentioned in that connection (p. 44). Yet, collectively, they provide a rather comprehensive, if slightly dated, catalog of Central Asian studies in the West.

While much of the information might be of interest to rank-and-file Uzbeks and other Central Asians, the issue is clearly destined for an elite readership. For example, the print run is small—2,587 copies—and the issue is generously footnoted to works published abroad, which are available only to the privileged.

TO THE KNOWING Soviet reader of Muslim nationality, this issue contains a wealth of information that is closer to home in the context of Central Asian politics than in that of East-West confrontation. For example, the reader will learn (p. 31) that Alexandre Bennigsen has coined the phrase "mirasism" to describe defense of the local cultural heritage—or as Bennigsen is said to treat it, "the struggle of the Muslims against Russians and Russian stifling of the national culture." He will also learn (pp. 22–23) that Gregory Massell has published a book devoted to the thesis that "the emancipated Central Asian woman has, with the energy awakened in her, been a substitute for the proletariat which was lacking in Central Asia." The "not unknown Soviet-baiter" Zbigniew Brzezinski is quoted (p. 63) as having asserted that in the USSR "nationalism can be the force capable of challenging the power of the Soviets." And it is observed (p. 50) that according to Western writers, the rapid rise in birthrate in the Soviet East "will allegedly result in coming decades in a numerical advantage for 'Muslims' on an all-Union scale." The full list of authors cited is too long for inclusion here, but it contains other familiar names such as Geoffrey Wheeler, Richard Pipes, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Michael Rywkin, Hugh Seton-Watson, Edward Allworth, Stephen and Ethel Dunn, Brian Silver, Elizabeth Bacon, David Montgomery, John Armstrong, and Timur Kocaoglu. Western academic centers (mostly in America) that conduct Central Asia–related programs are also noted, as are specialized publications.

At times, Western scholarship is enlisted (in barely disguised form) on behalf of one side of contemporary internal debates. Thus, when Bennigsen is criticized for quoting the assimilationist views of "nihilist" Soviet authors of the years 1951–53 (p. 21), this serves to brand those in the USSR still harboring similar views in 1980. Also pregnant with Soviet domestic political overtones is a passage (pp. 41–42) on Sovietologists who castigate Moscow's introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet as an instance of "Russification." Various writers are quoted to the effect that for the peoples of Central Asia this "undermines the true basis of their

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culture," "isolates them from the peoples of other Eastern countries," and "sets them apart from the classical heritage written in Arabic." In ostensible—though weak—rebuttal, the journal cites a 1921 speech on orthography by the controversial Uzbek intellectual Abdurauf Fitrat, in which he pleaded neither for the Latin nor the present Cyrillic alphabet which replaced it, but for a simplified version of Arabic script.

Since language is for Uzbeks a prime ethnic symbol (witness Erkin Vahidov's recent poem of defiance "My Mother Tongue Is Undying"[1]), it is hardly surprising that they are curious about foreign familiarity with their tongue. Uzbek readers should then be fascinated to learn from this publication that language textbooks used in the US include Alo Raun's *Basic Course in Uzbek*, Andrée F. Sjoberg's *Uzbek Structural Grammar*, and Nicholas Poppe, Jr.'s *Uzbek Newspaper Reader*,[2] and that study of Uzbek in the United States is funded by the National Defense Education Act.

Another subject of Uzbek curiosity is expressed in frequent questions to visitors about the life of fellow Uzbeks, apparently believed to live in large numbers in the US. The editors of *Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane* cannot have been unaware of this in printing an article containing the disclosure that the Voice of America's Uzbek Service "gives a detailed account of how Uzbeks and other representatives of Central Asian nationalities, who have for one reason or another found themselves in the USA, observe the old customs and religious rituals . . . ."[3]

THE IMPACT of the special issue is doubtless tempered by criticisms of "bourgeois falsification." For example, the present writer is chided for referring to the intellectual heritage of the Central Asian peoples as more "Muslim" than Russian. He is reminded by an Uzbek historian (who is, inter alia, head of the Department of Kolkhoz Peasantry of her institute) that medieval figures like Avicenna and Ulugh Bek "were distinguished by freethinking," and were often in opposition to Islamic dogmas.[4] Indigenous readers may also be startled by the claim (p. 61) that Western Sovietologists dealing with Soviet Central Asia are preparing "practical" economic and political alternatives for the area.

At the same time, it is plain that the aggregate effect of publishing these reviews is to enrich knowledge of forbidden subjects on the part of Uzbek readers, the more sophisticated of whom will know how to discount transparent ideological labels. That almost any topic, no matter how politically explosive, can be dealt with in this way is demonstrated by the fact that the "traitor" Baymirza Hayit's views on "united Turkestan" are expounded at some length.[5]

If in these articles by Uzbek reviewers there is an implicit plea—and not only from an ideological viewpoint—for better understanding of their region and culture by the West, there is also recognition that this must cut both ways. In an essay on how "bourgeois Sovietology" treats Central Asia (subsequently reprinted in an Uzbek-language journal with a 200,000-plus circulation[6]), Academician Marat K. Nurmuhamedov concludes with an appeal for better mastery by his own colleagues not only of foreign languages but also of foreign professional literature in their fields.

It seems obvious that appearance of this special issue of *Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane* at the present time is in part a response to the current emphasis in the West, especially in the United States, on development of Central Asian studies. Perhaps more fundamental, it evidences the growth and strengthening in the Central Asian republics of modern national intelligentsias clustered around distinct cultural institutions, and able—within the limits of overall conformity to the prevailing ideology—to articulate their own interests. Implicit in the reviewed issue is a drive by one such intelligentsia to establish a critical dialogue with Western scholars, in which Moscow's role may be increasingly that of a bystander.

[1] Published in *Sharq yulduzi* (Tashkent), No. 7, 1978, p. 34.

[2] These three volumes were published in 1969, 1963, and 1962, respectively, in the Uralic and Altaic Series of Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN.

[3] M.M. Khayrullayev, "Study of Cultural Heritage in the USSR and Criticism of Bourgeois Falsifiers," *Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane*, No. 3, 1980, pp. 30–31.

[4] R.Kh. Aminova, "Criticism of Bourgeois Conceptions of the Solution of the Nationality Problem in the USSR," ibid., p. 50.

[5] Both Khayrullayev and Aminova discuss Hayit, as does M. Nurmuhamedov in "Against Bourgeois Sovietologists' Falsification of Our Culture," ibid., pp. 18–19, 21, 29–30, and 47.

[6] Ibid. The essay, republished in *Sharq yulduzi*, No. 7, 1980, takes to task a brother Soviet scholar for overlooking works of British writer Ann Sheehy and Turkish writer A. Inan in a book on the anti-Russian Ferghana uprisings of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

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Marxism and Culture in Italy

By Clara M. Lovett

GIUSEPPE MAMMARELLA. *L'Italia dalla caduta del fascismo ad oggi* (Italy from the Fall of Fascism to Today). Rev. ed. Bologna, Il Mulino, 1978.

NELLO AJELLO, *Intellettuali e PCI, 1944-1958* (Intellectuals and the PCI, 1944-1958). Bari, Laterza, 1979.

GIUSEPPE VACCA. *Quale democrazia? Problemi della democrazia di transizione* (What Kind of Democracy? Problems of Transitional Democracy). Bari, De Donato, 1977.

RICCARDO GUASTINI. *I due poteri. Stato borghese e stato operaio nell'analisi marxista* (The Two Powers. The Bourgeois State and the Workers' State According to Marxist Analysis). Bologna, Il Mulino, 1978.

ALESSANDRO SILJ. *Never Again Without a Rifle: The Origins of Italian Terrorism*. New York, NY, Karz Publishers, 1979.

GIUSEPPE RUGGIERI and RICCARDO ALBANI. *Cattolici comunisti?* (Communist Catholics?). Brescia, Queriniana, 1977.

ITALY-WATCHERS have paid close attention to the fortunes of the Marxist Left—especially the Italian Communist Party (PCI)—in Italy's political life. It is well known, for example, that in national elections about one third of the Italian electorate votes for the parties of the Marxist Left. The figure is higher at the local and regional levels, particularly in Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna, but more recently even in such traditional rightist strongholds as the city of Naples. It is also well known that the PCI, excluded from the Italian government since 1947, has long been the second largest party in parliament, second only to the ruling Christian Democrats (DC). Moreover, the PCI, under the leadership of Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer, has since 1973 publicly committed itself to a "historic compromise" involving participation in a coalition government with the Christian Democrats and other parties of what it calls the "constitutionalist spectrum."

Recently, with the Christian Democrats having to weather yet another governmental crisis, scholars and pundits have again indulged in much speculation about the PCI and Italy's future. Will the newly formed coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists (PSI), and two minor parties prove workable in the long run, without PCI cooperation? Will the PCI push for a new government, in which it would act as a coalition partner with either the Christian Democrats or the socialist parties in an updated version of Popular Front government? Or will the PCI, goaded by bitter criticism by former and potential supporters on its left, take advantage of the widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo and attempt a coup d'état?

In focusing on elections, political parties, and the succession of governments, however, Italy-watchers have by and large overlooked another dimension of Italian life, one that is not strictly political but that certainly has a profound impact on Italian society and may be decisive in shaping its future. This other dimension is—to use the expression of Antonio Gramsci, one of the PCI's founders—the "organization of culture" that is occurring under the leadership of Marxist parties and intellectuals.

Giorgio Galli, a distinguished and acute observer of Italian political behavior, pointed out nearly a decade ago that if some 30 percent of adult Italians voted for Marxist parties, an even larger number of Italians (40-45 percent) were associated with one or more Marxist cultural or social organizations.[1] The latter percentage has not changed; indeed, it may be higher now among women and the young. Whether or not they vote for parties of the Marxist Left, many Italians take part in cultural and social ac-

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[1] Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1970.

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tivities sponsored by those parties. They read and subscribe to such periodicals as *Rinascita, Quaderni rossi, Mondoperaio, Studi storici,* and *Il movimento di liberazione in Italia*. They attend book fairs, song festivals, and dances sponsored by the Italian Communist Youth Federation (FGCI). They attend consciousness-raising workshops, child-care seminars, and even homemaking classes sponsored by the Union of Italian Women (UDI). In such Marxist-led organizations, they find resources that are often lacking in Italian life, especially among the lower classes: social services not hamstrung by bureaucratic red tape and arrogance, outlets for grass-roots democratic participation and leadership, and, last but not least, inexpensive entertainment and education.

The extensive network of Marxist cultural and social organizations and their success in attracting members and sympathizers are a highly significant phenomenon in a country not otherwise known for the coherent organization of its civic culture, especially at the national level, or for the legitimation of mass participation in public life. Yet, with the notable exception of some anthropological studies, this phenomenon has received little attention from scholars. Hence, there is a clear need for a preliminary investigation to review the literature on the "organization of culture" in Italy from Gramsci to the present time, to isolate the most salient and recurring aspects of the phenomenon, and to develop an appropriate methodology for the study of specific components.

THE BOOKS under review provide an excellent starting point for this much-needed critical effort. The issues they discuss include the PCI's applications of the Gramscian concept of hegemony in a variety of cultural and institutional settings (Nello Ajello and Riccardo Guastini), the theoretical dimensions of the transition from bourgeois democracy to socialism (Guastini and Giuseppe Vacca), terrorism (Alessandro Silj), and the ongoing Catholic-Marxist dialogue (Giuseppe Ruggieri and Riccardo Albani). Taken together, the books provide a thought-provoking introduction to the present state of Italian society and culture.

The most general work, historian Giuseppe Mammarella's *L'Italia dalla caduta del fascismo ad oggi,* is a revised edition of the author's earlier survey of postwar Italian developments, updated to include a discussion of the 1973–76 economic crisis and the 1976 parliamentary election. Balanced in both content and interpretation, it provides a useful factual introduction to the other works, which require a substantial background in Italian political history or at least a familiarity with the literature on European Marxism.

In his *Intellettuali e PCI,* Nello Ajello, the Socialist writer and senator, cites the recollections of historian Giorgio Candeloro, formerly a PCI organizer in the Roman neighborhood of Parioli:

I came in touch with people outside my usual circle of acquaintances; I found myself before staunch grass-roots supporters [una base convinta], people who created far fewer problems than those [I had met] in the Partito d'Azione . . . . How many people have been formed by the PCI! (p. 153)[2]

Candeloro's statement is not only the personal testimony of a prominent scholar and lifelong PCI activist. It also captures the essence of the story told by Ajello and illuminates issues raised by Vacca and Guastini.

Ajello's goal ostensibly was a modest one: to reconstruct the troubled if fruitful relationship between the PCI and Italian intellectuals from 1944 to the crucial turning point of 1956–58. But even this modest goal required him to examine scores of periodicals and official documents, to interview the leading figures of postwar Italian culture, and to analyze a welter of philosophical, literary, and artistic controversies. Obviously at home with such diverse and complex material, Ajello has given us an interpretation of a major aspect of Italy's recent past that political scientists and historians have largely ignored. This aspect is the PCI's attempt, contested yet crowned by considerable success, to build a cultural hegemony in Italy. This goal, seen in a Gramscian context as essential to the more distant achievement of political hegemony, has been pursued along two lines. On the one hand, the PCI has pressured the dominant Christian Democrats and their allies to democratize existing "bourgeois" institutions—e.g., to carry out university reform, accede to the subsidized pricing of daily newspapers, and grant broader access to radio and television channels. On the other, it has built a network of new cultural institutions designed to provide an alternative to those traditionally dominated by the middle and upper classes.

Ajello's reconstruction of how the PCI's cultural strategy developed and of the major internal and external obstacles it encountered stops at 1958. One hopes for a second volume that will tell the equally rich story of the past 20 years.

[2] The Partito d'Azione was a non-Marxist, leftist party of the immediate post-World War II period; it was noted for its intellectually distinguished anti-Fascist leadership.

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GIUSEPPE VACCA devotes some attention to this same aspect of Italian life from the perspective of what he calls the "transitional democracy" of the 1970's. A political theorist and former member of the PCI Central Committee, Vacca is much more interested in the transformation of economic and political structures than in intellectuals and culture per se. Yet he, too, agrees with Candeloro and many other militants that transformations at the level of consciousness, through cultural channels, must occur before any others can be attempted. Hence his interest in the PCI's impact on "bourgeois" culture, in its efforts to raise and broaden the cultural level of the Italian masses, and above all in its redefinition of the intellectual's proper role in society.

In quite different ways, both Ajello and Vacca elicit two compelling questions which vote-counters, historians of political movements, and even the devotees of participant observation have failed thus far to ask themselves. Could it be that the revolution in consciousness advocated by Communist intellectuals ever since Gramsci is indeed well under way in Italy? And could it also be that the democratic centrism led by the Christian Democrats for the past 30 years has created nearly ideal conditions for that revolution?

The decline of the liberal intellectual tradition, already evident in Italy before the advent of Fascism in 1922, is one factor that has favored Marxist claims to cultural hegemony. In the decades immediately after World War II, Italians of all social classes who wanted secular educational and cultural institutions found that several political parties were theoretically committed to such institutions. But in practice only the PCI was able to establish something akin to a secular counterculture in opposition to a semiofficial culture committed, at least in a broad sense, to Catholic values. Thus, the PCI gained support even among people who rejected its long-range claims to political hegemony and its fundamental critique of capitalism. Indeed, one of the apparent paradoxes of postwar Italy is that many middle-class Italians found themselves supporting anti-bourgeois movements *faute de mieux*. The atmosphere of the cold war obviously limited the appeal of Marxist-oriented periodicals and cultural organizations. Nevertheless, even at the height of the cold war, support for these was certainly greater than it was for the political programs of the PCI and PSI.

In the late 1960's and on into the 1970's, changed international conditions as well as the PCI's ever more obvious independence of Moscow made it easier still for Italians who voted for the secular members of the centrist coalition to take part in Communist-sponsored cultural initiatives and even to join formal organizations. Clearly, the phenomenon is intriguing and significant, even if one can only guess its dimensions and ultimate outcome.

The confessional character of the dominant centrist party favored the PCI's attempts to become the focal point of an alternative secular culture. DC organizational structure and governing practices indirectly and unintentionally favored Communist penetration and in some cases transformation of existing "bourgeois" institutions. For, within a democratic context, a party that had close links with the Catholic hierarchy and governed through an elaborate network of such parapolitical organizations as the Christian Association of Italian Workers (ACLI) could not easily prevent its opponents from pursuing a similar strategy.

The extent to which the PCI's strategy of cultural penetration and transformation has been successful is certainly a matter for debate. Both Vacca and Guastini, however, assume that it has already significantly eroded the two main pillars of "bourgeois" culture — individualism and privatization—and laid the foundations for a new culture based on communal and collective values.

Vacca proceeds from this assumption to explore Italy's "transitional democracy," that is, a political and economic system no longer firmly anchored to bourgeois values but not yet fully committed to socialist ones. At the core of Italy's transition he sees a widespread rejection of the indirect system of popular representation typical of all Western states established in the 19th century. Other countries have dealt with that same problem by shifting some of the functions of representative assemblies either to a strong, independently elected executive or to oligarchies of technocrats. But these, Vacca argues, are inherently undemocratic solutions; hence the quest in Italy for new forms of direct representation and participation by a highly politicized citizenry.

Guastini, a sociologist and labor activist, addresses himself to the same issues but from a more theoretical perspective. His intent is to refute those fellow Marxists who advocate the violent death of the bourgeois order at the hands of militant armed minorities and also those neorevisionists who believe in the inevitable self-destruction of the bourgeois order as a result of electoral and industrial democracy. To accomplish his task, Guastini examines and reinterprets, in the light of Italian conditions, the Leninist theory of the "two powers." In the transition from a

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capitalist to a socialist society, he contends, bourgeois representative institutions and an emerging "proletarian state" based on some form of participatory democracy exist side by side for a relatively long period of time. During this period, it becomes the responsibility of revolutionary leaders to attract large segments of the middle class to their cause, thereby isolating the capitalist class proper. They must do so in the economic sphere by exposing the relations of production that alienate even the best-paid and most-skilled worker from his work and by opposing a rigid and class-bound division of labor. But they must also do so at the level of consciousness by demonstrating, for instance, the use of mass education and science in the service of a capitalist mode of production. In contrast to some of his younger colleagues and students, Guastini sees no revolution around the corner; rather, he argues that the outlines of the "second power" are just barely becoming discernible in Italy today.

ALESSANDRO SILJ's book on the left-wing terrorist groups Red Brigades (BR) and Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP) stands in sharp contrast to the sophisticated theoretical analysis of Vacca and Guastini. Silj, a journalist of Marxist background but now critical of the PCI, never quite brings off his attempt to make a convincing case for armed struggle, especially urban guerrilla warfare, in the service of a Marxist revolution. Indeed, at times he seems so taken with the revolutionaries whose profiles he has reconstructed that he forsakes analysis for something akin to hagiography. Yet his book (at least for those lucky enough to avoid the atrocious English translation) makes fascinating reading. For Silj's profiles, perhaps unintentionally, provide concrete documentation of the transformation of consciousness, of the "transition" from one set of values to another, that all the other authors under discussion regard as a key element of contemporary Italian society.

The transition can be slow and partial, as seems to have been the case for the young voters studied by Giacomo Sani.[3] Or it can be relatively rapid and total, as has been the case for Silj's subjects. But the process is the same. Whether it leads to systematic theorizing about revolution or to violence, it leads in every case to a rejection of bourgeois democracy. What accounts for this process? Biased and sloppy as they are, Silj's profiles of young men and women from very diverse backgrounds show the inadequacy of currently fashionable psychological or sociological explanations based on theories of marginality, deprivation, unresolved oedipal conflicts, and the like.

Guido Ruggieri and Riccardo Albani, both well-known journalists, have no answers for this transformation of consciousness, a phenomenon not exclusively Italian yet seemingly more advanced in Italy than in other Western industrial democracies. In their exploration of the dialectic relationship between Catholicism and Marxism, however, they open up a possible avenue for understanding. Italy, they point out, is the most important country in Western Europe in which the liberal/democratic political tradition has never found a viable degree of legitimacy among the masses. The two traditions that have found such legitimacy are the Catholic and the Marxist. Both have operated within the framework of a capitalist representative democracy for the past 30 years. Yet both are committed to the preservation of that framework only insofar as it keeps opposing traditions in check and only insofar as it allows them to develop freely and to attract supporters. For example, in the resistance to Fascism and Nazism, and then again during Italy's postwar reconstruction, the spokesmen for these two political traditions, while remaining at odds ideologically, worked toward common goals of overriding importance.

In the 1980's, this sort of situation may arise again as Italy faces an unstable international order, the energy shortage, and other major problems. Should the PCI and the DC coalesce around the formula proposed by Berlinguer in 1976 or around any other, the outcome is not likely to be the sudden, violent overthrow of the existing political and economic institutions but their transformation through a time-honored Italian process that Giuseppe Di Palma has rightly compared to "geological layering."[4] Who will ultimately occupy the core of a new "geological formation" remains to be seen. It would be difficult not to agree with Candeloro that the PCI has indeed "formed" many people for this historic task. But then again, in its own way, so has the Christian Democratic party.

[3] Giacomo Sani, "Generations of Politics in Italy," a paper presented at the Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Turin, 1977.

[4] Giuseppe Di Palma, "Italy: Transitions," a paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 1977.

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Foreign and Domestic Policy Linkage in Romania

By Mary Ellen Fischer

RONALD H. LINDEN. *Bear and Foxes: The International Relations of the East European States, 1965–1969.* Boulder, CO, East European Monographs, 1979.

SILVIU BRUCAN. *The Dialectic of World Politics.* New York, NY, The Free Press, 1978.

AUREL BRAUN. *Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965: The Political and Military Limits of Autonomy.* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1978.

ANDREAS C. TSANTIS and ROY PEPPER. *Romania: The Industrialization of an Agrarian Economy Under Socialist Planning.* Washington, DC, The World Bank, 1979.

KENNETH JOWITT, Ed. *Social Change in Romania, 1860–1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation.* Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978.

SCHOLARS who study Romania, a state known for its devotion to the Soviet model in domestic development strategy and for its deviation from Communist bloc norms in foreign policy, seldom dispute the mutual influence of domestic and foreign politics. The authors of the volumes under consideration here are no exceptions. Ronald Linden finds the "impetus" for foreign policy deviance in Eastern Europe in the domestic goals of economic development and regime stability. Silviu Brucan stresses the "national" content of ideologies and actions in foreign policy and defines the clash between international class interests and national motivations as a fundamental factor in the contemporary world. Aurel Braun searches both inside and outside Romania for factors determining the "political and military limits of autonomy," while the goal of the World Bank study is to determine the "creditworthiness" of Romania for foreign investment in the domestic economy. Finally, the contributors to the volume edited by Kenneth Jowitt focus on the "dependency" debate—the interaction of external and internal economic (and cultural) resources in a "peripheral" country and the effect of that interaction on economic (and cultural) growth.

Yet even if one acknowledges the reciprocal influence of foreign and domestic politics, the exact nature of that interaction is exceedingly complex and at times a matter of intense debate. Political leaders, to be sure, choose external and internal policies that reinforce each other whenever possible. But for outsiders, which policy is the independent and which the dependent variable often remains unclear. This is particularly true in socialist states like Romania, where interviews and pronouncements by policymakers are not merely obfuscatory but frequently nonexistent or, at best, formal repetitions of ideological priorities. Moreover, the relationship between foreign and domestic policies is not static, and both priorities and causality may vary from time to time, case to case, and location to location. Foreign policy may be the independent variable, as it is when the existence of a foreign enemy bolsters domestic support for an existing government, or, conversely, when support of an existing regime by an unpopular foreign power saps a government's legitimacy at home. But it may also be the dependent variable, as it is when a weak regime conjures up—perhaps unconsciously at first—an external threat for the purpose of strengthening its internal position. Fidel Castro did this shortly after taking power in Cuba, though the perception he fostered of the United States as an enemy soon assumed the role of an independent variable and for a time became the touchstone of Cuban foreign policy and domestic development strategy as well.

The interaction of internal and external forces, then, is not only obscure but also constantly changing. As a result, it may not be important today to ascertain

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whether the domestic development needs of the Romanian regime in the 1950's provided the impetus for the state's deviant foreign policy or whether, on the contrary, the desire for increased independence in foreign policy produced a domestic policy aimed at rapid industrialization. In the unique circumstances of the 1960's and early 1970's the two policies reinforced each other. Romanian leaders never really had to choose between foreign and domestic goals—and so clarify their priorities to observers or even to themselves. The 1980's, however, may prove quite different. The worldwide rise in petroleum prices and, more recently, the revolution in Iran have created a new problem of dependency for planners in Bucharest. By the late 1970's, it was already becoming more difficult for the Romanians to combine a strategy of rapid development with deviance in foreign policy. If they must now import higher-cost oil from the USSR, the time may not be distant when they will have to choose between autonomy and continued economic growth. Only then will their priorities for the 1980's be clear.

THE CORNERSTONE of Romanian foreign policy since World War II, of course, has been the country's relationship with the Soviet Union. Verbal interaction between the two states has constantly reaffirmed the commitment of both parties to their alliance. But almost from the outset there have also been indirect accusations of interference (from the Romanians) and of disloyalty (from the Soviets). If Romania appeared to be a model ally in the Stalin era, by the 1960's signs of Soviet-Romanian disagreement and mistrust were apparent to all. In *Bear and Foxes,* Ronald Linden uses quantitative techniques to show the extent of Romanian deviance from Warsaw Pact norms in the 1965–69 period. He studies the international *interactions* of the individual states of Eastern Europe — including Romania — with a variety of Communist, Western, and nonaligned partners by coding such events as visits, treaties, and other agreements. He also uses content analysis to examine the attitudes of the East European states on certain key issues in the late 1960's, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, and US actions in Vietnam. He finds that *interactional deviance* and *attitudinal deviance* do not always coincide. For example, interactional but not attitudinal deviance correlates with low levels of economic development. This would suggest that interactional deviance may result from "the desire of the less developed states to develop broadly and rapidly" and the lesser vulnerability of those states "to possible Soviet economic countermeasures" (pp. 164–65). When he looks at the question of energy dependence, Linden finds that states are deviant in interactions or attitudes only if they are energy sufficient, and after a detailed investigation of the data, he concludes that "energy sufficiency is apparently a necessary factor for negative deviance, though not a sufficient one" (p. 165). This conclusion does not bode well for Romanian foreign policy deviance in the 1980's, as we will see later.

Linden's study is especially impressive as an attempt to extend the analytical techniques of comparative foreign policy to the study of Communist foreign policies. In analyzing the integration of the East European region and then focusing on "the anomalous foreign policy" of Romania (p. v), he applies quantitative techniques that are painstakingly thought out and explains his propositions and results more subtly and knowledgeably than is frequently the case with such attempts. While Linden's findings more often than not support conventional preconceptions, there do emerge some correlations which, though explainable, are surprising. For example, the discovery that both interactional and attitudinal deviance are associated with states that are "internally vulnerable" (defined for Linden's purposes as "multiethnic") is not intuitively obvious but is plausibly explained by Linden as the result of the regime's "pursuit [of legitimacy] using a 'nationalized' foreign policy vis-à-vis the dominating external power" (p. 164).

Certainly, the *Romanian* leadership made use of foreign policy deviance to strengthen—perhaps even to create—its popular support. Linden sees this goal and the desire for economic development as the two main factors behind Romanian self-assertion in international politics. In his chapter on the Romanian case, he describes in detail the evolution of the Romanian position from "concern with economic sovereignty" to the "assertion of national sovereignty" (p. 193). The relationship between internal and external politics is, in Linden's view, very close. In his tables, after all, Romania ranks number one, above even Yugoslavia, for both *interactional* and *attitudinal* deviance.

A SOPHISTICATED expression of the "deviant" but official Romanian viewpoint on international politics can be found in Silviu Brucan's *The Dialectic of World Politics.* Brucan is a former Romanian ambassador to the United States and later to the United Nations, and is currently a professor of interna-

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tional relations in Bucharest. He has produced a general interpretation of world politics that is both "a product of the intellectual climate of Romania and of the growing struggle against dogmatic thinking" (p. xii). He displays in a tour de force as unique as Linden's an excellent prose style, deep acquaintance with the Western literature on international politics, and a marvelously subtle sense of humor. In contrast to many Marxists, Brucan neither denigrates nor ignores the importance of the nation. Instead, he postulates the "two essential forms of human aggregation" to be classes and ethnic communities (i.e., nations), and asserts that modern history has been distinguished by a dialectic higher than the class struggle, namely, "the seesaw of class and national motive forces in international politics" (pp. ix, 21–22). Nations, according to Brucan's schema, experience alternate periods of societal and class conflict and periods of national integration in the face of external threat. All of this fits well with Romanian Communist Party chief Nicolae Ceausescu's emphasis on the importance of the nation in the contemporary world.

Brucan admits that classes, nations, and states will "eventually disappear," but he pushes any global integration off to "a very distant future (perhaps the late twenty-first century)" (p. x). Classes and nations "display unusual vigor in contemporary societies," he notes, but he attributes this to "the dialectical phenomenon that makes social categories perish as a result of their own development" (p. x).

In the process of stressing the national as well as the class content of any policy, Brucan justifies diversity in the socialist bloc. If the ideology of American overseas expansion was different from that of the British or French, he argues, "similarly, Soviet socialist ideology differs from the Chinese, or, for that matter, from the Cuban or Romanian" (p. 26). He also supports Ceausescu's call for the dissolution of military blocs by pointing out that any ideological military pact has two functions—protection of members against an external hostile alliance, and preservation of a system of relations inside the pact. Citing former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's warnings to NATO about Eurocommunism and the Soviet reaction to the Dubcek experiment in Czechoslovakia as evidence, he concludes that "when the external threat diminishes . . . the military pact is used to restore order inside" (p. 62). Coercion for this purpose, Brucan implies, is unjustifiable.

Brucan returns to the subject of coercion when he discusses the preferred nature of the future world integrative process. Explicitly disagreeing with Amitai Etzioni's prediction that a "monoelite" union will be more successful than a "multielite" system,[1] he charges that the former would have to be imposed by coercion and that "the use of force in integration generates such intense anger and alienation that unification is inevitably delayed" (p. 97). Here is Brucan's theoretical defense of Romania's refusal to cooperate more closely in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

Turning explicitly to a discussion of CMEA, Brucan argues that further regional integration is not possible at the present time because of the asymmetry of power and uneven levels of economic development in Eastern Europe. It will become so only when both class *and* national inequalities are eliminated. In other words, when the Romanian economy catches up with the rest of Eastern Europe, and when Soviet power is either greatly reduced in relative terms or is at least tempered by a more equitable distribution of influence within the organization, then and only then will further CMEA integration be acceptable.

Romanian diplomats in the 20th century have been well known for their intellectual ability and their skills of persuasion. They modestly incorporate the beliefs and assumptions of their listeners or readers into their own arguments and thereby induce acceptance of their own priorities. In *The Dialectic of World Politics,* Brucan shows himself a worthy exponent of this tradition.

WHERE BRUCAN concentrates on theoretical underpinnings, Aurel Braun focuses much more explicitly on the content of Romanian policy, especially toward the Soviet Union. In *Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965,* he asks why Soviet leaders have not chosen to invade Romania, or, rather, how the Romanians have managed to discourage or preempt the necessity for a military intervention on the part of their superpower ally. What he discovers is a "network" of political and military defenses which has kept the Soviets from ever taking that final, violent step. The network has included barriers built by the Romanians through their own statements and actions, and also obstacles which the Soviets have created for themselves. Stated Soviet assumptions about relations among Communist states and Soviet priorities in bloc organization, for example, provide grist for the Romanian mill. As in the past, Bucharest's diplomats

[1] Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Analysis of Leaders and Forces,* New York, NY, Holt, 1965, p. 17, as cited in Brucan, p. 95.

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today are able to speak persuasively to the beliefs and assumptions of their partners.

While nothing startlingly unexpected emerges from the author's research, Braun does present an overview of Romanian-Soviet relations in the post-1965 period which pays particular attention to military factors such as Soviet and Romanian doctrine and strategy and Romanian defense capabilities. Braun assumes that the origins of Romanian-Soviet friction lay in economic causes, but he focuses his discussion on what Linden would term "enabling"—as opposed to "stimulating"—factors: ideological conformity, party unity around Ceausescu, economic and political contacts outside the Communist bloc, Soviet and Romanian legal concepts of international relations, and military loyalty without subservience. The combination of these "defenses," in Braun's view, has induced the USSR to accept Romanian deviance.

ALL OF THE STUDIES discussed thus far concentrate on Romanian-Soviet relations since World War II and treat the interaction between domestic and foreign policies as a zero-sum game in which gains for Romania in the form of political autonomy and economic development are inextricably linked together and result in direct losses for the Soviet Union in the form of reduced political and economic control. Complex as the interaction may seem at this level, the issues involved become still more difficult to define—not to say resolve—if one lays open to question the wisdom of Romanian assumptions as to Romania's own best interests. For example, one can legitimately ask whether economic autonomy from CMEA and rapid industrialization at the expense of consumption have actually been in Romania's long-run economic best interests. The rejection of CMEA integration has not resulted in a completely autarkic development strategy, but has forced the Romanians to look elsewhere for trade and investment: to the developed market economies of the European Economic Community and North America and to the developing economies of the Third World. Short-term economic results have been quite impressive, as the World Bank study by Andreas Tsantis and Roy Pepper makes clear. Future prospects, however, "will depend more and more on expanding foreign trade," these authors conclude, making Romania increasingly vulnerable to "world market oscillations" (pp. 384–90) just when the international economic situation is becoming dangerously volatile.

The tables compiled by Tsantis and Pepper on Romanian trade from 1960 to 1976 (pp. 574–77) highlight Romania's dilemma in the vital area of energy imports. By 1976, Iran was surpassed as a Romanian trading partner only by the USSR, West and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and had become firmly established as Romania's largest supplier of petroleum. The Islamic revolution in Tehran in 1979 resulted in a virtual cut-off of oil exports to Romania, and this is already having a major impact on Romanian economic prospects. If Linden is right in his assertion that energy sufficiency is a prerequisite for deviance, the cut-off will also reduce Romania's potential for choice in foreign policy. The Romanians are undoubtedly readjusting[2] and seeking to diversify their energy sources again, just as they reoriented overall trade away from CMEA in the late 1950's and early 1960's. But that was a period of massive expansion in world trade. In the 1980's it may prove difficult for the Romanians to duplicate past accomplishments despite all that they have gained economically in the interim.

The World Bank country study, in fact, concentrates not on foreign economic relations but on the transformation of the Romanian domestic economy between 1950 and 1975. The authors find that over those 25 years Romania "sustained the highest growth rate in eastern Europe and one of the highest in the world" (p. 5), and conclude that past performance and future prospects make Romania worthy of credit from foreign investors, including the World Bank. While not principally country specialists, Tsantis and Pepper assess quite perceptively, at the macroeconomic level and by economic sector, the failures and difficulties as well as the successes of the Romanian economy; yet some of their analysis de-emphasizes negative features. They do reach and substantiate positive conclusions, after all, and much of their information, as they are careful to point out, comes from official Romanian sources (published data and interviews). The strength of this study lies in the broad comparative background of the authors and also in the tremendous amount of data made available by them on Communist Romania's economic—and political—system. The volume purports to be "descriptive rather than analytical," and as such it is a valuable resource for both comparativists and Romania specialists.

[2] A new agreement between Iran and Romania was reached in the spring of 1980, but apparently not on the favorable barter terms perviously granted the Romanians by Tehran.

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ANALYSIS is certainly not lacking from the papers on dependency edited by Kenneth Jowitt. Based on a 1977 conference on social change in Romania, the volume gives students of current Romanian foreign policy and economic development strategies the perspective provided by a century of debate among Romanians over the best way to bring about social and economic change. Jowitt's own contribution is theoretical and, as always, provocative, cutting across the boundary between comparative politics and comparative communism. He contends that Romania before World War II was not a "class" society but a "status" society, characterized by "dependency," which Jowitt defines as "a consequence of the premature adoption of a political format for which the appropriate social base is lacking"—the introduction, for example, of liberal political institutions into a "status" peasant society (p. 20). In such a society, Jowitt argues, the elites could not possibly escape "dependency" without creating a new social paradigm, class orientation, which has been the main contribution of Leninism. Jowitt believes that the behavioral patterns and assumptions of a society place stringent limitations on the abilities and choices of political elites, even in foreign policy, and even when, as in prewar Romania, there was "a striking gap between the social elite and the peasantry" (p. 1).

Other chapters in the book focus directly on the classic dependency debate over the merits of "open" versus "closed" development. Daniel Chirot describes a dispute which took place in Romania during the 1920's between Stefan Zeletin, a member of the Liberal Party, which governed Romania for much of the decade, and Serban Voinea, a Social Democrat. Zeletin argued that every country must pass through certain fixed stages of development, and that the stage at which Romania found itself required closure (protective tariffs) and temporary rule by a capitalist oligarchy. Voinea, on the other hand, "rejected the theory of universal stages of development, suggested that economic closure would do more harm than good, and strongly supported the view that a creative role could be played by a genuine pluralist democracy in developing Romania" (pp. 32–33). Ironically, while Voinea's social-democratic position would seem strange to many a Marxist today, the Liberal Zeletin advocated positions strikingly similar to Romanian Communist Party policies since 1958.

Chirot's essay illustrates how closely development strategy has been related to foreign policy in Romania during the last century. In the 1920's Zeletin could assert with relief that Germany, weakened by World War I, was no longer able to retard Romania's growth by forcing the country to be a grain and petroleum supplier (p. 40); but German revival made that danger a reality in the 1930's. Bucharest's policymakers have been trying since the 1960's to prevent the USSR from reimposing a similar role on Communist Romania.

After long discussion, Chirot accepts Zeletin's arguments for closure and against the luxury of democracy. He is criticized for this by John Michael Montias, who argues in his contribution to the volume that the issue of protection is far more complicated than advocates of closed strategies recognize. Montias, who is an accomplished economist and economic historian, asserts persuasively that national strength, measured in terms of tax capacity, might have been "nurtured more effectively by allowing the domestic consumption of industrial goods to rise unimpeded by protective tariffs" (p. 55). He suggests that a "sequencing" of open and closed development strategies may be most efficient, and that the "timing" of such a sequence demands detailed information on costs and prices and supply and demand—information which can often be produced only by open debate in a democratic political system. He thus rejects Zeletin's (and Chirot's) concept of a "neoliberal" oligarchy and its "factual penumbra" (p. 69). Whether one accepts the arguments of Zeletin or Voinea, of Chirot or Montias, these chapters are worth reading. They place current CMEA and Third World debates on development strategy into broader context and demonstrate that these issues are not unique to the contemporary world order.

In the remaining essays of the Jowitt volume, Andrew Janos develops a paradigm for peripheral politics; Philippe Schmitter discusses Mihail Manoilescu as both a corporatist and an early dependency theorist; Keith Hitchins analyzes the interwar debate over the nature of Romanian ethnicity and culture in terms sometimes reminiscent of the much earlier debate in Russia between Slavophiles and Westernizers; and Virgil Nemoianu examines the interaction between Eugen Lovinescu and Western aestheticism. Hitchins and Nemoianu focus much more closely than their colleagues on the issue of cultural dependency, but overall the insights provided by the volume are quite relevant for analysts of Communist politics. Two accomplishments of the volume are of particular merit in this regard. First, it places issues of dependency *inside* the Soviet bloc firmly within the disciplinary fields of comparative politics, compara-

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tive development, and theories of dependency relating to the Third World. Second, it contributes a time dimension to debates over paths to socialism, reminding us that it was Stalinist uniformity that was the anomaly, not the present diversity of development strategies among Marxists.

WHILE CONTRIBUTORS to the Jowitt volume may question the wisdom of closure and oligarchy for Romania, so far Romanian planners have not done so, at least not in public. Romania's leaders still cling to the advantages in policy implementation provided by a highly centralized political and economic system which recognizes the authority of one individual and controls interactions with the outside world. But they must also face the consequences of past policy choices. Continued economic growth will require still greater reliance on foreign trade, and this is likely to produce increased vulnerability at a time when international markets are quite unstable. The future supply and marketability of petroleum-related industrial and finished goods, which make up a major sector of the Romanian economy, are already in doubt as the 1980's begin. And of course, there are inherent disadvantages as well as advantages to highly centralized control, as Montias has pointed out. A world economic depression or another oil crisis could increase Romania's dependence on the USSR and bring an end to the country's deviant foreign policy.

If past performance is any guide, however, the Romanians will somehow land on their feet. Their diplomatic tradition is both skillful and surprising. In early 1958, with Soviet troops still in Romania, who would have expected that the country could deviate from the Soviet line in foreign policy or that such a deviation would be led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the man who had just cooperated closely with the Soviets to put down the Hungarian uprising? Bucharest is already finding other sources of petroleum and, by exploiting Moscow's own goals and assumptions, persuading the Soviets to make deliveries despite continued Romanian deviations in foreign policy. During 1980, the Romanians have coupled their own indirect criticism of Soviet policy in Afghanistan with fervent calls for disarmament and continued détente, thus preserving common ground with the Soviets, who would like to see a return to business as usual in their relations with the United States. As long as common interests exist between Romania and the USSR, there is room for negotiation, and the Romanian record in negotiating is unsurpassed.

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